From patchwork Tue Nov 8 13:39:20 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 13036322 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5421C43219 for ; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 13:57:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234827AbiKHN5A (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Nov 2022 08:57:00 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58836 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234823AbiKHN47 (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Nov 2022 08:56:59 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8F5ADCCF; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 05:56:58 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C03D6157B; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 13:56:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 24BB3C433C1; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 13:56:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1667915817; bh=YV56Qv4wz7zOVx4PQgODxJYPLbTWTfoDq/RaAwr/mW0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BG4rQdHm2ctCHc5Y7l4ZBrCy0k7Wd1sYR18eYDDVcvpTZ01xBqLkMqGkqOq0g1f7h W0Il8IFwMDTl0faQ1hd7JEXEHcnyNScOZwwRTkahGMuv0565v82GyG76n8JcvftqZ3 dCduWY/I8DoWHpGBrCNGwbBb62b/26LTaD+/QyWU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, syzbot+104c2a89561289cec13e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" , Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH 5.10 082/118] fscrypt: fix keyring memory leak on mount failure Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 14:39:20 +0100 Message-Id: <20221108133344.269148624@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.1 In-Reply-To: <20221108133340.718216105@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20221108133340.718216105@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers commit ccd30a476f8e864732de220bd50e6f372f5ebcab upstream. Commit d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key") moved the keyring destruction from __put_super() to generic_shutdown_super() so that the filesystem's block device(s) are still available. Unfortunately, this causes a memory leak in the case where a mount is attempted with the test_dummy_encryption mount option, but the mount fails after the option has already been processed. To fix this, attempt the keyring destruction in both places. Reported-by: syzbot+104c2a89561289cec13e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011213838.209879-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/crypto/keyring.c | 17 +++++++++++------ fs/super.c | 3 ++- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -202,14 +202,19 @@ static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(s } /* - * This is called at unmount time to release all encryption keys that have been - * added to the filesystem, along with the keyring that contains them. + * Release all encryption keys that have been added to the filesystem, along + * with the keyring that contains them. * - * Note that besides clearing and freeing memory, this might need to evict keys - * from the keyslots of an inline crypto engine. Therefore, this must be called - * while the filesystem's underlying block device(s) are still available. + * This is called at unmount time. The filesystem's underlying block device(s) + * are still available at this time; this is important because after user file + * accesses have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the + * keyslots of an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s). + * + * This is also called when the super_block is being freed. This is needed to + * avoid a memory leak if mounting fails after the "test_dummy_encryption" + * option was processed, as in that case the unmount-time call isn't made. */ -void fscrypt_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) +void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb) { struct fscrypt_keyring *keyring = sb->s_master_keys; size_t i; --- a/fs/super.c +++ b/fs/super.c @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ static void __put_super(struct super_blo WARN_ON(s->s_inode_lru.node); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts)); security_sb_free(s); + fscrypt_destroy_keyring(s); put_user_ns(s->s_user_ns); kfree(s->s_subtype); call_rcu(&s->rcu, destroy_super_rcu); @@ -453,7 +454,7 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super evict_inodes(sb); /* only nonzero refcount inodes can have marks */ fsnotify_sb_delete(sb); - fscrypt_sb_delete(sb); + fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb); if (sb->s_dio_done_wq) { destroy_workqueue(sb->s_dio_done_wq); --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct fscrypt } /* keyring.c */ -void fscrypt_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb); +void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb); int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(struct file *filp, void __user *arg); @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ fscrypt_free_dummy_policy(struct fscrypt } /* keyring.c */ -static inline void fscrypt_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) +static inline void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb) { }