new file mode 100755
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#! /bin/bash
+# FS QA Test generic/500
+#
+# Test that without the encryption key for a directory, long filenames are
+# presented in a way which avoids collisions, even though they are abbreviated
+# in order to support names up to NAME_MAX bytes.
+#
+# Regression test for:
+# TODO_COMMIT_ID ("f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry")
+# TODO_COMMIT_ID ("fscrypt: avoid collisions when presenting long encrypted filenames")
+#
+# Even with these two fixes it's still possible to create intentional
+# collisions. For now this test covers "accidental" collisions only.
+#
+#-----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Copyright (c) 2017 Google, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+# published by the Free Software Foundation.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it would be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write the Free Software Foundation,
+# Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+#-----------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+
+seq=`basename $0`
+seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
+echo "QA output created by $seq"
+
+here=`pwd`
+tmp=/tmp/$$
+status=1 # failure is the default!
+trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
+
+_cleanup()
+{
+ cd /
+ rm -f $tmp.*
+}
+
+# get standard environment, filters and checks
+. ./common/rc
+. ./common/filter
+. ./common/encrypt
+
+# remove previous $seqres.full before test
+rm -f $seqres.full
+
+# real QA test starts here
+_supported_fs generic
+_supported_os Linux
+_require_scratch_encryption
+_require_xfs_io_command "set_encpolicy"
+_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
+
+# set up an encrypted directory
+
+_new_session_keyring
+_scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>> $seqres.full
+_scratch_mount
+mkdir $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+keydesc=$(_generate_encryption_key)
+# -f 0x2: zero-pad to 16-byte boundary (i.e. encryption block boundary)
+$XFS_IO_PROG -c "set_encpolicy -f 0x2 $keydesc" $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+
+# Create files with long names (> 32 bytes, long enough to trigger the use of
+# "digested" names) in the encrypted directory.
+#
+# Use 100,000 files so that we have a good chance of detecting buggy filesystems
+# that solely use a 32-bit hash to distinguish files, which f2fs was doing.
+#
+# Furthermore, make the filenames differ only in the last 16-byte encryption
+# block. This reproduces the bug where it was not accounted for that ciphertext
+# stealing (CTS) causes the last two blocks to appear "flipped".
+seq -f "$SCRATCH_MNT/edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
+find $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
+
+_unlink_encryption_key $keydesc
+_scratch_cycle_mount
+
+# Verify that every file has a unique inode number and can be removed without
+# error. With the bug(s), some filenames incorrectly pointed to the same inode,
+# and ext4 reported a "Structure needs cleaning" error when removing files.
+find $SCRATCH_MNT/edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
+rm -rf $SCRATCH_MNT/edir
+stat $SCRATCH_MNT/edir |& _filter_scratch
+
+# success, all done
+status=0
+exit
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+QA output created by 500
+100000
+100000
+stat: cannot stat 'SCRATCH_MNT/edir': No such file or directory
@@ -431,3 +431,4 @@
426 auto quick exportfs
427 auto quick aio rw
428 auto quick
+500 auto encrypt