From patchwork Wed Sep 20 19:56:37 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Serge Semin X-Patchwork-Id: 13393378 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E523C04FF8 for ; Wed, 20 Sep 2023 19:58:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230229AbjITT60 (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2023 15:58:26 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53264 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230228AbjITT6Y (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2023 15:58:24 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-x22d.google.com (mail-lj1-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A177D8; Wed, 20 Sep 2023 12:58:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-lj1-x22d.google.com with SMTP id 38308e7fff4ca-2c038a1e2e6so2728211fa.2; Wed, 20 Sep 2023 12:58:11 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1695239889; x=1695844689; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=mRfHOWyS91vzVwejPj0vpq+g8xJCLUmXQ16geMum0B4=; b=d8PBC+VNoV70VJbTh5RSlgjKcRX2RMVIuEYqQruHJKutQebt0zeU0uDEkrJRo6pq+C tDt/s3SlurGVHGBm9lV+v7XWevSd+HM91VmbFeviyhcL05jM5Lr+a4EnGZqbCN9bpIDa l6VT2T2ea8nrBoNgx5oc2fFJK5WDMTM7Jpar4gd3uBuMRtk0TjC4iXq+3PfKViqiZWiq LVcxTjTducWVNHnn/DpM0PN3MD0ZpxkFqlJpdYeDvl6odey5l9HBQZFmpXZljAI6+84t DJgEeu8qHIWAiSsLo3RwATZZpb15K5x3RE54OcFqG4dl+wqXYYokLY1W1voEqIzT3BDX UwEQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1695239889; x=1695844689; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=mRfHOWyS91vzVwejPj0vpq+g8xJCLUmXQ16geMum0B4=; b=NNiJYuFIon8e14s1d239bf6AQ13KG8EQ3PQjQC5+vCOuw2W7OZWpLR1zo629/pp7HS lYdoYMqXH/aLAlEChfiRlUIUc48Use7vJ0anNeHoh2EirenC1s5vsLS26/Kc6bhxl5n7 DgLN9H+mknU//MC8IZRNIWvS6SV4yv3MWnJfZxvhD7p6jDjKdpvpAI0R1UklIJ0RHvCD N6+Ol5kB6meJKwkYIRCQOOyIDapflGSED2ODO83E8SWctYzb/fyHFBWwGmVxRmvAudOk KL7Nozqo9jk1lHyQhvFxFryRoUaNKh+w03Svka/VhjFwWwBQZs5Ur8S/syzujrXF5Ozs o89w== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yw8tR0M1ysTWkAupvEcYOHGsRI3MkzucLsveAvjxok9kwH46hV8 L7YhgsqBUN2uAc8TwiNIE9Q= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IEhkeWO5iqHVcZbgwdbs2SL/BUg1QSfo+mbevfgbf8qk8U9vY+ktIQYS1YUrsCWQZJH8B2YQw== X-Received: by 2002:a2e:96d5:0:b0:2bf:e9e8:de23 with SMTP id d21-20020a2e96d5000000b002bfe9e8de23mr3254452ljj.16.1695239889401; Wed, 20 Sep 2023 12:58:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([83.149.21.16]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t15-20020a2e780f000000b002c02e57c72bsm821321ljc.140.2023.09.20.12.58.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 20 Sep 2023 12:58:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Serge Semin To: Michal Simek , Alexander Stein , Borislav Petkov , Tony Luck , James Morse , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Robert Richter , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski Cc: Serge Semin , Punnaiah Choudary Kalluri , Dinh Nguyen , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-edac@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 06/13] EDAC/synopsys: Add data poisoning disable support Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 22:56:37 +0300 Message-ID: <20230920195720.32047-7-fancer.lancer@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 In-Reply-To: <20230920195720.32047-1-fancer.lancer@gmail.com> References: <20230920195720.32047-1-fancer.lancer@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Even though being a pure-debug feature currently the data poison can't be disabled once it has been initialized and enabled. Irrespective to the way the feature has been implemented it doesn't seem right since the system may print false ECC errors in case if the poisoned address is