From patchwork Wed Mar 20 18:39:13 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10862399 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A81517E0 for ; Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:40:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30D6229E16 for ; Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:40:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 1F97829E18; Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:40:22 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10A5829C2C for ; Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:40:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727537AbfCTSkT (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:40:19 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:36620 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726812AbfCTSkR (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:40:17 -0400 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.mtv.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.1.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 963BF218A2; Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:40:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1553107215; bh=jEJ17DfyejGc8TI94VO3u5nCjiy43EqYCoVtJ5ZK1/0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=vqrHZmW8JsWjo3WETOCU5/G7NY+mDXYDNWtjlMn5ZPfok64BD7AGrR5M5B45ckX8U 0uNbpwNs3K1BtVRrt4t1frNFnzRyxwMxpHaoILDn3gjAqgyD7Icw4K6FPD2zyZCh2L SOl1P/d+zpOfUDUMq8nXqOd/5MNczqLrvnQ71nVY= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, Sarthak Kukreti , Gao Xiang Subject: [PATCH v2 5/5] fscrypt: fix race where ->lookup() marks plaintext dentry as ciphertext Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 11:39:13 -0700 Message-Id: <20190320183913.12686-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog In-Reply-To: <20190320183913.12686-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20190320183913.12686-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-fscrypt-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers ->lookup() in an encrypted directory begins as follows: 1. fscrypt_prepare_lookup(): a. Try to load the directory's encryption key. b. If the key is unavailable, mark the dentry as a ciphertext name via d_flags. 2. fscrypt_setup_filename(): a. Try to load the directory's encryption key. b. If the key is available, encrypt the name (treated as a plaintext name) to get the on-disk name. Otherwise decode the name (treated as a ciphertext name) to get the on-disk name. But if the key is concurrently added, it may be found at (2a) but not at (1a). In this case, the dentry will be wrongly marked as a ciphertext name even though it was actually treated as plaintext. This will cause the dentry to be wrongly invalidated on the next lookup, potentially causing problems. For example, if the racy ->lookup() was part of sys_mount(), then the new mount will be detached when anything tries to access it. This is despite the mountpoint having a plaintext path, which should remain valid now that the key was added. Of course, this is only possible if there's a userspace race. Still, the additional kernel-side race is confusing and unexpected. Close the kernel-side race by changing fscrypt_prepare_lookup() to also set the on-disk filename (step 2b), consistent with the d_flags update. Fixes: 28b4c263961c ("ext4 crypto: revalidate dentry after adding or removing the key") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/fname.c | 1 + fs/crypto/hooks.c | 11 +++--- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/namei.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/f2fs/namei.c | 17 +++++---- fs/ubifs/dir.c | 8 ++--- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 30 ++++++++++------ 7 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c index 7ff40a73dbece..dea65c091f713 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c @@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, } if (!lookup) return -ENOKEY; + fname->is_ciphertext_name = true; /* * We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index 9d8910e86ee5d..042d5b44f4ed9 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -104,20 +104,21 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_rename); -int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + struct fscrypt_name *fname) { - int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); + int err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, fname); - if (err) + if (err && err != -ENOENT) return err; - if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { + if (fname->is_ciphertext_name) { spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock); dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock); d_set_d_op(dentry, &fscrypt_d_ops); } - return 0; + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup); diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 82ffdacdc7fac..e64a4ee96d30a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2287,23 +2287,47 @@ extern unsigned ext4_free_clusters_after_init(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t ext4_inode_to_goal_block(struct inode *); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +static inline void ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(struct ext4_filename *dst, + const struct fscrypt_name *src) +{ + memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst)); + + dst->usr_fname = src->usr_fname; + dst->disk_name = src->disk_name; + dst->hinfo.hash = src->hash; + dst->hinfo.minor_hash = src->minor_hash; + dst->crypto_buf = src->crypto_buf; +} + static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *iname, - int