| Message ID | 20200616154311.12314-2-longman@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
| Headers | show |
| Series | mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() | expand |
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index 9e72ba224175..37d48a56431d 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@ void kzfree(const void *p) if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem))) return; ks = ksize(mem); - memset(mem, 0, ks); + memzero_explicit(mem, ks); kfree(mem); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back to the pool. Memset() is currently used for buffer clearing. However unlikely, there is still a non-zero probability that the compiler may choose to optimize away the memory clearing especially if LTO is being used in the future. To make sure that this optimization will never happen, memzero_explicit(), which is introduced in v3.18, is now used in kzfree() to future-proof it. Fixes: 3ef0e5ba4673 ("slab: introduce kzfree()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> --- mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)