From patchwork Mon Jan 4 21:49:50 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stephan Mueller X-Patchwork-Id: 11997607 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C56FC433E6 for ; Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:59:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63B23224F9 for ; Mon, 4 Jan 2021 21:59:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726983AbhADV6t (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Jan 2021 16:58:49 -0500 Received: from mo4-p01-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([85.215.255.50]:23010 "EHLO mo4-p01-ob.smtp.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726929AbhADV6t (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Jan 2021 16:58:49 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1609797354; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:From: Subject:Sender; bh=pAgy1otXzvJufKgLKh/aLwRJrmcHtfA9dc+JXv9QmgU=; b=mXkmFOFIRn9UABk36iBUgalfsdGB6AqBA0oZp6q8nF9u3/iHSLratoBpAeQMqPB5YS VK8SjjTHV7L6jMap3gdLclhMEzhqu5rdXyxazhp81k9SaVoI/uaEj7LfJjooFkiPaHlb /QjMgZr2N/drhMZ2ztb02xeDQiy52xs6UHkXmi+ge9CfIzyqPW/kDwMrqxkDHbWtQP6y 9gyT0z+2/i56lzYxXEJSFb79Bgva0YP9WkbDDpst2UA7yGCMM6vyOfYgW2bhjRYAhbZb 1fPqrV3246LpAVhkl8qpMPFplOwCwicpJWGFPJrtxfRQp+nzrt71OrzXhB4LZcdw/Z+M CENQ== X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xmwdNnzGHXPaIvSZFqc=" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from positron.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 47.10.7 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id h02bd9x04LqjxfK (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Mon, 4 Jan 2021 22:52:45 +0100 (CET) From: Stephan =?iso-8859-1?q?M=FCller?= To: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ebiggers@kernel.org, mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com, dhowells@redhat.com Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/5] security: DH - use KDF implementation from crypto API Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2021 22:49:50 +0100 Message-ID: <3088284.aeNJFYEL58@positron.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <4616980.31r3eYUQgx@positron.chronox.de> References: <4616980.31r3eYUQgx@positron.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org The kernel crypto API provides the SP800-108 counter KDF implementation. Thus, the separate implementation provided as part of the keys subsystem can be replaced with calls to the KDF offered by the kernel crypto API. The keys subsystem uses the counter KDF with a hash cipher primitive. Thus, it only uses the call to crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate. The change removes the specific code that adds a zero padding that was intended to be invoked when the DH operation result was smaller than the modulus. However, this cannot occur any more these days because the function mpi_write_to_sgl is used in the code path that calculates the shared secret in dh_compute_value. This MPI service function guarantees that leading zeros are introduced as needed to ensure the resulting data is exactly as long as the modulus. This implies that the specific code to add zero padding is dead code which can be safely removed. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller --- security/keys/Kconfig | 2 +- security/keys/dh.c | 118 ++++++------------------------------------ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 83bc23409164..e6604499f0a8 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys" depends on KEYS select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HASH + select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR select CRYPTO_DH help This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index 1abfa70ed6e1..46fa442b81ec 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "internal.h" @@ -79,16 +80,9 @@ static void dh_crypto_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err) complete(&compl->completion); } -struct kdf_sdesc { - struct shash_desc shash; - char ctx[]; -}; - -static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname) +static int kdf_alloc(struct crypto_shash **hash, char *hashname) { struct crypto_shash *tfm; - struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc; - int size; int err; /* allocate synchronous hash */ @@ -102,14 +96,7 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname) if (crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm) == 0) goto out_free_tfm; - err = -ENOMEM; - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm); - sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sdesc) - goto out_free_tfm; - sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm; - - *sdesc_ret = sdesc; + *hash = tfm; return 0; @@ -118,92 +105,20 @@ static int kdf_alloc(struct kdf_sdesc **sdesc_ret, char *hashname) return err; } -static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc) -{ - if (!sdesc) - return; - - if (sdesc->shash.tfm) - crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm); - - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); -} - -/* - * Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1 - * as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF). - * - * SP800-56A: - * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret - * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section - * 5.8.1.2). - * - * 'dlen' must be a multiple of the digest size. - */ -static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, - u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen) +static void kdf_dealloc(struct crypto_shash *hash) { - struct shash_desc *desc = &sdesc->shash; - unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm); - int err = 0; - u8 *dst_orig = dst; - __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1); - - while (dlen) { - err = crypto_shash_init(desc); - if (err) - goto err; - - err = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&counter, sizeof(__be32)); - if (err) - goto err; - - if (zlen && h) { - u8 tmpbuffer[32]; - size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer)); - memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk); - - do { - err = crypto_shash_update(desc, tmpbuffer, - chunk); - if (err) - goto err; - - zlen -= chunk; - chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer)); - } while (zlen); - } - - if (src && slen) { - err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen); - if (err) - goto err; - } - - err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst); - if (err) - goto err; - - dlen -= h; - dst += h; - counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1); - } - - return 0; - -err: - memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen); - return err; + if (hash) + crypto_free_shash(hash); } -static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, +static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_shash *hash, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, - uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen, size_t lzero) + uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen) { + struct kvec kbuf_iov = { .iov_base = kbuf, .iov_len = kbuflen }; uint8_t *outbuf = NULL; int ret; - size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, - crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); + size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, crypto_shash_digestsize(hash)); outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf) { @@ -211,7 +126,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, goto err; } - ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, outbuf_len, lzero); + ret = crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate(hash, &kbuf_iov, 1, outbuf, outbuf_len); if (ret) goto err; @@ -240,7 +155,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, struct kpp_request *req; uint8_t *secret; uint8_t *outbuf; - struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc = NULL; + struct crypto_shash *hash = NULL; if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) { ret = -EINVAL; @@ -273,7 +188,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, } /* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */ - ret = kdf_alloc(&sdesc, hashname); + ret = kdf_alloc(&hash, hashname); kfree(hashname); if (ret) goto out1; @@ -383,9 +298,8 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, goto out6; } - ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(sdesc, buffer, buflen, outbuf, - req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen, - outlen - req->dst_len); + ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(hash, buffer, buflen, outbuf, + req->dst_len + kdfcopy->otherinfolen); } else if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, req->dst_len) == 0) { ret = req->dst_len; } else { @@ -403,7 +317,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, out2: dh_free_data(&dh_inputs); out1: - kdf_dealloc(sdesc); + kdf_dealloc(hash); return ret; }