| Message ID | 919ce5664ab3883f1bc15aadfc6b6a2d9b30ecbd.1722260176.git.lukas@wunner.de (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Templatize ecdsa signature decoding | expand |
On 7/29/24 9:49 AM, Lukas Wunner wrote: > When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded > integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length > "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) > and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). > > This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. > > The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, > meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the > function does check for overflow: > > if (-diff >= bufsize) > return -EINVAL; > > So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it > might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. > > Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out > if "vlen" is too large. > > Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> > --- > crypto/ecdsa.c | 17 ++++------------- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c > index f63731fb7535..03f608132242 100644 > --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c > +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c > @@ -35,29 +35,20 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, > const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits) > { > size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64); > - ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize; > const char *d = value; > > - if (!value || !vlen) > + if (!value || !vlen || vlen > bufsize + 1) > return -EINVAL; > > - /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size > - * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that > - * makes the value a positive integer; error on more > - * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros > - */ > - if (diff > 0) { > + if (vlen > bufsize) { At this point vlen could be 1 larger then bufsize in the worst case and there must be a leading 0. > /* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */ > if (*d == 0) { > vlen -= 1; > - diff--; > d++; > - > - if (diff) > + } else { > return -EINVAL; > + } > } > - if (-diff >= bufsize) > - return -EINVAL; > > ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits); > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, 29 Jul 2024 15:49:00 +0200 Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote: > When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded > integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length > "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) > and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). > > This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. > > The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, > meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the > function does check for overflow: > > if (-diff >= bufsize) > return -EINVAL; > > So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it > might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. > > Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out > if "vlen" is too large. > > Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Change looks fine to me. Random musing inline. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> > --- > crypto/ecdsa.c | 17 ++++------------- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c > index f63731fb7535..03f608132242 100644 > --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c > +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c > @@ -35,29 +35,20 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, > const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits) > { > size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64); > - ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize; > const char *d = value; > > - if (!value || !vlen) > + if (!value || !vlen || vlen > bufsize + 1) Given vlen and bufsize unsigned. Even in the weird case of bufsize + 1 == 0 vlen cannot be zero. So could drop the second condition? (or am I missing something?) Maybe it's easier to reason that vlen == 0 is invalid though. > return -EINVAL; > > - /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size > - * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that > - * makes the value a positive integer; error on more > - * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros > - */ > - if (diff > 0) { > + if (vlen > bufsize) { > /* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */ > if (*d == 0) { > vlen -= 1; > - diff--; > d++; > - } > - if (diff) > + } else { > return -EINVAL; > + } > } > - if (-diff >= bufsize) > - return -EINVAL; > > ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits); >
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c index f63731fb7535..03f608132242 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c @@ -35,29 +35,20 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag, const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits) { size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64); - ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize; const char *d = value; - if (!value || !vlen) + if (!value || !vlen || vlen > bufsize + 1) return -EINVAL; - /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size - * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that - * makes the value a positive integer; error on more - * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros - */ - if (diff > 0) { + if (vlen > bufsize) { /* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */ if (*d == 0) { vlen -= 1; - diff--; d++; - } - if (diff) + } else { return -EINVAL; + } } - if (-diff >= bufsize) - return -EINVAL; ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits);
When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the function does check for overflow: if (-diff >= bufsize) return -EINVAL; So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out if "vlen" is too large. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> --- crypto/ecdsa.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)