| Message ID | 20190606080106.10640-1-jthumshirn@suse.de (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | btrfs: correctly validate compression type | expand |
On 6.06.19 г. 11:01 ч., Johannes Thumshirn wrote: > Nikolay reported the following KASAN splat when running btrfs/048: > > [ 1843.470920] ================================================================== > [ 1843.471971] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.472775] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111e369e2 by task btrfs/3979 > > [ 1843.473904] CPU: 3 PID: 3979 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-default #536 > [ 1843.475009] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 > [ 1843.476322] Call Trace: > [ 1843.476674] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb > [ 1843.477132] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.477587] print_address_description+0x114/0x320 > [ 1843.478256] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.478740] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.479185] __kasan_report+0x14e/0x192 > [ 1843.479759] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.480209] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 > [ 1843.480679] strncmp+0x66/0xb0 > [ 1843.481105] prop_compression_validate+0x24/0x70 > [ 1843.481798] btrfs_xattr_handler_set_prop+0x65/0x160 > [ 1843.482509] __vfs_setxattr+0x71/0x90 > [ 1843.483012] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x84/0x130 > [ 1843.483606] vfs_setxattr+0xac/0xb0 > [ 1843.484085] setxattr+0x18c/0x230 > [ 1843.484546] ? vfs_setxattr+0xb0/0xb0 > [ 1843.485048] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xa0 > [ 1843.485672] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 > [ 1843.486233] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x988/0x1290 > [ 1843.486823] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 > [ 1843.487330] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 > [ 1843.487842] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 > [ 1843.488442] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x22/0x40 > [ 1843.489089] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0xe/0x70 > [ 1843.489707] ? __sb_start_write+0x158/0x200 > [ 1843.490278] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 > [ 1843.490855] ? __mnt_want_write+0x98/0xe0 > [ 1843.491397] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 > [ 1843.492201] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c > [ 1843.493201] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 > [ 1843.493988] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > [ 1843.495041] RIP: 0033:0x7fa7a8a7707a > [ 1843.495819] Code: 48 8b 0d 21 de 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 be 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ee dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 > [ 1843.499203] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb73bca38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000be > [ 1843.500210] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RCX: 00007fa7a8a7707a > [ 1843.501170] RDX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RSI: 00000000006dc050 RDI: 0000000000000003 > [ 1843.502152] RBP: 00000000006dc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 > [ 1843.503109] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcb73bda91 > [ 1843.504055] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007ffcb73bda82 R15: ffffffffffffffff > > [ 1843.505268] Allocated by task 3979: > [ 1843.505771] save_stack+0x19/0x80 > [ 1843.506211] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.5+0xa0/0xd0 > [ 1843.506836] setxattr+0xeb/0x230 > [ 1843.507264] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 > [ 1843.507886] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 > [ 1843.508429] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe > > [ 1843.509558] Freed by task 0: > [ 1843.510188] (stack is not available) > > [ 1843.511309] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111e369e0 > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 > [ 1843.514095] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of > 8-byte region [ffff888111e369e0, ffff888111e369e8) > [ 1843.516524] The buggy address belongs to the page: > [ 1843.517561] page:ffff88813f478d80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88811940c300 index:0xffff888111e373b8 compound_mapcount: 0 > [ 1843.519993] flags: 0x4404000010200(slab|head) > [ 1843.520951] raw: 0004404000010200 ffff88813f48b008 ffff888119403d50 ffff88811940c300 > [ 1843.522616] raw: ffff888111e373b8 000000000016000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 > [ 1843.524281] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected > > [ 1843.525936] Memory state around the buggy address: > [ 1843.526975] ffff888111e36880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > [ 1843.528479] ffff888111e36900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > [ 1843.530138] >ffff888111e36980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc > [ 1843.531877] ^ > [ 1843.533287] ffff888111e36a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > [ 1843.534874] ffff888111e36a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > [ 1843.536468] ================================================================== > > This is caused by supplying a too short compression value ('lz') in the > test-case and comparing it to 'lzo' with strncmp() and a length of 3. > strncmp() read past the 'lz' when looking for the 'o' and thus caused an > out-of-bounds read. > > Introduce a new check 'btrfs_compress_is_valid_type()' which not only > checks the user-supplied value against known compression types, but also > employs checks for too short values. > > Fixes: 272e5326c783 ("btrfs: prop: fix vanished compression property after failed set") > Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> > Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> > --- > fs/btrfs/compression.