From patchwork Fri May 21 10:20:53 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ard Biesheuvel X-Patchwork-Id: 12272791 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95B0FC43461 for ; Fri, 21 May 2021 10:21:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76E5D613BD for ; Fri, 21 May 2021 10:21:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231908AbhEUKWk (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 May 2021 06:22:40 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59222 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234454AbhEUKWh (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 May 2021 06:22:37 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90CC9613BE; Fri, 21 May 2021 10:21:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1621592475; bh=BENSWZ9IGinJ9DApFd7Een4c2HMopl9cTHAw0uG/+Bw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SKjnEzPvyqwhbN/cZtdnnnrKxdbBBwZ5q0FRKvfHc1+hvgwe31+w5jxwzSe0uDrcR oAQBbIC9CBtGj45/oN4xiENq2qx87BG2zlsh7XMzYS0aXzJJ6px1XI/UpgvvHkSyGK OX1F4YEmUW4kE1MaZNXRcyOTs+fONR0AmBSwHm0ZTgi8Rfk4vVpaHsCRImCQZkmFX8 8rxr743gRGhy2Xw92fkaDdE52oGVygLu8ONxWjhMREqIz9PG4bRZ74duZIfZEHp+UM ZTy+imvT939Tj0oLd84BZ5NRavraLmsJrB2FpkgyywpFsgNJ8Mj+ZjTnTI/PDy2QRh xgc6GygPvhEvg== From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, ebiggers@kernel.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, will@kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com, Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - avoid by-ref argument for ce_aes_ccm_auth_data Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 12:20:53 +0200 Message-Id: <20210521102053.66609-6-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20210521102053.66609-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20210521102053.66609-1-ardb@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org With the SIMD code path removed, we can clean up the CCM auth-only path a bit further, by passing the 'macp' input buffer pointer by value, rather than by reference, and taking the output value from the function's return value. This way, the compiler is no longer forced to allocate macp on the stack. This is not expected to make any difference in practice, it just makes for slightly cleaner code. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S | 23 ++++++++++---------- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 17 +++++---------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S index 8adff299fcd3..b03f7f71f893 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S @@ -12,22 +12,21 @@ .arch armv8-a+crypto /* - * void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, - * u32 *macp, u8 const rk[], u32 rounds); + * u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, + * u32 macp, u8 const rk[], u32 rounds); */ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) - ldr w8, [x3] /* leftover from prev round? */ ld1 {v0.16b}, [x0] /* load mac */ - cbz w8, 1f - sub w8, w8, #16 + cbz w3, 1f + sub w3, w3, #16 eor v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b 0: ldrb w7, [x1], #1 /* get 1 byte of input */ subs w2, w2, #1 - add w8, w8, #1 + add w3, w3, #1 ins v1.b[0], w7 ext v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b, #1 /* rotate in the input bytes */ beq 8f /* out of input? */ - cbnz w8, 0b + cbnz w3, 0b eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b 1: ld1 {v3.4s}, [x4] /* load first round key */ prfm pldl1strm, [x1] @@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) beq 10f adds w2, w2, #16 beq 10f - mov w8, w2 + mov w3, w2 7: ldrb w7, [x1], #1 umov w6, v0.b[0] eor w6, w6, w7 @@ -71,15 +70,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) beq 10f ext v0.16b, v0.16b, v0.16b, #1 /* rotate out the mac bytes */ b 7b -8: cbz w8, 91f - mov w7, w8 - add w8, w8, #16 +8: cbz w3, 91f + mov w7, w3 + add w3, w3, #16 9: ext v1.16b, v1.16b, v1.16b, #1 adds w7, w7, #1 bne 9b 91: eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b st1 {v0.16b}, [x0] -10: str w8, [x3] +10: mov w0, w3 ret SYM_FUNC_END(ce_aes_ccm_auth_data) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c index 8effd18429ac..d4e87b4e348f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx) return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4; } -asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, - u32 *macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds); +asmlinkage u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, + u32 macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds); asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[], @@ -96,13 +96,6 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen) return 0; } -static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], - u32 abytes, u32 *macp) -{ - ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc, - num_rounds(key)); -} - static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) { struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); @@ -122,7 +115,8 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) ltag.len = 6; } - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp); + macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, macp, + ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); do { @@ -134,7 +128,8 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len); } p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp); + macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, p, n, macp, ctx->key_enc, + num_rounds(ctx)); len -= n; scatterwalk_unmap(p);