From patchwork Tue Aug 8 17:08:05 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sweet Tea Dorminy X-Patchwork-Id: 13346799 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4135DC001DB for ; Tue, 8 Aug 2023 18:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231405AbjHHSyY (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Aug 2023 14:54:24 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49264 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231771AbjHHSyC (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Aug 2023 14:54:02 -0400 Received: from box.fidei.email (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9042563496; Tue, 8 Aug 2023 10:08:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from authenticated-user (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by box.fidei.email (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6FB5683545; Tue, 8 Aug 2023 13:08:23 -0400 (EDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=dorminy.me; s=mail; t=1691514503; bh=hdt5Oxh1/yha851knbsYCyjKyvmap3vWBAAm6xQtpeU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SThpj4J7KsjXb2OsnN1MSHv38Ssz365awdlZOjWB05HraW6GpzG6XdGlpAZPh1OY2 vcqDsMJGdfxpWQSxzfhgVw5KVn92lECigKpGZtYm/giuXgP2FudkawNJo3MzvQuf2+ lc66nYYF6Odm45u3LmSGTun+5c4SZX0yKxh4QT/4Pj8hRleUJaFcMJQTnD6sklL92F uNtjM1G2zYxL1aOHPHST1RpcupfK7qlHZSPYl6/zgVaiDkh3gkUHNY8srFRkdmJA0Q iMZhwPmhkWmxwkh++23/ENb4io5OYZl9V3MfTFD066CvqcWtRHik8LeY0f5o6Jh2Lw RNCy4M7HyUX/w== From: Sweet Tea Dorminy To: Chris Mason , Josef Bacik , David Sterba , "Theodore Y . Ts'o" , Jaegeuk Kim , kernel-team@meta.com, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers Cc: Sweet Tea Dorminy Subject: [PATCH v6 5/8] fscrypt: reduce special-casing of IV_INO_LBLK_32 Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 13:08:05 -0400 Message-ID: <542ea134771e2caa3043dfe48c2825d93495c626.1691505830.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Right now, the IV_INO_LBLK_32 policy is handled by its own function called in fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(), different from all other policies which just call find_mode_prepared_key() with various parameters. The function additionally sets up the relevant inode hashing key in the master key, and uses it to hash the inode number if possible. This is not particularly relevant to setting up a prepared key, so this change tries to make it clear that every non-default policy uses basically the same setup mechanism for its prepared key. The other setup is moved to be called from the top crypt_info setup function. Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy --- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 430e2455ea2d..8b201b91c036 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -302,44 +302,30 @@ void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_info *ci, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); } -static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, - struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +static int fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { int err; - err = find_mode_prepared_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys, - HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, true); - if (err) - return err; - /* pairs with smp_store_release() below */ - if (!smp_load_acquire(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized)) { + if (smp_load_acquire(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized)) + return 0; - mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); + mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - if (mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized) - goto unlock; + if (mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized) + goto unlock; - err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, - HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY, - NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); - if (err) - goto unlock; - /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */ - smp_store_release(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized, true); + err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, + HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY, + NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); + if (err) + goto unlock; + /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */ + smp_store_release(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized, true); unlock: - mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - if (err) - return err; - } + mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - /* - * New inodes may not have an inode number assigned yet. - * Hashing their inode number is delayed until later. - */ - if (ci->ci_inode->i_ino) - fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, mk); - return 0; + return err; } static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, @@ -371,7 +357,9 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, true); } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) { - err = fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(ci, mk); + err = find_mode_prepared_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys, + HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, + true); } else { u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; @@ -629,6 +617,20 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, goto out; } + /* + * The IV_INO_LBLK_32 policy needs a hashed inode number, but new + * inodes may not have an inode number assigned yet. + */ + if (policy->version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 && + (policy->v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) { + res = fscrypt_setup_ino_hash_key(mk); + if (res) + goto out; + + if (inode->i_ino) + fscrypt_hash_inode_number(crypt_info, mk); + } + /* * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info. * So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in