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > fs/btrfs/compression.h | 1 + > fs/btrfs/props.c | 6 +----- > 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.c b/fs/btrfs/compression.c > index 66e21a4e9ea2..d21ae92c172c 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.c > @@ -43,6 +43,22 @@ const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type) > return NULL; > } > > +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(btrfs_compress_types); i++) { > + size_t comp_len = strlen(btrfs_compress_types[i]); > + > + if (comp_len != len) > + continue; > + > + if (!strncmp(btrfs_compress_types[i], str, comp_len)) > + return true; > + } > + return false; > +} > + > static int btrfs_decompress_bio(struct compressed_bio *cb); > > static inline int compressed_bio_size(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.h b/fs/btrfs/compression.h > index 191e5f4e3523..2035b8eb1290 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.h > +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.h > @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_lzo_compress; > extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_zstd_compress; > > const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type); > +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len); > > int btrfs_compress_heuristic(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end); > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/props.c b/fs/btrfs/props.c > index a9e2e66152ee..af109c0ba720 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/props.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/props.c > @@ -257,11 +257,7 @@ static int prop_compression_validate(const char *value, size_t len) > if (!value) > return 0; > > - if (!strncmp("lzo", value, 3)) > - return 0; > - else if (!strncmp("zlib", value, 4)) > - return 0; > - else if (!strncmp("zstd", value, 4)) > + if (btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(value, len)) > return 0; > > return -EINVAL; >
On 2019/06/06 17:01, Johannes Thumshirn wrote: > Nikolay reported the following KASAN splat when running btrfs/048: > (snip) > > This is caused by supplying a too short compression value ('lz') in the > test-case and comparing it to 'lzo' with strncmp() and a length of 3. > strncmp() read past the 'lz' when looking for the 'o' and thus caused an > out-of-bounds read. > > Introduce a new check 'btrfs_compress_is_valid_type()' which not only > checks the user-supplied value against known compression types, but also > employs checks for too short values. > > Fixes: 272e5326c783 ("btrfs: prop: fix vanished compression property after failed set") > Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> > Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> > --- > fs/btrfs/compression.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > fs/btrfs/compression.h | 1 + > fs/btrfs/props.c | 6 +----- > 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.c b/fs/btrfs/compression.c > index 66e21a4e9ea2..d21ae92c172c 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.c > @@ -43,6 +43,22 @@ const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type) > return NULL; > } > > +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(btrfs_compress_types); i++) { > + size_t comp_len = strlen(btrfs_compress_types[i]); > + > + if (comp_len != len) Should this be "if (comp_len > len)"? a7164fa4e055 ("btrfs: prepare for extensions in compression options") allowed compression property to have compression options. If we have the options, we will have "len" larger than "comp_len". > + continue; > + > + if (!strncmp(btrfs_compress_types[i], str, comp_len)) > + return true; > + } > + return false; > +} > + > static int btrfs_decompress_bio(struct compressed_bio *cb); > > static inline int compressed_bio_size(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.h b/fs/btrfs/compression.h > index 191e5f4e3523..2035b8eb1290 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.h > +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.h > @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_lzo_compress; > extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_zstd_compress; > > const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type); > +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len); > > int btrfs_compress_heuristic(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end); > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/props.c b/fs/btrfs/props.c > index a9e2e66152ee..af109c0ba720 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/props.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/props.c > @@ -257,11 +257,7 @@ static int prop_compression_validate(const char *value, size_t len) > if (!value) > return 0; > > - if (!strncmp("lzo", value, 3)) > - return 0; > - else if (!strncmp("zlib", value, 4)) > - return 0; > - else if (!strncmp("zstd", value, 4)) > + if (btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(value, len)) > return 0; > > return -EINVAL; >
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 08:43:34AM +0000, Naohiro Aota wrote: [...] > > +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len) > > +{ > > + int i; > > + > > + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(btrfs_compress_types); i++) { > > + size_t comp_len = strlen(btrfs_compress_types[i]); > > + > > + if (comp_len != len) > > Should this be "if (comp_len > len)"? I thought about this as well and essentiall it is 'comp_len > len' as the strncmp() later compares up to comp_len anyways. But your're rigth it'll fail on values like "zlib:9". Thanks, Johannes
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.c b/fs/btrfs/compression.c index 66e21a4e9ea2..d21ae92c172c 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.c @@ -43,6 +43,22 @@ const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type) return NULL; } +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(btrfs_compress_types); i++) { + size_t comp_len = strlen(btrfs_compress_types[i]); + + if (comp_len != len) + continue; + + if (!strncmp(btrfs_compress_types[i], str, comp_len)) + return true; + } + return false; +} + static int btrfs_decompress_bio(struct compressed_bio *cb); static inline int compressed_bio_size(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, diff --git a/fs/btrfs/compression.h b/fs/btrfs/compression.h index 191e5f4e3523..2035b8eb1290 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/compression.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/compression.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_lzo_compress; extern const struct btrfs_compress_op btrfs_zstd_compress; const char* btrfs_compress_type2str(enum btrfs_compression_type type); +bool btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(const char *str, size_t len); int btrfs_compress_heuristic(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/props.c b/fs/btrfs/props.c index a9e2e66152ee..af109c0ba720 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/props.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/props.c @@ -257,11 +257,7 @@ static int prop_compression_validate(const char *value, size_t len) if (!value) return 0; - if (!strncmp("lzo", value, 3)) - return 0; - else if (!strncmp("zlib", value, 4)) - return 0; - else if (!strncmp("zstd", value, 4)) + if (btrfs_compress_is_valid_type(value, len)) return 0; return -EINVAL;
Nikolay reported the following KASAN splat when running btrfs/048: [ 1843.470920] ================================================================== [ 1843.471971] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.472775] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111e369e2 by task btrfs/3979 [ 1843.473904] CPU: 3 PID: 3979 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-default #536 [ 1843.475009] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 1843.476322] Call Trace: [ 1843.476674] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 1843.477132] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.477587] print_address_description+0x114/0x320 [ 1843.478256] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.478740] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.479185] __kasan_report+0x14e/0x192 [ 1843.479759] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.480209] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 1843.480679] strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.481105] prop_compression_validate+0x24/0x70 [ 1843.481798] btrfs_xattr_handler_set_prop+0x65/0x160 [ 1843.482509] __vfs_setxattr+0x71/0x90 [ 1843.483012] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x84/0x130 [ 1843.483606] vfs_setxattr+0xac/0xb0 [ 1843.484085] setxattr+0x18c/0x230 [ 1843.484546] ? vfs_setxattr+0xb0/0xb0 [ 1843.485048] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xa0 [ 1843.485672] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 [ 1843.486233] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x988/0x1290 [ 1843.486823] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 [ 1843.487330] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 [ 1843.487842] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 [ 1843.488442] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x22/0x40 [ 1843.489089] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0xe/0x70 [ 1843.489707] ? __sb_start_write+0x158/0x200 [ 1843.490278] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 [ 1843.490855] ? __mnt_want_write+0x98/0xe0 [ 1843.491397] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 [ 1843.492201] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 1843.493201] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 [ 1843.493988] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 1843.495041] RIP: 0033:0x7fa7a8a7707a [ 1843.495819] Code: 48 8b 0d 21 de 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 be 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ee dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 1843.499203] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb73bca38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000be [ 1843.500210] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RCX: 00007fa7a8a7707a [ 1843.501170] RDX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RSI: 00000000006dc050 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1843.502152] RBP: 00000000006dc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1843.503109] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcb73bda91 [ 1843.504055] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007ffcb73bda82 R15: ffffffffffffffff [ 1843.505268] Allocated by task 3979: [ 1843.505771] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 1843.506211] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.5+0xa0/0xd0 [ 1843.506836] setxattr+0xeb/0x230 [ 1843.507264] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 [ 1843.507886] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 [ 1843.508429] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 1843.509558] Freed by task 0: [ 1843.510188] (stack is not available) [ 1843.511309] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111e369e0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 [ 1843.514095] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of 8-byte region [ffff888111e369e0, ffff888111e369e8) [ 1843.516524] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 1843.517561] page:ffff88813f478d80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88811940c300 index:0xffff888111e373b8 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 1843.519993] flags: 0x4404000010200(slab|head) [ 1843.520951] raw: 0004404000010200 ffff88813f48b008 ffff888119403d50 ffff88811940c300 [ 1843.522616] raw: ffff888111e373b8 000000000016000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1843.524281] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 1843.525936] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1843.526975] ffff888111e36880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.528479] ffff888111e36900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.530138] >ffff888111e36980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc [ 1843.531877] ^ [ 1843.533287] ffff888111e36a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.534874] ffff888111e36a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.536468] ================================================================== This is caused by supplying a too short compression value ('lz') in the test-case and comparing it to 'lzo' with strncmp() and a length of 3. strncmp() read past the 'lz' when looking for the 'o' and thus caused an out-of-bounds read. Introduce a new check 'btrfs_compress_is_valid_type()' which not only checks the user-supplied value against known compression types, but also employs checks for too short values. Fixes: 272e5326c783 ("btrfs: prop: fix vanished compression property after failed set") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> --- fs/btrfs/compression.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/compression.h | 1 + fs/btrfs/props.c | 6 +----- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)