diff mbox series

[2/4] X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA

Message ID 20220301173651.3435350-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series Add CA enforcement in the machine keyring | expand

Commit Message

Eric Snowberg March 1, 2022, 5:36 p.m. UTC
Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.

BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
        cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
        pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }

If the CA is true, store it in a new public_key field call key_is_ca.
This will be used in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the
public key is a CA.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
 include/crypto/public_key.h               | 1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

Comments

Stefan Berger March 4, 2022, 3:10 p.m. UTC | #1
On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
> identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.
>
> BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
>          cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
>          pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
>
> If the CA is true, store it in a new public_key field call key_is_ca.
> This will be used in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the
> public key is a CA.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> ---
>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
>   include/crypto/public_key.h               | 1 +
>   2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index 2899ed80bb18..38c907f4ce27 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -583,6 +583,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>   		return 0;
>   	}
>   
> +	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {

Don't you have to check whether you can access v[0] and v[1]?

if (vlen < 3)

     return -EBADMSG;

or should it even be

if (vlen != 3)

      return -EBADMSG;


> +		if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
> +			return -EBADMSG;
> +		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
> +			return -EBADMSG;
> +		if (v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
> +			ctx->cert->pub->key_is_ca = true;
> +	}
> +
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 6d61695e1cde..0521241764b7 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ struct public_key {
>   	void *params;
>   	u32 paramlen;
>   	bool key_is_private;
> +	bool key_is_ca;
>   	const char *id_type;
>   	const char *pkey_algo;
>   };
Eric Snowberg March 7, 2022, 6:02 p.m. UTC | #2
> On Mar 4, 2022, at 8:10 AM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Parse the X.509 Basic Constraints.  The basic constraints extension
>> identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA.
>> 
>> BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
>>         cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
>>         pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
>> 
>> If the CA is true, store it in a new public_key field call key_is_ca.
>> This will be used in a follow on patch that requires knowing if the
>> public key is a CA.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> ---
>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 9 +++++++++
>>  include/crypto/public_key.h               | 1 +
>>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> index 2899ed80bb18..38c907f4ce27 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> @@ -583,6 +583,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>  		return 0;
>>  	}
>>  +	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
> 
> Don't you have to check whether you can access v[0] and v[1]?

Good catch, I’ll add the check

> if (vlen < 3)
> 
>     return -EBADMSG;

I think this would be best

> or should it even be
> 
> if (vlen != 3)
> 
>      return -EBADMSG;

since the length could be larger than 3 if the optional pathLenConstraint
is supplied.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 2899ed80bb18..38c907f4ce27 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -583,6 +583,15 @@  int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_basicConstraints) {
+		if (v[0] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ))
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[1] != vlen - 2)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		if (v[1] != 0 && v[2] == ASN1_BOOL && v[3] == 1)
+			ctx->cert->pub->key_is_ca = true;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 6d61695e1cde..0521241764b7 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@  struct public_key {
 	void *params;
 	u32 paramlen;
 	bool key_is_private;
+	bool key_is_ca;
 	const char *id_type;
 	const char *pkey_algo;
 };