From patchwork Fri Jan 5 18:49:42 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13512486 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 68DA036AF5; Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:51:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="n3Out9+g" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7F975C433D9; Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:51:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1704480690; bh=i8YhV27gpx+OSDHWglug9n/uD7xBsTN3bFNKdWJ5qT0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=n3Out9+ge/7+DGaIz/i1PR/buOCLMeKvADnSJMLvWEDJSr12yKbvTJcS4RqZPfY1m mdhOlvPgX12jEncpmiX93qBUmH022et1RN3x10V0Xaa9LZX4CsMZnxyCU951QOGC/e xiW9KAU/gr5CA/ZkOEW8lkkf3bBaLF4W85ikwnMUQZh8k6xDvVqK9bg+vQGsl0JVZI gX8hGrIbUKcH9mD9y+BoP8370yFXqLkIaiSqX/ExuW+FGnL1rq+RRMYpeNupHjnx0x phoDdLvb914I9j+aupSe+JfFuAP8K9PknpzfZjDV4qXStbTKS2NEejSl85mpHmetn0 dFMYUnuEGs3VQ== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Jerry Shih Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , Heiko Stuebner , Phoebe Chen , hongrong.hsu@sifive.com, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Andy Chiu Subject: [PATCH v2 06/12] crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated AES-{ECB,CBC,CTR,XTS} Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:49:42 -0800 Message-ID: <20240105184950.43181-7-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240105184950.43181-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20240105184950.43181-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Jerry Shih Add implementations of AES-ECB, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, and AES-XTS, as well as bare (single-block) AES, using the RISC-V vector crypto extensions. The assembly code is derived from OpenSSL code (openssl/openssl#21923) that was dual-licensed so that it could be reused in the kernel. Nevertheless, the assembly has been significantly reworked for integration with the kernel, for example by using regular .S files instead of the so-called perlasm, using the assembler instead of bare '.inst', greatly reducing code duplication, supporting AES-192, and making the code use the same AES key structure as the C code. Co-developed-by: Phoebe Chen Signed-off-by: Phoebe Chen Signed-off-by: Jerry Shih Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig | 16 + arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile | 4 + arch/riscv/crypto/aes-macros.S | 156 +++++ arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-glue.c | 550 ++++++++++++++++++ .../crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.S | 300 ++++++++++ arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.S | 146 +++++ arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned.S | 180 ++++++ 7 files changed, 1352 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/riscv/crypto/aes-macros.S create mode 100644 arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-glue.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.S create mode 100644 arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.S create mode 100644 arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned.S diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig index 10d60edc0110a..ebe805fa3f5f7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig @@ -1,5 +1,21 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (riscv)" +config CRYPTO_AES_RISCV64 + tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS" + depends on 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select CRYPTO_LIB_AES + select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER + help + Block cipher: AES cipher algorithms + Length-preserving ciphers: AES with ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS + + Architecture: riscv64 using: + - Zvkned vector crypto extension + - Zvbb vector extension (XTS) + - Zvkb vector crypto extension (CTR) + - Zvkg vector crypto extension (XTS) + endmenu diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile b/arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile index b3b6332c9f6d0..f3e0049611c06 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only # # linux/arch/riscv/crypto/Makefile # + +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_RISCV64) += aes-riscv64.o +aes-riscv64-y := aes-riscv64-glue.o aes-riscv64-zvkned.o \ + aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.o aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-macros.S b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-macros.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..2ada0c70f4a6a --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-macros.S @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ +// +// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your +// choice of either of the following two licenses: +// +// Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You can obtain +// a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html +// +// or +// +// Copyright (c) 2023, Christoph Müllner +// Copyright (c) 2023, Phoebe Chen +// Copyright (c) 2023, Jerry Shih +// Copyright 2024 Google LLC +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +// are met: +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +// documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. INP NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER INP CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING