diff mbox series

[v4,3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

Message ID 7834eb187ef67cd88fc67f10e831130e3717d776.1641822505.git.msuchanek@suse.de (mailing list archive)
State Not Applicable
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series KEXEC_SIG with appended signature | expand

Commit Message

Michal Suchanek Jan. 10, 2022, 1:49 p.m. UTC 
Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on
      MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
    - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
    - Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
      than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 19 +++------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------
 include/linux/verification.h          |  3 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h              |  2 --
 kernel/module.c                       |  4 +++-
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 98d1cb5135b4..64cd314cce0d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@  static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@  int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					 "kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c944d71316c7..345f2eab6e04 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@  const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@  int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					"kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@  extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@  struct load_info {
 		unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
 	} index;
 };
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@  static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
-		err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@ 
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
  */
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
-	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
-	info->len = modlen;
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
+	*len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+				      trusted_keys,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }