From patchwork Thu Oct 20 16:58:40 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sweet Tea Dorminy X-Patchwork-Id: 13013807 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5223C433FE for ; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 17:00:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229986AbiJTRAS (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Oct 2022 13:00:18 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:51300 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229998AbiJTRAQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 Oct 2022 13:00:16 -0400 Received: from box.fidei.email (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 058259AF80; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 10:00:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from authenticated-user (box.fidei.email [71.19.144.250]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by box.fidei.email (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 27563811D7; Thu, 20 Oct 2022 12:59:39 -0400 (EDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=dorminy.me; s=mail; t=1666285179; bh=3LGhGx+DVMJdPU0aZqSOrMi0E7gESXwazg7yDLKnx58=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=xGL3EISPUMovbSyRBawkfTzaclVpdq1Ytc0J0nVkSQAbrQhpx/vglddAqqnRS2szs rF9mMV0/oJ0R28jJDY/iNe5rqaGSAvHjfakMy0iscnPE0+wlXyZA+hHlkjkJNbGKBK eUaLqDW3E0syGKpADgOepGtm/x+rgmJ6+viJqZjdD51j7rzuARC+esc30ZiMfa+1Vo xjsfVD31lR/3G/dmNsL7+y5Rg67xhKkLvw5a4lmThI5it+5oyaw6TKoLxxEXuvswln iArZg5+NAyXz8TJm0nACPLAulnH5CFpr8yHhKrenyR74uLlcUgmHoynS0LKE9r8HL/ F4KKYcHQMLNmA== From: Sweet Tea Dorminy To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Jaegeuk Kim , Eric Biggers , Chris Mason , Josef Bacik , David Sterba , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com Cc: Omar Sandoval , Sweet Tea Dorminy Subject: [PATCH v3 21/22] fscrypt: add flag allowing partially-encrypted directories Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 12:58:40 -0400 Message-Id: <2664d197270314e809421f58aaeb728df3a3daf4.1666281277.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org From: Omar Sandoval Creating several new subvolumes out of snapshots of another subvolume, each for a different VM's storage, is a important usecase for btrfs. We would like to give each VM a unique encryption key to use for new writes to its subvolume, so that secure deletion of the VM's data is as simple as securely deleting the key; to avoid needing multiple keys in each VM, we envision the initial subvolume being unencrypted. However, this means that the snapshot's directories would have a mix of encrypted and unencrypted files. During lookup with a key, both unencrypted and encrypted forms of the desired name must be queried. To allow this, add another FS_CFLG to allow filesystems to opt into partially encrypted directories. Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy --- fs/crypto/fname.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c index b3e7e3a66312..16b64e0589e4 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, fname->usr_fname = iname; if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) { +unencrypted: fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name; fname->disk_name.len = iname->len; return 0; @@ -448,8 +449,16 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, * user-supplied name */ - if (iname->len > FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX_ENCODED) + if (iname->len > FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX_ENCODED) { + /* + * This isn't a valid nokey name, but it could be an unencrypted + * name if the filesystem allows partially encrypted + * directories. + */ + if (dir->i_sb->s_cop->flags & FS_CFLG_ALLOW_PARTIAL) + goto unencrypted; return -ENOENT; + } fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL) @@ -460,6 +469,12 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, if (ret < (int)offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes[1]) || (ret > offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256) && ret != FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX)) { + /* Again, this could be an unencrypted name. */ + if (dir->i_sb->s_cop->flags & FS_CFLG_ALLOW_PARTIAL) { + kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name); + fname->crypto_buf.name = NULL; + goto unencrypted; + } ret = -ENOENT; goto errout; } diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index 4143c722ea1b..485471174594 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ struct fscrypt_nokey_name { * pages for writes and therefore won't need the fscrypt bounce page pool. */ #define FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES (1U << 1) +/* The filesystem allows partially encrypted directories/files. */ +#define FS_CFLG_ALLOW_PARTIAL (1U << 2) /* Crypto operations for filesystems */ struct fscrypt_operations {