lookup, struct ext4_filename *fname) + const struct qstr *iname, + int lookup, + struct ext4_filename *fname) { struct fscrypt_name name; int err; - memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct ext4_filename)); - err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, iname, lookup, &name); + if (err) + return err; - fname->usr_fname = name.usr_fname; - fname->disk_name = name.disk_name; - fname->hinfo.hash = name.hash; - fname->hinfo.minor_hash = name.minor_hash; - fname->crypto_buf = name.crypto_buf; - return err; + ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); + return 0; +} + +static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + struct ext4_filename *fname) +{ + struct fscrypt_name name; + int err; + + err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &name); + if (err) + return err; + + ext4_fname_from_fscrypt_name(fname, &name); + return 0; } static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) @@ -2317,19 +2341,27 @@ static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) fname->usr_fname = NULL; fname->disk_name.name = NULL; } -#else +#else /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *iname, - int lookup, struct ext4_filename *fname) + const struct qstr *iname, + int lookup, + struct ext4_filename *fname) { fname->usr_fname = iname; fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *) iname->name; fname->disk_name.len = iname->len; return 0; } -static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) { } -#endif +static inline int ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + struct ext4_filename *fname) +{ + return ext4_fname_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, fname); +} + +static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) { } +#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ /* dir.c */ extern int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *, unsigned int, struct inode *, diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 980166a8122a6..3ba6f30db8d92 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ static int is_dx_internal_node(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block, } /* - * ext4_find_entry() + * __ext4_find_entry() * * finds an entry in the specified directory with the wanted name. It * returns the cache buffer in which the entry was found, and the entry @@ -1337,39 +1337,32 @@ static int is_dx_internal_node(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block, * The returned buffer_head has ->b_count elevated. The caller is expected * to brelse() it when appropriate. */ -static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *d_name, - struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, - int *inlined) +static struct buffer_head *__ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, + struct ext4_filename *fname, + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, + int *inlined) { struct super_block *sb; struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE]; struct buffer_head *bh, *ret = NULL; ext4_lblk_t start, block; - const u8 *name = d_name->name; + const u8 *name = fname->usr_fname->name; size_t ra_max = 0; /* Number of bh's in the readahead buffer, bh_use[] */ size_t ra_ptr = 0; /* Current index into readahead buffer */ ext4_lblk_t nblocks; int i, namelen, retval; - struct ext4_filename fname; *res_dir = NULL; sb = dir->i_sb; - namelen = d_name->len; + namelen = fname->usr_fname->len; if (namelen > EXT4_NAME_LEN) return NULL; - retval = ext4_fname_setup_filename(dir, d_name, 1, &fname); - if (retval == -ENOENT) - return NULL; - if (retval) - return ERR_PTR(retval); - if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { int has_inline_data = 1; - ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, + ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, fname, res_dir, &has_inline_data); if (has_inline_data) { if (inlined) @@ -1389,7 +1382,7 @@ static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir, goto restart; } if (is_dx(dir)) { - ret = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir); + ret = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, fname, res_dir); /* * On success, or if the error was file not found, * return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the @@ -1453,7 +1446,7 @@ static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir, goto cleanup_and_exit; } set_buffer_verified(bh); - i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, &fname, + i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir); if (i == 1) { EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block; @@ -1484,10 +1477,50 @@ static struct buffer_head * ext4_find_entry (struct inode *dir, /* Clean up the read-ahead blocks */ for (; ra_ptr < ra_max; ra_ptr++) brelse(bh_use[ra_ptr]); - ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); return ret; } +static struct buffer_head *ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *d_name, + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, + int *inlined) +{ + int err; + struct ext4_filename fname; + struct buffer_head *bh; + + err = ext4_fname_setup_filename(dir, d_name, 1, &fname); + if (err == -ENOENT) + return NULL; + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, inlined); + + ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); + return bh; +} + +static struct buffer_head *ext4_lookup_entry(struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, + struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) +{ + int err; + struct ext4_filename fname; + struct buffer_head *bh; + + err = ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &fname); + if (err == -ENOENT) + return NULL; + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, NULL); + + ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); + return bh; +} + static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) @@ -1546,16 +1579,11 @@ static struct dentry *ext4_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsi struct inode *inode; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; struct buffer_head *bh; - int err; - - err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, flags); - if (err) - return ERR_PTR(err); if (dentry->d_name.len > EXT4_NAME_LEN) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); - bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL); + bh = ext4_lookup_entry(dir, dentry, &de); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return ERR_CAST(bh); inode = NULL; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index f5e34e4670031..c3e8a901d47ac 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -436,19 +436,23 @@ static struct dentry *f2fs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, nid_t ino = -1; int err = 0; unsigned int root_ino = F2FS_ROOT_INO(F2FS_I_SB(dir)); + struct fscrypt_name fname; trace_f2fs_lookup_start(dir, dentry, flags); - err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, flags); - if (err) - goto out; - if (dentry->d_name.len > F2FS_NAME_LEN) { err = -ENAMETOOLONG; goto out; } - de = f2fs_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &page); + err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &fname); + if (err == -ENOENT) + goto out_splice; + if (err) + goto out; + de = __f2fs_find_entry(dir, &fname, &page); + fscrypt_free_filename(&fname); + if (!de) { if (IS_ERR(page)) { err = PTR_ERR(page); @@ -488,8 +492,7 @@ static struct dentry *f2fs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } out_splice: new = d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); - if (IS_ERR(new)) - err = PTR_ERR(new); + err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(new); trace_f2fs_lookup_end(dir, dentry, ino, err); return new; out_iput: diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c index 5767b373a8ffb..b73de6d04fa3e 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c @@ -220,11 +220,9 @@ static struct dentry *ubifs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, dbg_gen("'%pd' in dir ino %lu", dentry, dir->i_ino); - err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, flags); - if (err) - return ERR_PTR(err); - - err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, &nm); + err = fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &nm); + if (err == -ENOENT) + return d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index 39bd2619a3424..c00b764d6b8c9 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct fscrypt_name { u32 hash; u32 minor_hash; struct fscrypt_str crypto_buf; + bool is_ciphertext_name; }; #define FSTR_INIT(n, l) { .name = n, .len = l } @@ -233,7 +234,8 @@ extern int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, unsigned int flags); -extern int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); +extern int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + struct fscrypt_name *fname); extern int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link); @@ -347,7 +349,7 @@ static inline int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name)); + memset(fname, 0, sizeof(*fname)); fname->usr_fname = iname; fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name; fname->disk_name.len = iname->len; @@ -434,7 +436,8 @@ static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, } static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, - struct dentry *dentry) + struct dentry *dentry, + struct fscrypt_name *fname) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -555,25 +558,32 @@ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, * fscrypt_prepare_lookup - prepare to lookup a name in a possibly-encrypted directory * @dir: directory being searched * @dentry: filename being looked up - * @flags: lookup flags + * @fname: (output) the name to use to search the on-disk directory * - * Prepare for ->lookup() in a directory which may be encrypted. Lookups can be - * done with or without the directory's encryption key; without the key, + * Prepare for ->lookup() in a directory which may be encrypted by determining + * the name that will actually be used to search the directory on-disk. Lookups + * can be done with or without the directory's encryption key; without the key, * filenames are presented in encrypted form. Therefore, we'll try to set up * the directory's encryption key, but even without it the lookup can continue. * * This also installs a custom ->d_revalidate() method which will invalidate the * dentry if it was created without the key and the key is later added. * - * Return: 0 on success, -errno if a problem occurred while setting up the - * encryption key + * Return: 0 on success; -ENOENT if key is unavailable but the filename isn't a + * correctly formed encoded ciphertext name, so a negative dentry should be + * created; or another -errno code. */ static inline int fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - unsigned int flags) + struct fscrypt_name *fname) { if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) - return __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry); + return __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, fname); + + memset(fname, 0, sizeof(*fname)); + fname->usr_fname = &dentry->d_name; + fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)dentry->d_name.name; + fname->disk_name.len = dentry->d_name.len; return 0; }