From patchwork Wed Nov 6 11:50:46 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Filipe Manana X-Patchwork-Id: 13864546 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7D451F667B for ; Wed, 6 Nov 2024 11:50:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730893852; cv=none; b=WS6qcoXhGVlHcroaW6dJnbLAgvWHWdELB9nyAj+cSw6hbNuBtUurH1kPzlttp7GR01NT6RJqUWQUl8nGTVzTF4Vfojxzlfeu/yExUthh2iEduFBvr4fBr+RgcvTFt2jZIN8Tw2XyMuVlMv1/3ugt9ueU9OnvBA9cSzgOnvSIN08= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730893852; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IpZix5SK0DnjLf2Ro0Ml/0QOF1RTYQQ7MppGLlMuk44=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Qd/fGifbaa6GftiIxar1i3IGdZ54se89dUzEliAwD0SOP++evsfCoWF75w4jgYwgjpErxBHeDCqL4+xdF+r8hn1SiLp5DDCWmmCG041dBnjF0d7ZqFC1kABm0JQP2EfeIx+58zQfkPpUuj+Hyx6cNAW3zHF02eKROo10sUa59bw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=BTmDJjou; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="BTmDJjou" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CA218C4CED4 for ; Wed, 6 Nov 2024 11:50:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1730893852; bh=IpZix5SK0DnjLf2Ro0Ml/0QOF1RTYQQ7MppGLlMuk44=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BTmDJjouE7Ts7okjcPG/yewStX0DjBO0lOPWSzuHP6QrFUgA7NLfzvIo6tDA6D3/T +JBqqtOMPkhNXw6a3+dJO7sjhBb0f05bi/RVJIne6PtVg2JtG1JncATTLlNKTabRdZ rCNdveSKju6cnIbvmjo5aPr+O3BgjMbcd5e8oq2ZAOYQUaYKrnkYcp3JjYcVc+LXdm ZkGC08BqZF42F13bhFkOtjNcQJRGQjKbBVZhjNw0TVDWP7QSJO9YLd8jTOYRpCWzPg aFwB/Bl5vS/V1AMQQjFYkwNU5KFxfmIHC4i+JWBk/oaAqmYjgBRsYNWZkL9EL73E/6 /Zs1K5vcoPT7A== From: fdmanana@kernel.org To: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/2] btrfs: send: check for read-only send root under critical section Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 11:50:46 +0000 Message-Id: <9d93c7970de221d5045212aa4be5200aa271e081.1730892928.git.fdmanana@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Filipe Manana We're checking if the send root is read-only without being under the protection of the root's root_item_lock spinlock, which is what protects the root's flags when clearing the read-only flag, done at btrfs_ioctl_subvol_setflags(). Furthermore, it should be done in the same critical section that increments the root's send_in_progress counter, as btrfs_ioctl_subvol_setflags() clears the read-only flag in the same critical section that checks the counter's value. So fix this by moving the read-only check under the critical section delimited by the root's root_item_lock which also increments the root's send_in_progress counter. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana --- fs/btrfs/send.c | 16 ++++++---------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index 3fcc8113641d..7254279c3cc9 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -8133,7 +8133,12 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct btrfs_inode *inode, const struct btrfs_ioctl_send_a spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock); return -EPERM; } - if (btrfs_root_readonly(send_root) && send_root->dedupe_in_progress) { + /* Userspace tools do the checks and warn the user if it's not RO. */ + if (!btrfs_root_readonly(send_root)) { + spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock); + return -EPERM; + } + if (send_root->dedupe_in_progress) { dedupe_in_progress_warn(send_root); spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock); return -EAGAIN; @@ -8141,15 +8146,6 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct btrfs_inode *inode, const struct btrfs_ioctl_send_a send_root->send_in_progress++; spin_unlock(&send_root->root_item_lock); - /* - * Userspace tools do the checks and warn the user if it's - * not RO. - */ - if (!btrfs_root_readonly(send_root)) { - ret = -EPERM; - goto out; - } - /* * Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request * clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside