Message ID | 20170928212602.41744-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Not Applicable |
Headers | show |
On Thu, 28 Sep 2017, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > digsig_verify() requests a user key, then accesses its payload. > However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for > this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a > window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore. > > Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was > already revoked at the time it was requested. > > Fixes: 051dbb918c7f ("crypto: digital signature verification support") > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.3+] > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index 03d7c63837ae..6ba6fcd92dd1 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -87,6 +87,12 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, down_read(&key->sem); ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key); + if (!ukp) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + err = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto err1; + } + if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh)) goto err1;