accessed by the kernel or by the user-space applications. It's possible since the poisoned address isn't reserved in any kernel mm subsystems. Even though that doesn't seem right either at least it's tolerable since the ECC data poison is supposed to be utilized in the framework of the EDAC driver debugging, but having the feature non-switchable can't be justified that easy especially seeing it's not that hard to implement. So in order to have the ECC data poison switchable define three possible values acceptable by the "inject_data_poison" DebugFS node: 1. "CE" - emit correctable error (as before). 2. "UE" - emit uncorrectable error (used to be any non-"CE" value). 3. Any other value - disable data poison feature. Note the macros describing the data poison-related fields of the ECC_CFG0 register need to be redefined in a way so they would be used to separately switch the feature on/off and to select the type of the ECC error. As a result the suggest solution turns into a proper ECC_CFG0 CSRs fields setup based on the value written to the "inject_data_poison" DebugFS node. Signed-off-by: Serge Semin --- drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c b/drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c index 90640b2f877a..3735c784fac9 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c +++ b/drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c @@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ #define ECC_CFG0_DIS_SCRUB BIT(4) #define ECC_CFG0_MODE_MASK GENMASK(2, 0) +/* ECC CFG1 register definitions */ +#define ECC_CFG1_POISON_BIT BIT(1) +#define ECC_CFG1_POISON_EN BIT(0) + /* ECC status register definitions */ #define ECC_STAT_UE_MASK GENMASK(23, 16) #define ECC_STAT_CE_MASK GENMASK(15, 8) @@ -154,10 +158,6 @@ #define ECC_POISON1_BANK_MASK GENMASK(26, 24) #define ECC_POISON1_ROW_MASK GENMASK(17, 0) -/* DDRC ECC CE & UE poison mask */ -#define ECC_CEPOISON_MASK GENMASK(1, 0) -#define ECC_UEPOISON_MASK BIT(0) - /* DDRC address mapping parameters */ #define DDR_ADDRMAP_NREGS 12 @@ -1787,10 +1787,14 @@ static ssize_t snps_inject_data_poison_read(struct file *filep, char __user *ubu int pos; regval = readl(priv->baseaddr + ECC_CFG1_OFST); - errstr = FIELD_GET(ECC_CEPOISON_MASK, regval) == ECC_CEPOISON_MASK ? - "Correctable Error" : "UnCorrectable Error"; + if (!(regval & ECC_CFG1_POISON_EN)) + errstr = "Off"; + else if (regval & ECC_CFG1_POISON_BIT) + errstr = "CE"; + else + errstr = "UE"; - pos = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Data Poisoning: %s\n\r", errstr); + pos = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s\n", errstr); return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, size, offp, buf, pos); } @@ -1801,6 +1805,7 @@ static ssize_t snps_inject_data_poison_write(struct file *filep, const char __us struct mem_ctl_info *mci = filep->private_data; struct snps_edac_priv *priv = mci->pvt_info; char buf[SNPS_DBGFS_BUF_LEN]; + u32 regval; int rc; rc = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, sizeof(buf), offp, ubuf, size); @@ -1808,10 +1813,16 @@ static ssize_t snps_inject_data_poison_write(struct file *filep, const char __us return rc; writel(0, priv->baseaddr + DDR_SWCTL); + + regval = readl(priv->baseaddr + ECC_CFG1_OFST); if (strncmp(buf, "CE", 2) == 0) - writel(ECC_CEPOISON_MASK, priv->baseaddr + ECC_CFG1_OFST); + regval |= ECC_CFG1_POISON_BIT | ECC_CFG1_POISON_EN; + else if (strncmp(buf, "UE", 2) == 0) + regval = (regval & ~ECC_CFG1_POISON_BIT) | ECC_CFG1_POISON_EN; else - writel(ECC_UEPOISON_MASK, priv->baseaddr + ECC_CFG1_OFST); + regval &= ~ECC_CFG1_POISON_EN; + writel(regval, priv->baseaddr + ECC_CFG1_OFST); + writel(1, priv->baseaddr + DDR_SWCTL); return size;