From patchwork Thu Nov 12 19:40:08 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 11901359 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B9F114C0 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:41:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66EC32224E for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:41:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ZBj/D/N8" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726977AbgKLTlX (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:41:23 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:41128 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726904AbgKLTlS (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:41:18 -0500 Received: from sol.attlocal.net (172-10-235-113.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [172.10.235.113]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1100B2224E; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:41:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605210077; bh=EpTOUMK7soZkOK8vZ0A/yHscVNF48u8n7ipbwwBUoDM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ZBj/D/N8Do7E7sKE5B0XFc5XxtHy4KmvlBE8rU7h9G1uppsUB4b5y3uZSBORgvEeK u8a7vbluAlnmnU1Jbftf7sGikXCDl0yYlewiHsU/S0PsNeVMpmvWquXz8B5HfzNZBC QATU8rwzfnSOxOkhjL6fZFEfpp7KnLF1p7Cwg95w= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Satya Tangirala , Ulf Hansson , Andy Gross , Bjorn Andersson , Adrian Hunter , Ritesh Harjani , Asutosh Das , Rob Herring , Neeraj Soni , Barani Muthukumaran , Peng Zhou , Stanley Chu , Konrad Dybcio Subject: [PATCH 5/8] firmware: qcom_scm: update comment for ICE-related functions Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 11:40:08 -0800 Message-Id: <20201112194011.103774-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20201112194011.103774-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20201112194011.103774-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers The SCM calls QCOM_SCM_ES_INVALIDATE_ICE_KEY and QCOM_SCM_ES_CONFIG_SET_ICE_KEY are also needed for eMMC inline encryption support, not just for UFS. Update the comments accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c b/drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c index 7be48c1bec96d..f57779fc7ee93 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom_scm.c @@ -965,8 +965,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(qcom_scm_ice_available); * qcom_scm_ice_invalidate_key() - Invalidate an inline encryption key * @index: the keyslot to invalidate * - * The UFSHCI standard defines a standard way to do this, but it doesn't work on - * these SoCs; only this SCM call does. + * The UFSHCI and eMMC standards define a standard way to do this, but it + * doesn't work on these SoCs; only this SCM call does. + * + * It is assumed that the SoC has only one ICE instance being used, as this SCM + * call doesn't specify which ICE instance the keyslot belongs to. * * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure. */ @@ -995,10 +998,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(qcom_scm_ice_invalidate_key); * units, e.g. 1 = 512 bytes, 8 = 4096 bytes, etc. * * Program a key into a keyslot of Qualcomm ICE (Inline Crypto Engine), where it - * can then be used to encrypt/decrypt UFS I/O requests inline. + * can then be used to encrypt/decrypt UFS or eMMC I/O requests inline. + * + * The UFSHCI and eMMC standards define a standard way to do this, but it + * doesn't work on these SoCs; only this SCM call does. * - * The UFSHCI standard defines a standard way to do this, but it doesn't work on - * these SoCs; only this SCM call does. + * It is assumed that the SoC has only one ICE instance being used, as this SCM + * call doesn't specify which ICE instance the keyslot belongs to. * * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure. */