From patchwork Mon Jun 6 23:11:49 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 12871153 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1225CCA473 for ; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 23:12:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235145AbiFFXMD (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2022 19:12:03 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45070 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232334AbiFFXMC (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Jun 2022 19:12:02 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B284CC9ECA; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 16:12:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46FE3B81C1E; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 23:12:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B99BAC385A9; Mon, 6 Jun 2022 23:11:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1654557118; bh=os+VNrxZ18hzpoZQbhF28dYaPUqeEW+gxHjeRa9iGag=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=EHIWTo20rJbhfy9yJ1iKii9XkbAPDx+ruYaSZ8LLPWUCdyOIXSkCK9JVZF0OSk41e jvo516e6jO1hykde+nHeDw6Jq/dv6YFTExIVME03gI8PxYo72no+Mh+HLYKFXTsbHp 2Qy0tMkt9l4qa1+nRilqvJs/6zCQKf+y4fAJmQyf6LVhf2WPqFuFJf4qn7ght/qvNp TNbwR0GYzpRW79SgKlThZ9NkWfC94eVQsY3t7sKB8YPXi6/0d8fkXSN1qiAdLZs7dY O70P3e1gFIccFvcgynaPHaNqFkvm+mThBHysrXfVQK41Ys3eBGOlml8OXkwI/7WXsR L2ZkEr8iSxzQQ== From: Eric Biggers To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi , Theodore Ts'o Subject: [PATCH 5.15] ext4: only allow test_dummy_encryption when supported Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2022 16:11:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20220606231149.165759-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers commit 5f41fdaea63ddf96d921ab36b2af4a90ccdb5744 upstream. Make the test_dummy_encryption mount option require that the encrypt feature flag be already enabled on the filesystem, rather than automatically enabling it. Practically, this means that "-O encrypt" will need to be included in MKFS_OPTIONS when running xfstests with the test_dummy_encryption mount option. (ext4/053 also needs an update.) Moreover, as long as the preconditions for test_dummy_encryption are being tightened anyway, take the opportunity to start rejecting it when !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION rather than ignoring it. The motivation for requiring the encrypt feature flag is that: - Having the filesystem auto-enable feature flags is problematic, as it bypasses the usual sanity checks. The specific issue which came up recently is that in kernel versions where ext4 supports casefold but not encrypt+casefold (v5.1 through v5.10), the kernel will happily add the encrypt flag to a filesystem that has the casefold flag, making it unmountable -- but only for subsequent mounts, not the initial one. This confused the casefold support detection in xfstests, causing generic/556 to fail rather than be skipped. - The xfstests-bld test runners (kvm-xfstests et al.) already use the required mkfs flag, so they will not be affected by this change. Only users of test_dummy_encryption alone will be affected. But, this option has always been for testing only, so it should be fine to require that the few users of this option update their test scripts. - f2fs already requires it (for its equivalent feature flag). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220519204437.61645-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 6 ------ fs/ext4/super.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) base-commit: 207ca688162d4d77129981a8b4352114b97a52b5 diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index a0a9878578949..2d84030d7b7fc 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -1435,12 +1435,6 @@ struct ext4_super_block { #ifdef __KERNEL__ -#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) ((sbi)->s_dummy_enc_policy.policy != NULL) -#else -#define DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) (0) -#endif - /* Number of quota types we support */ #define EXT4_MAXQUOTAS 3 diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index d12f11c6fbf25..de7b0897f3d4b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2058,6 +2058,12 @@ static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); int err; + if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, + "test_dummy_encryption requires encrypt feature"); + return -1; + } + /* * This mount option is just for testing, and it's not worthwhile to * implement the extra complexity (e.g. RCU protection) that would be @@ -2085,11 +2091,13 @@ static int ext4_set_test_dummy_encryption(struct super_block *sb, return -1; } ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Test dummy encryption mode enabled"); + return 1; #else ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, - "Test dummy encryption mount option ignored"); + "test_dummy_encryption option not supported"); + return -1; + #endif - return 1; } struct ext4_parsed_options { @@ -4783,12 +4791,6 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto failed_mount_wq; } - if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !sb_rdonly(sb) && - !ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) { - ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb); - ext4_commit_super(sb); - } - /* * Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the * superblock if present.