diff mbox series

[v2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix ECDSA use via keyctl uapi

Message ID 20220826145119.9375-1-denkenz@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series [v2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix ECDSA use via keyctl uapi | expand

Commit Message

Denis Kenzior Aug. 26, 2022, 2:51 p.m. UTC
When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
sizes were never updated.  This makes it impossible to use such keys via
keyctl API from userspace.

Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.

Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
---

Version History:

  v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments.  No
  functional code changes.

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Stefan Berger Aug. 26, 2022, 3:13 p.m. UTC | #1
On 8/26/22 10:51, Denis Kenzior wrote:
> When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
> sizes were never updated.  This makes it impossible to use such keys via
> keyctl API from userspace.
> 
> Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
> SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
> per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
> 
> Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
> Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> 
> Version History:
> 
>    v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments.  No
>    functional code changes.
> 
>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
>   1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
>   
>   	len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
>   	info->key_size = len * 8;
> -	info->max_data_size = len;
> -	info->max_sig_size = len;
> +
> +	if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
> +		/*
> +		 * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
> +		 * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
> +		 * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
> +		 * based keys.  Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
> +		 * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
> +		 */
> +		info->max_data_size = 64;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
> +		 * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
> +		 * ASN.1.  Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
> +		 */
> +		info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
> +	} else {
> +		info->max_data_size = len;
> +		info->max_sig_size = len;
> +	}
> +
>   	info->max_enc_size = len;
>   	info->max_dec_size = len;
>   	info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
Michael Yartys Jan. 18, 2023, 6:14 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi

What's the hold-up with this patch? I would really appreciate if someone could take a look at it and move it along to finally enable iwd to connect to networks using ECDSA certificates (my eduroam network for example).

Michael


------- Original Message -------
On Friday, August 26th, 2022 at 16:51, Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> wrote:


> 
> 
> When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature
> sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via
> keyctl API from userspace.
> 
> Update constraint on max_data_size to 64 bytes in order to support
> SHA512-based signatures. Also update the signature length constraints
> per ECDSA signature encoding described in RFC 5480.
> 
> Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys")
> Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior denkenz@gmail.com
> 
> ---
> 
> Version History:
> 
> v2: Update patch description according to Jarkko's comments. No
> functional code changes.
> 
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
> 
> len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
> info->key_size = len * 8;
> 
> - info->max_data_size = len;
> 
> - info->max_sig_size = len;
> 
> +
> + if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
> 
> + /*
> + * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
> + * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
> + * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
> + * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
> + * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
> + */
> + info->max_data_size = 64;
> 
> +
> + /*
> + * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
> + * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
> + * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
> + */
> + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
> 
> + } else {
> + info->max_data_size = len;
> 
> + info->max_sig_size = len;
> 
> + }
> +
> info->max_enc_size = len;
> 
> info->max_dec_size = len;
> 
> info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |
> 
> --
> 2.35.1
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -186,8 +186,28 @@  static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
 
 	len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
 	info->key_size = len * 8;
-	info->max_data_size = len;
-	info->max_sig_size = len;
+
+	if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
+		 * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
+		 * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
+		 * based keys.  Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
+		 * the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
+		 */
+		info->max_data_size = 64;
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
+		 * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
+		 * ASN.1.  Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
+		 */
+		info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2;
+	} else {
+		info->max_data_size = len;
+		info->max_sig_size = len;
+	}
+
 	info->max_enc_size = len;
 	info->max_dec_size = len;
 	info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |