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Tue, 10 Nov 2020 14:12:45 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 23:10:38 +0100 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2.222.g5d2a92d10f8-goog Subject: [PATCH v9 41/44] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata From: Andrey Konovalov To: Catalin Marinas X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201110_171250_191313_884B5359 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 19.58 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Marco Elver , Andrey Konovalov , Kevin Brodsky , Will Deacon , Branislav Rankov , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko , Evgenii Stepanov , Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Vincenzo Frascino , Dmitry Vyukov Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Kernel allocator code accesses metadata for slab objects, that may lie out-of-bounds of the object itself, or be accessed when an object is freed. Such accesses trigger tag faults and lead to false-positive reports with hardware tag-based KASAN. Software KASAN modes disable instrumentation for allocator code via KASAN_SANITIZE Makefile macro, and rely on kasan_enable/disable_current() annotations which are used to ignore KASAN reports. With hardware tag-based KASAN neither of those options are available, as it doesn't use compiler instrumetation, no tag faults are ignored, and MTE is disabled after the first one. Instead, reset tags when accessing metadata (currently only for SLUB). Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino Acked-by: Marco Elver Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko --- Change-Id: I39f3c4d4f29299d4fbbda039bedf230db1c746fb --- mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +++- mm/page_poison.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 24b45261e2bd..f1648aee8d88 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -1195,8 +1195,10 @@ static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages) /* s390's use of memset() could override KASAN redzones. */ kasan_disable_current(); - for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++) + for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++) { + page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i); clear_highpage(page + i); + } kasan_enable_current(); } diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c index ae0482cded87..e6c994af7518 100644 --- a/mm/page_poison.c +++ b/mm/page_poison.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void poison_page(struct page *page) /* KASAN still think the page is in-use, so skip it. */ kasan_disable_current(); - memset(addr, PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), PAGE_POISON, PAGE_SIZE); kasan_enable_current(); kunmap_atomic(addr); } diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index b30be2385d1c..df2fd5b57df1 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *ptr, { #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED /* - * When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. + * When CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS is enabled, ptr_addr might be tagged. * Normally, this doesn't cause any issues, as both set_freepointer() * and get_freepointer() are called with a pointer with the same tag. * However, there are some issues with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG code. For @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void *freelist_dereference(const struct kmem_cache *s, static inline void *get_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) { + object = kasan_reset_tag(object); return freelist_dereference(s, object + s->offset); } @@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) BUG_ON(object == fp); /* naive detection of double free or corruption */ #endif + freeptr_addr = (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)freeptr_addr); *(void **)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr(s, fp, freeptr_addr); } @@ -538,8 +540,8 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr, unsigned int length) { metadata_access_enable(); - print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, addr, - length, 1); + print_hex_dump(level, kasan_reset_tag(text), DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, + 16, 1, addr, length, 1); metadata_access_disable(); } @@ -570,7 +572,7 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, p = object + get_info_end(s); - return p + alloc; + return kasan_reset_tag(p + alloc); } static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, @@ -583,7 +585,8 @@ static void set_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned int nr_entries; metadata_access_enable(); - nr_entries = stack_trace_save(p->addrs, TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT, 3); + nr_entries = stack_trace_save(kasan_reset_tag(p->addrs), + TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT, 3); metadata_access_disable(); if (nr_entries < TRACK_ADDRS_COUNT) @@ -747,7 +750,7 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val) { - u8 *p = object; + u8 *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad); @@ -777,7 +780,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *addr = page_address(page); metadata_access_enable(); - fault = memchr_inv(start, value, bytes); + fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(start), value, bytes); metadata_access_disable(); if (!fault) return 1; @@ -873,7 +876,7 @@ static int slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page) pad = end - remainder; metadata_access_enable(); - fault = memchr_inv(pad, POISON_INUSE, remainder); + fault = memchr_inv(kasan_reset_tag(pad), POISON_INUSE, remainder); metadata_access_disable(); if (!fault) return 1; @@ -1118,7 +1121,7 @@ void setup_page_debug(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *addr) return; metadata_access_enable(); - memset(addr, POISON_INUSE, page_size(page)); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(addr), POISON_INUSE, page_size(page)); metadata_access_disable(); } @@ -1566,10 +1569,10 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch * the redzone. */ - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size); rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0; - memset((char *)object + s->inuse, 0, + memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(object) + s->inuse, 0, s->size - s->inuse - rsize); } @@ -2883,10 +2886,10 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); } - maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object); + maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, kasan_reset_tag(object)); if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object) - memset(object, 0, s->object_size); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size); slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object);