INP ANY WAY OUTP OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +// This file contains macros that are shared by the other aes-*.S files. The +// generated code of these macros depends on the following RISC-V extensions: +// - RV64I +// - RISC-V Vector ('V') with VLEN >= 128 +// - RISC-V Vector AES block cipher extension ('Zvkned') + +// Loads the AES round keys from \keyp into vector registers and jumps to code +// specific to the length of the key. Specifically: +// - If AES-128, loads round keys into v1-v11 and jumps to \label128. +// - If AES-192, loads round keys into v1-v13 and jumps to \label192. +// - If AES-256, loads round keys into v1-v15 and continues onwards. +// +// Also sets vl=4 and vtype=e32,m1,ta,ma. Clobbers t0 and t1. +.macro aes_begin keyp, label128, label192 + lwu t0, 480(\keyp) // t0 = key length in bytes + li t1, 24 // t1 = key length for AES-192 + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vle32.v v1, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v2, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v3, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v4, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v5, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v6, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v7, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v8, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v9, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v10, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v11, (\keyp) + blt t0, t1, \label128 // If AES-128, goto label128. + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v12, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v13, (\keyp) + beq t0, t1, \label192 // If AES-192, goto label192. + // Else, it's AES-256. + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v14, (\keyp) + addi \keyp, \keyp, 16 + vle32.v v15, (\keyp) +.endm + +// Encrypts \data using zvkned instructions, using the round keys loaded into +// v1-v11 (for AES-128), v1-v13 (for AES-192), or v1-v15 (for AES-256). \keylen +// is the AES key length in bits. vl and vtype must already be set +// appropriately. Note that if vl > 4, multiple blocks are encrypted. +.macro aes_encrypt data, keylen + vaesz.vs \data, v1 + vaesem.vs \data, v2 + vaesem.vs \data, v3 + vaesem.vs \data, v4 + vaesem.vs \data, v5 + vaesem.vs \data, v6 + vaesem.vs \data, v7 + vaesem.vs \data, v8 + vaesem.vs \data, v9 + vaesem.vs \data, v10 +.if \keylen == 128 + vaesef.vs \data, v11 +.elseif \keylen == 192 + vaesem.vs \data, v11 + vaesem.vs \data, v12 + vaesef.vs \data, v13 +.else + vaesem.vs \data, v11 + vaesem.vs \data, v12 + vaesem.vs \data, v13 + vaesem.vs \data, v14 + vaesef.vs \data, v15 +.endif +.endm + +// Same as aes_encrypt, but decrypts instead of encrypts. +.macro aes_decrypt data, keylen +.if \keylen == 128 + vaesz.vs \data, v11 +.elseif \keylen == 192 + vaesz.vs \data, v13 + vaesdm.vs \data, v12 + vaesdm.vs \data, v11 +.else + vaesz.vs \data, v15 + vaesdm.vs \data, v14 + vaesdm.vs \data, v13 + vaesdm.vs \data, v12 + vaesdm.vs \data, v11 +.endif + vaesdm.vs \data, v10 + vaesdm.vs \data, v9 + vaesdm.vs \data, v8 + vaesdm.vs \data, v7 + vaesdm.vs \data, v6 + vaesdm.vs \data, v5 + vaesdm.vs \data, v4 + vaesdm.vs \data, v3 + vaesdm.vs \data, v2 + vaesdf.vs \data, v1 +.endm + +// Expands to aes_encrypt or aes_decrypt according to \enc, which is 1 or 0. +.macro aes_crypt data, enc, keylen +.if \enc + aes_encrypt \data, \keylen +.else + aes_decrypt \data, \keylen +.endif +.endm diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-glue.c b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..8c400d68b3e7e --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,550 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AES using the RISC-V vector crypto extensions. Includes the bare block + * cipher and the ECB, CBC, CTR, and XTS modes. + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 VRULL GmbH + * Author: Heiko Stuebner + * + * Copyright (C) 2023 SiFive, Inc. + * Author: Jerry Shih + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +asmlinkage void aes_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], + u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); +asmlinkage void aes_decrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 in[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], + u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +asmlinkage void aes_ecb_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len); +asmlinkage void aes_ecb_decrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len); + +asmlinkage void aes_cbc_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); +asmlinkage void aes_cbc_decrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +asmlinkage void aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +asmlinkage void aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, + u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, + u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +static int riscv64_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + /* + * For now we just use the generic key expansion, for these reasons: + * + * - zvkned's key expansion instructions don't support AES-192. + * So, non-zvkned fallback code would be needed anyway. + * + * - Users of AES in Linux usually don't change keys frequently. + * So, key expansion isn't performance-critical. + * + * - For single-block AES exposed as a "cipher" algorithm, it's + * necessary to use struct crypto_aes_ctx and initialize its 'key_dec' + * field with the round keys for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher. This + * is because with "cipher", decryption can be requested from a + * context where the vector unit isn't usable, necessitating a + * fallback to aes_decrypt(). But, zvkned can only generate and use + * the normal round keys. Of course, it's preferable to not have + * special code just for "cipher", as e.g. XTS also uses a + * single-block AES encryption. It's simplest to just use + * struct crypto_aes_ctx and aes_expandkey() everywhere. + */ + return aes_expandkey(ctx, key, keylen); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_setkey_cipher(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + return riscv64_aes_setkey(ctx, key, keylen); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_setkey_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + return riscv64_aes_setkey(ctx, key, keylen); +} + +/* Bare AES, without a mode of operation */ + +static void riscv64_aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src) +{ + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + if (crypto_simd_usable()) { + kernel_vector_begin(); + aes_encrypt_zvkned(ctx, src, dst); + kernel_vector_end(); + } else { + aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src); + } +} + +static void riscv64_aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src) +{ + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + if (crypto_simd_usable()) { + kernel_vector_begin(); + aes_decrypt_zvkned(ctx, src, dst); + kernel_vector_end(); + } else { + aes_decrypt(ctx, dst, src); + } +} + +/* AES-ECB */ + +static inline int riscv64_aes_ecb_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes; + int err; + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + kernel_vector_begin(); + if (enc) + aes_ecb_encrypt_zvkned(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, + nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + else + aes_ecb_decrypt_zvkned(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, + nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + kernel_vector_end(); + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + } + + return err; +} + +static int riscv64_aes_ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_ecb_crypt(req, true); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_ecb_crypt(req, false); +} + +/* AES-CBC */ + +static inline int riscv64_aes_cbc_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct skcipher_walk walk; + unsigned int nbytes; + int err; + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + kernel_vector_begin(); + if (enc) + aes_cbc_encrypt_zvkned(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, + nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1), + walk.iv); + else + aes_cbc_decrypt_zvkned(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, + nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1), + walk.iv); + kernel_vector_end(); + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, nbytes & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + } + + return err; +} + +static int riscv64_aes_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_cbc_crypt(req, true); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_cbc_crypt(req, false); +} + +/* AES-CTR */ + +static int riscv64_aes_ctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + unsigned int nbytes, p1_nbytes; + struct skcipher_walk walk; + u32 ctr32, nblocks; + int err; + + /* Get the low 32-bit word of the 128-bit big endian counter. */ + ctr32 = get_unaligned_be32(req->iv + 12); + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) != 0) { + if (nbytes < walk.total) { + /* Not the end yet, so keep the length block-aligned. */ + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + nblocks = nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } else { + /* It's the end, so include any final partial block. */ + nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + ctr32 += nblocks; + + kernel_vector_begin(); + if (ctr32 >= nblocks) { + /* The low 32-bit word of the counter won't overflow. */ + aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes, + req->iv); + } else { + /* + * The low 32-bit word of the counter will overflow. + * The assembly doesn't handle this case, so split the + * operation into two at the point where the overflow + * will occur. After the first part, add the carry bit. + */ + p1_nbytes = min_t(unsigned int, nbytes, + (nblocks - ctr32) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb(ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, + p1_nbytes, req->iv); + crypto_inc(req->iv, 12); + + if (ctr32) { + aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb( + ctx, + walk.src.virt.addr + p1_nbytes, + walk.dst.virt.addr + p1_nbytes, + nbytes - p1_nbytes, req->iv); + } + } + kernel_vector_end(); + + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); + } + + return err; +} + +/* AES-XTS */ + +struct riscv64_aes_xts_ctx { + struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx1; + struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx2; +}; + +static int riscv64_aes_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct riscv64_aes_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + return xts_verify_key(tfm, key, keylen) ?: + riscv64_aes_setkey(&ctx->ctx1, key, keylen / 2) ?: + riscv64_aes_setkey(&ctx->ctx2, key + keylen / 2, keylen / 2); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct riscv64_aes_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + int tail = req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + struct scatterlist sg_src[2], sg_dst[2]; + struct skcipher_request subreq; + struct scatterlist *src, *dst; + struct skcipher_walk walk; + int err; + + if (req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Encrypt the IV with the tweak key to get the first tweak. */ + kernel_vector_begin(); + aes_encrypt_zvkned(&ctx->ctx2, req->iv, req->iv); + kernel_vector_end(); + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + + /* + * If the message length isn't divisible by the AES block size and the + * full message isn't available in one step of the scatterlist walk, + * then separate off the last full block and the partial block. This + * ensures that they are processed in the same call to the assembly + * function, which is required for ciphertext stealing. + */ + if (unlikely(tail > 0 && walk.nbytes < walk.total)) { + skcipher_walk_abort(&walk); + + skcipher_request_set_tfm(&subreq, tfm); + skcipher_request_set_callback(&subreq, + skcipher_request_flags(req), + NULL, NULL); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(&subreq, req->src, req->dst, + req->cryptlen - tail - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + req->iv); + req = &subreq; + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + } else { + tail = 0; + } + + while (walk.nbytes) { + unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; + + if (nbytes < walk.total) + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + kernel_vector_begin(); + if (enc) + aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + &ctx->ctx1, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes, req->iv); + else + aes_xts_decrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + &ctx->ctx1, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, nbytes, req->iv); + kernel_vector_end(); + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); + } + + if (err || likely(!tail)) + return err; + + /* Do ciphertext stealing with the last full block and partial block. */ + + dst = src = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_src, req->src, req->cryptlen); + if (req->dst != req->src) + dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_dst, req->dst, req->cryptlen); + + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + tail, + req->iv); + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (err) + return err; + + kernel_vector_begin(); + if (enc) + aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + &ctx->ctx1, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes, req->iv); + else + aes_xts_decrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg( + &ctx->ctx1, walk.src.virt.addr, + walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes, req->iv); + kernel_vector_end(); + + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_xts_crypt(req, true); +} + +static int riscv64_aes_xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return riscv64_aes_xts_crypt(req, false); +} + +/* Algorithm definitions */ + +static struct crypto_alg riscv64_zvkned_aes_cipher_alg = { + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx), + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_name = "aes", + .cra_driver_name = "aes-riscv64-zvkned", + .cra_cipher = { + .cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .cia_setkey = riscv64_aes_setkey_cipher, + .cia_encrypt = riscv64_aes_encrypt, + .cia_decrypt = riscv64_aes_decrypt, + }, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, +}; + +static struct skcipher_alg riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs[] = { + { + .setkey = riscv64_aes_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = riscv64_aes_ecb_encrypt, + .decrypt = riscv64_aes_ecb_decrypt, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* matches LMUL=4 */ + .base = { + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx), + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_name = "ecb(aes)", + .cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-riscv64-zvkned", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, + }, { + .setkey = riscv64_aes_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = riscv64_aes_cbc_encrypt, + .decrypt = riscv64_aes_cbc_decrypt, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base = { + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx), + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_name = "cbc(aes)", + .cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-riscv64-zvkned", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, + } +}; + +static struct skcipher_alg riscv64_zvkned_zvkb_aes_skcipher_alg = { + .setkey = riscv64_aes_setkey_skcipher, + .encrypt = riscv64_aes_ctr_crypt, + .decrypt = riscv64_aes_ctr_crypt, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* matches LMUL=4 */ + .base = { + .cra_blocksize = 1, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx), + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_name = "ctr(aes)", + .cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}; + +static struct skcipher_alg riscv64_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg_aes_skcipher_alg = { + .setkey = riscv64_aes_xts_setkey, + .encrypt = riscv64_aes_xts_encrypt, + .decrypt = riscv64_aes_xts_decrypt, + .min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, /* matches LMUL=4 */ + .base = { + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct riscv64_aes_xts_ctx), + .cra_priority = 300, + .cra_name = "xts(aes)", + .cra_driver_name = "xts-aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg", + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}; + +static inline bool riscv64_aes_xts_supported(void) +{ + return riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVBB) && + riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKG) && + riscv_vector_vlen() < 2048 /* Implementation limitation */; +} + +static int __init riscv64_aes_mod_init(void) +{ + int err = -ENODEV; + + if (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKNED) && + riscv_vector_vlen() >= 128) { + err = crypto_register_alg(&riscv64_zvkned_aes_cipher_alg); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_register_skciphers( + riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs, + ARRAY_SIZE(riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs)); + if (err) + goto unregister_zvkned_cipher_alg; + + if (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKB)) { + err = crypto_register_skcipher( + &riscv64_zvkned_zvkb_aes_skcipher_alg); + if (err) + goto unregister_zvkned_skcipher_algs; + } + + if (riscv64_aes_xts_supported()) { + err = crypto_register_skcipher( + &riscv64_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg_aes_skcipher_alg); + if (err) + goto unregister_zvkned_zvkb_skcipher_alg; + } + } + + return err; + +unregister_zvkned_zvkb_skcipher_alg: + if (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKB)) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&riscv64_zvkned_zvkb_aes_skcipher_alg); +unregister_zvkned_skcipher_algs: + crypto_unregister_skciphers(riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs, + ARRAY_SIZE(riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs)); +unregister_zvkned_cipher_alg: + crypto_unregister_alg(&riscv64_zvkned_aes_cipher_alg); + return err; +} + +static void __exit riscv64_aes_mod_exit(void) +{ + if (riscv64_aes_xts_supported()) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&riscv64_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg_aes_skcipher_alg); + if (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZVKB)) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&riscv64_zvkned_zvkb_aes_skcipher_alg); + crypto_unregister_skciphers(riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs, + ARRAY_SIZE(riscv64_zvkned_aes_skcipher_algs)); + crypto_unregister_alg(&riscv64_zvkned_aes_cipher_alg); +} + +module_init(riscv64_aes_mod_init); +module_exit(riscv64_aes_mod_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS (RISC-V accelerated)"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Jerry Shih "); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbc(aes)"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ctr(aes)"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts(aes)"); diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.S b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..41eb618e8a5d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvbb-zvkg.S @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ +// +// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your +// choice of either of the following two licenses: +// +// Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You can obtain +// a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html +// +// or +// +// Copyright (c) 2023, Jerry Shih +// Copyright 2024 Google LLC +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +// are met: +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +// documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +// The generated code of this file depends on the following RISC-V extensions: +// - RV64I +// - RISC-V Vector ('V') with VLEN >= 128 && VLEN < 2048 +// - RISC-V Vector AES block cipher extension ('Zvkned') +// - RISC-V Vector Bit-manipulation extension ('Zvbb') +// - RISC-V Vector GCM/GMAC extension ('Zvkg') + +#include + +.text +.option arch, +zvkned, +zvbb, +zvkg + +#include "aes-macros.S" + +#define KEYP a0 +#define INP a1 +#define OUTP a2 +#define LEN a3 +#define TWEAKP a4 + +#define LEN32 a5 +#define TAIL_LEN a6 +#define VL a7 + +// v1-v15 contain the AES round keys, but they are used for temporaries before +// the AES round keys have been loaded. +#define TWEAKS v16 // LMUL=4 (most of the time) +#define TWEAKS_BREV v20 // LMUL=4 (most of the time) +#define MULTS_BREV v24 // LMUL=4 (most of the time) +#define TMP0 v28 +#define TMP1 v29 +#define TMP2 v30 +#define TMP3 v31 + +// xts_init initializes the following values: +// +// TWEAKS: N 128-bit tweaks T*(x^i) for i in 0..(N - 1) +// TWEAKS_BREV: same as TWEAKS, but bit-reversed +// MULTS_BREV: N 128-bit values x^N, bit-reversed. Only if N > 1. +// +// N is the maximum number of blocks that will be processed per loop iteration, +// computed using vsetvli. +// +// The field convention used by XTS is the same as that of GHASH, but with the +// bits reversed within each byte. The zvkg extension provides the vgmul +// instruction which does multiplication in this field. Therefore, for tweak +// computation we use vgmul to do multiplications in parallel, instead of +// serially multiplying by x using shifting+xoring. Note that for this to work, +// the inputs and outputs to vgmul must be bit-reversed (we do it with vbrev8). +.macro xts_init + + // Load the first tweak T. