@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
(below)
+1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
+1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
@@ -1158,6 +1158,8 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
else
setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
+ boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
+
setup_graphics(boot_params);
setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
__HEAD
ENTRY(startup_32)
+ movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%esi)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
jmp preferred_addr
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_64)
* that maps our entire kernel(text+data+bss+brk), zero page
* and command line.
*/
+ movb $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
/*
* The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so
@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params)
memset(&boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image, 0,
(char *)&boot_params->efi_info -
(char *)&boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image);
- memset(&boot_params->kbd_status, 0,
+ boot_params->kbd_status = 0;
+ memset(&boot_params->_pad5, 0,
(char *)&boot_params->hdr -
- (char *)&boot_params->kbd_status);
+ (char *)&boot_params->_pad5);
memset(&boot_params->_pad7[0], 0,
(char *)&boot_params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer[0] -
(char *)&boot_params->_pad7[0]);
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
- __u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
+ __u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
/*
* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
*
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
BLANK();
OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
+ OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
+lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
-static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
- static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
- 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
-
- efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
- u8 val;
- unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
- efi_status_t status;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 0)
- return 0;
-
- status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
- NULL, &size, &val);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (val == 1)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-out_efi_err:
- switch (status) {
- case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
- return 0;
- case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
- return -EIO;
- case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
- return -EACCES;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-}
-
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -226,7 +180,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
- int secure_boot = 0;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -296,19 +250,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
- if (secure_boot > 0)
- pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-
- if (secure_boot < 0) {
- pr_efi_err(sys_table,
- "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- }
/*
- * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
- * ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
+ * Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
+ * 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
+ * boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
- if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
+ if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
+ strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Secure boot handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
+ * Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+/* BIOS variables */
+static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
+};
+static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
+ 'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
+};
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__);
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ */
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
+ unsigned long size;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ size = sizeof(secboot);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &secboot);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out_efi_err;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+
+ pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+
+out_efi_err:
+ pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+}
@@ -1477,6 +1477,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+ efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+};
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
+
/*
* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
How about the attached? Thanks, David --- commit 6788837a26d517d10d00138aadd338cc73d69237 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Mon Nov 21 23:55:55 2016 +0000 efi: Get the secure boot status Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash it somewhere that the main kernel image can find. The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a) generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>