| Message ID | 20240703124958.45898-1-david@sigma-star.at (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
| Headers | show |
| Series | crypto: mxs-dcp: Ensure payload is zero when using key slot | expand |
On Wed Jul 3, 2024 at 3:49 PM EEST, David Gstir wrote: > We could leak stack memory through the payload field when running > AES with a key from one of the hardware's key slots. Fix this by > ensuring the payload field is set to 0 in such cases. > > This does not affect the common use case when the key is supplied > from main memory via the descriptor payload. > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202405270146.Y9tPoil8-lkp@intel.com/ > Fixes: 3d16af0b4cfa ("crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys") > --- > drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c > index 057d73c370b7..c82775dbb557 100644 > --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c > +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c > @@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) > static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, > struct skcipher_request *req, int init) > { > - dma_addr_t key_phys, src_phys, dst_phys; > + dma_addr_t key_phys = 0; > + dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys; > struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; > struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; > struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); I'm on holiday up until week 31 so might be that review will take up to then. BR, Jarkko
On Wed, Jul 03, 2024 at 02:49:58PM +0200, David Gstir wrote: > We could leak stack memory through the payload field when running > AES with a key from one of the hardware's key slots. Fix this by > ensuring the payload field is set to 0 in such cases. > > This does not affect the common use case when the key is supplied > from main memory via the descriptor payload. > > Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202405270146.Y9tPoil8-lkp@intel.com/ > Fixes: 3d16af0b4cfa ("crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys") > --- > drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Patch applied. Thanks.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index 057d73c370b7..c82775dbb557 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct skcipher_request *req, int init) { - dma_addr_t key_phys, src_phys, dst_phys; + dma_addr_t key_phys = 0; + dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys; struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
We could leak stack memory through the payload field when running AES with a key from one of the hardware's key slots. Fix this by ensuring the payload field is set to 0 in such cases. This does not affect the common use case when the key is supplied from main memory via the descriptor payload. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202405270146.Y9tPoil8-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 3d16af0b4cfa ("crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys") --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)