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vle32.v TWEAKS, (TWEAKP) + + // If there's only one block (or no blocks at all), then skip the tweak + // sequence computation because (at most) T itself is needed. + li t0, 16 + ble LEN, t0, .Linit_single_block\@ + + // Save a copy of T bit-reversed in v12. + vbrev8.v v12, TWEAKS + + // + // Generate x^i for i in 0..(N - 1), i.e. 128-bit values 1 << i assuming + // that N <= 128. Though, this code actually requires N < 64 (or + // equivalently VLEN < 2048) due to the use of 64-bit intermediate + // values here and in the x^N computation later. + // + vsetvli VL, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + srli t0, VL, 2 // t0 = N (num blocks) + // Generate two sequences, each with N 32-bit values: + // v0=[1, 1, 1, ...] and v1=[0, 1, 2, ...]. + vsetvli zero, t0, e32, m1, ta, ma + vmv.v.i v0, 1 + vid.v v1 + // Use vzext to zero-extend the sequences to 64 bits. Reinterpret them + // as two sequences, each with 2*N 32-bit values: + // v2=[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ...] and v4=[0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, ...]. + vsetvli zero, t0, e64, m2, ta, ma + vzext.vf2 v2, v0 + vzext.vf2 v4, v1 + slli t1, t0, 1 // t1 = 2*N + vsetvli zero, t1, e32, m2, ta, ma + // Use vwsll to compute [1<<0, 0<<0, 1<<1, 0<<0, 1<<2, 0<<0, ...], + // widening to 64 bits per element. When reinterpreted as N 128-bit + // values, this is the needed sequence of 128-bit values 1 << i (x^i). + vwsll.vv v8, v2, v4 + + // Copy the bit-reversed T to all N elements of TWEAKS_BREV, then + // multiply by x^i. This gives the sequence T*(x^i), bit-reversed. + vsetvli zero, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + vmv.v.i TWEAKS_BREV, 0 + vaesz.vs TWEAKS_BREV, v12 + vbrev8.v v8, v8 + vgmul.vv TWEAKS_BREV, v8 + + // Save a copy of the sequence T*(x^i) with the bit reversal undone. + vbrev8.v TWEAKS, TWEAKS_BREV + + // Generate N copies of x^N, i.e. 128-bit values 1 << N, bit-reversed. + li t1, 1 + sll t1, t1, t0 // t1 = 1 << N + vsetivli zero, 2, e64, m1, ta, ma + vmv.v.i v0, 0 + vsetivli zero, 1, e64, m1, tu, ma + vmv.v.x v0, t1 + vbrev8.v v0, v0 + vsetvli zero, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + vmv.v.i MULTS_BREV, 0 + vaesz.vs MULTS_BREV, v0 + + j .Linit_done\@ + +.Linit_single_block\@: + vbrev8.v TWEAKS_BREV, TWEAKS +.Linit_done\@: +.endm + +// Set the first 128 bits of MULTS_BREV to 0x40, i.e. 'x' bit-reversed. This is +// the multiplier required to advance the tweak by one. +.macro load_x + li t0, 0x40 + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vmv.v.i MULTS_BREV, 0 + vsetivli zero, 1, e8, m1, tu, ma + vmv.v.x MULTS_BREV, t0 +.endm + +.macro __aes_xts_crypt enc, keylen + // With 16 < len <= 31, there's no main loop, just ciphertext stealing. + beqz LEN32, .Lcts_without_main_loop\@ + + vsetvli VL, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + j 2f +1: + vsetvli VL, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + // Compute the next sequence of tweaks by multiplying the previous + // sequence by x^N. Store the result in both bit-reversed order and + // regular order (i.e. with the bit reversal undone). + vgmul.vv TWEAKS_BREV, MULTS_BREV + vbrev8.v TWEAKS, TWEAKS_BREV +2: + // Encrypt or decrypt VL/4 blocks. + vle32.v TMP0, (INP) + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TWEAKS + aes_crypt TMP0, \enc, \keylen + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TWEAKS + vse32.v TMP0, (OUTP) + + // Update the pointers and the remaining length. + slli t0, VL, 2 + add INP, INP, t0 + add OUTP, OUTP, t0 + sub LEN32, LEN32, VL + + // Repeat if more blocks remain. + bnez LEN32, 1b + +.Lmain_loop_done\@: + load_x + + // Compute the next tweak. + addi t0, VL, -4 + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m4, ta, ma + vslidedown.vx TWEAKS_BREV, TWEAKS_BREV, t0 // Extract last tweak + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vgmul.vv TWEAKS_BREV, MULTS_BREV // Advance to next tweak + + bnez TAIL_LEN, .Lcts\@ + + // Update *TWEAKP to contain the next tweak. + vbrev8.v TWEAKS, TWEAKS_BREV + vse32.v TWEAKS, (TWEAKP) + ret + +.Lcts_without_main_loop\@: + load_x +.Lcts\@: + // TWEAKS_BREV now contains the next tweak. Compute the one after that. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vmv.v.v TMP0, TWEAKS_BREV + vgmul.vv TMP0, MULTS_BREV + // Undo the bit reversal of the next two tweaks and store them in TMP1 + // and TMP2, such that TMP1 is the first needed and TMP2 the second. +.if \enc + vbrev8.v TMP1, TWEAKS_BREV + vbrev8.v TMP2, TMP0 +.else + vbrev8.v TMP1, TMP0 + vbrev8.v TMP2, TWEAKS_BREV +.endif + + // Encrypt/decrypt the last full block. + vle32.v TMP0, (INP) + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TMP1 + aes_crypt TMP0, \enc, \keylen + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TMP1 + + // Swap the first TAIL_LEN bytes of the above result with the tail. + // Note that to support in-place encryption/decryption, the load from + // the input tail must happen before the store to the output tail. + addi t0, INP, 16 + addi t1, OUTP, 16 + vmv.v.v TMP3, TMP0 + vsetvli zero, TAIL_LEN, e8, m1, tu, ma + vle8.v TMP0, (t0) + vse8.v TMP3, (t1) + + // Encrypt/decrypt again and store the last full block. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TMP2 + aes_crypt TMP0, \enc, \keylen + vxor.vv TMP0, TMP0, TMP2 + vse32.v TMP0, (OUTP) + + ret +.endm + +.macro aes_xts_crypt enc + + // Check whether the length is a multiple of the AES block size. + andi TAIL_LEN, LEN, 15 + beqz TAIL_LEN, 1f + + // The length isn't a multiple of the AES block size, so ciphertext + // stealing will be required. Ciphertext stealing involves special + // handling of the partial block and the last full block, so subtract + // the length of both from the length to be processed in the main loop. + sub LEN, LEN, TAIL_LEN + addi LEN, LEN, -16 +1: + srli LEN32, LEN, 2 + // LEN and LEN32 now contain the total length of the blocks that will be + // processed in the main loop, in bytes and 32-bit words respectively. + + xts_init + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + __aes_xts_crypt \enc, 256 +111: + __aes_xts_crypt \enc, 128 +222: + __aes_xts_crypt \enc, 192 +.endm + +// void aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, +// u8 tweak[16]); +// +// |key| is the data key. |tweak| contains the next tweak; the encryption of +// the original IV with the tweak key was already done. This function supports +// incremental computation, but |len| must always be >= 16 (AES_BLOCK_SIZE), and +// |len| must be a multiple of 16 except on the last call. If |len| is a +// multiple of 16, then this function updates |tweak| to contain the next tweak. +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg) + aes_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg) + +// Same prototype and calling convention as the encryption function +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_xts_decrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg) + aes_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt_zvkned_zvbb_zvkg) diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.S b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..c4a84e84e60df --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned-zvkb.S @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ +// +// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your +// choice of either of the following two licenses: +// +// Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You can obtain +// a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html +// +// or +// +// Copyright (c) 2023, Jerry Shih +// Copyright 2024 Google LLC +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +// are met: +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +// documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +// The generated code of this file depends on the following RISC-V extensions: +// - RV64I +// - RISC-V Vector ('V') with VLEN >= 128 +// - RISC-V Vector AES block cipher extension ('Zvkned') +// - RISC-V Vector Cryptography Bit-manipulation extension ('Zvkb') + +#include + +.text +.option arch, +zvkned, +zvkb + +#include "aes-macros.S" + +#define KEYP a0 +#define INP a1 +#define OUTP a2 +#define LEN a3 +#define IVP a4 + +#define LEN32 a5 +#define VL_E32 a6 +#define VL_BLOCKS a7 + +.macro aes_ctr32_crypt keylen + // LEN32 = number of blocks, rounded up, in 32-bit words. + addi t0, LEN, 15 + srli t0, t0, 4 + slli LEN32, t0, 2 + + // Create a mask that selects the last 32-bit word of each 128-bit + // block. This is the word that contains the (big-endian) counter. + li t0, 0x88 + vsetvli t1, zero, e8, m1, ta, ma + vmv.v.x v0, t0 + + // Load the IV into v31. The last 32-bit word contains the counter. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, ma + vle32.v v31, (IVP) + + // Convert the big-endian counter into little-endian. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, mu + vrev8.v v31, v31, v0.t + + // Splat the IV to v16 (with LMUL=4). The number of copies is the + // maximum number of blocks that will be processed per iteration. + vsetvli zero, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, ma + vmv.v.i v16, 0 + vaesz.vs v16, v31 + + // v20 = [x, x, x, 0, x, x, x, 1, ...] + viota.m v20, v0, v0.t + // v16 = [IV0, IV1, IV2, counter+0, IV0, IV1, IV2, counter+1, ...] + vsetvli VL_E32, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, mu + vadd.vv v16, v16, v20, v0.t + + j 2f +1: + // Set the number of blocks to process in this iteration. vl=VL_E32 is + // the length in 32-bit words, i.e. 4 times the number of blocks. + vsetvli VL_E32, LEN32, e32, m4, ta, mu + + // Increment the counters by the number of blocks processed in the + // previous iteration. + vadd.vx v16, v16, VL_BLOCKS, v0.t +2: + // Prepare the AES inputs into v24. + vmv.v.v v24, v16 + vrev8.v v24, v24, v0.t // Convert counters back to big-endian. + + // Encrypt the AES inputs to create the next portion of the keystream. + aes_encrypt v24, \keylen + + // XOR the data with the keystream. + vsetvli t0, LEN, e8, m4, ta, ma + vle8.v v20, (INP) + vxor.vv v20, v20, v24 + vse8.v v20, (OUTP) + + // Advance the pointers and update the remaining length. + add INP, INP, t0 + add OUTP, OUTP, t0 + sub LEN, LEN, t0 + sub LEN32, LEN32, VL_E32 + srli VL_BLOCKS, VL_E32, 2 + + // Repeat if more data remains. + bnez LEN, 1b + + // Update *IVP to contain the next counter. + vsetivli zero, 4, e32, m1, ta, mu + vadd.vx v16, v16, VL_BLOCKS, v0.t + vrev8.v v16, v16, v0.t // Convert counters back to big-endian. + vse32.v v16, (IVP) + + ret +.endm + +// void aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, +// u8 iv[16]); +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb) + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + aes_ctr32_crypt 256 +111: + aes_ctr32_crypt 128 +222: + aes_ctr32_crypt 192 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_ctr32_crypt_zvkned_zvkb) diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned.S b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..6f7e8b0f31423 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/aes-riscv64-zvkned.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */ +// +// This file is dual-licensed, meaning that you can use it under your +// choice of either of the following two licenses: +// +// Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You can obtain +// a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +// https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html +// +// or +// +// Copyright (c) 2023, Christoph Müllner +// Copyright (c) 2023, Phoebe Chen +// Copyright (c) 2023, Jerry Shih +// Copyright 2024 Google LLC +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +// are met: +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +// notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +// documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. INP NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +// OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER INP CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING INP ANY WAY OUTP OF THE USE +// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +// The generated code of this file depends on the following RISC-V extensions: +// - RV64I +// - RISC-V Vector ('V') with VLEN >= 128 +// - RISC-V Vector AES block cipher extension ('Zvkned') + +#include + +.text +.option arch, +zvkned + +#include "aes-macros.S" + +#define KEYP a0 +#define INP a1 +#define OUTP a2 +#define LEN a3 +#define IVP a4 + +.macro __aes_crypt_zvkned enc, keylen + vle32.v v16, (INP) + aes_crypt v16, \enc, \keylen + vse32.v v16, (OUTP) + ret +.endm + +.macro aes_crypt_zvkned enc + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + __aes_crypt_zvkned \enc, 256 +111: + __aes_crypt_zvkned \enc, 128 +222: + __aes_crypt_zvkned \enc, 192 +.endm + +// void aes_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 in[16], u8 out[16]); +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_encrypt_zvkned) + aes_crypt_zvkned 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_encrypt_zvkned) + +// Same prototype and calling convention as the encryption function +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_decrypt_zvkned) + aes_crypt_zvkned 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_decrypt_zvkned) + +.macro __aes_ecb_crypt enc, keylen + srli t0, LEN, 2 + // t0 is the remaining length in 32-bit words. It's a multiple of 4. +1: + vsetvli t1, t0, e32, m4, ta, ma + sub t0, t0, t1 // Subtract number of words processed + slli t1, t1, 2 // Words to bytes + vle32.v v16, (INP) + aes_crypt v16, \enc, \keylen + vse32.v v16, (OUTP) + add INP, INP, t1 + add OUTP, OUTP, t1 + bnez t0, 1b + + ret +.endm + +.macro aes_ecb_crypt enc + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + __aes_ecb_crypt \enc, 256 +111: + __aes_ecb_crypt \enc, 128 +222: + __aes_ecb_crypt \enc, 192 +.endm + +// void aes_ecb_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len); +// +// |len| must be nonzero and a multiple of 16 (AES_BLOCK_SIZE). +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_ecb_encrypt_zvkned) + aes_ecb_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_ecb_encrypt_zvkned) + +// Same prototype and calling convention as the encryption function +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_ecb_decrypt_zvkned) + aes_ecb_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_ecb_decrypt_zvkned) + +.macro aes_cbc_encrypt keylen + vle32.v v16, (IVP) // Load IV +1: + vle32.v v17, (INP) // Load plaintext block + vxor.vv v16, v16, v17 // XOR with IV or prev ciphertext block + aes_encrypt v16, \keylen // Encrypt + vse32.v v16, (OUTP) // Store ciphertext block + addi INP, INP, 16 + addi OUTP, OUTP, 16 + addi LEN, LEN, -16 + bnez LEN, 1b + + vse32.v v16, (IVP) // Store next IV + ret +.endm + +.macro aes_cbc_decrypt keylen + vle32.v v16, (IVP) // Load IV +1: + vle32.v v17, (INP) // Load ciphertext block + vmv.v.v v18, v17 // Save ciphertext block + aes_decrypt v17, \keylen // Decrypt + vxor.vv v17, v17, v16 // XOR with IV or prev ciphertext block + vse32.v v17, (OUTP) // Store plaintext block + vmv.v.v v16, v18 // Next "IV" is prev ciphertext block + addi INP, INP, 16 + addi OUTP, OUTP, 16 + addi LEN, LEN, -16 + bnez LEN, 1b + + vse32.v v16, (IVP) // Store next IV + ret +.endm + +// void aes_cbc_encrypt_zvkned(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 iv[16]); +// +// |len| must be nonzero and a multiple of 16 (AES_BLOCK_SIZE). +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_cbc_encrypt_zvkned) + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + aes_cbc_encrypt 256 +111: + aes_cbc_encrypt 128 +222: + aes_cbc_encrypt 192 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_cbc_encrypt_zvkned) + +// Same prototype and calling convention as the encryption function +SYM_FUNC_START(aes_cbc_decrypt_zvkned) + aes_begin KEYP, 111f, 222f + aes_cbc_decrypt 256 +111: + aes_cbc_decrypt 128 +222: + aes_cbc_decrypt 192 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_cbc_decrypt_zvkned)