@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ union bpf_attr;
struct io_uring_params;
struct clone_args;
struct open_how;
+struct landlock_ruleset_attr;
+enum landlock_rule_type;
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
@@ -1008,6 +1010,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,
siginfo_t __user *info,
unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *attr,
+ size_t size, __u32 flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_landlock_add_rule(int ruleset_fd, enum landlock_rule_type rule_type,
+ const void __user *rule_attr, __u32 flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_landlock_enforce_ruleset_current(int ruleset_fd, __u32 flags);
/*
* Architecture-specific system calls
@@ -9,6 +9,59 @@
#ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__
#define _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_ruleset_attr - Ruleset definition
+ *
+ * Argument of sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). This structure can grow in
+ * future versions.
+ */
+struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
+ /**
+ * @handled_access_fs: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Filesystem flags`_)
+ * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no
+ * rule explicitly allow them. This is needed for backward
+ * compatibility reasons.
+ */
+ __u64 handled_access_fs;
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum landlock_rule_type - Landlock rule type
+ *
+ * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
+ */
+enum landlock_rule_type {
+ /**
+ * @LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: Type of a &struct
+ * landlock_path_beneath_attr .
+ */
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_path_beneath_attr - Path hierarchy definition
+ *
+ * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
+ */
+struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
+ /**
+ * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed actions for this file hierarchy
+ * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_).
+ */
+ __u64 allowed_access;
+ /**
+ * @parent_fd: File descriptor, open with ``O_PATH``, which identifies
+ * the parent directory of a file hierarchy, or just a file.
+ */
+ __s32 parent_fd;
+ /*
+ * This struct is packed to avoid trailing reserved members.
+ * Cf. security/landlock/syscall.c:build_check_abi()
+ */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
/**
* DOC: fs_access
*
@@ -264,6 +264,11 @@ COND_SYSCALL(request_key);
COND_SYSCALL(keyctl);
COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(keyctl);
+/* security/landlock/syscall.c */
+COND_SYSCALL(landlock_create_ruleset);
+COND_SYSCALL(landlock_add_rule);
+COND_SYSCALL(landlock_enforce_ruleset_current);
+
/* arch/example/kernel/sys_example.c */
/* mm/fadvise.c */
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
-landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
+landlock-y := setup.o syscall.o object.o ruleset.o \
cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - System call implementations and user space interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
+
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "fs.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+/**
+ * copy_min_struct_from_user - Safe future-proof argument copying
+ *
+ * Extend copy_struct_from_user() to check for consistent user buffer.
+ *
+ * @dst: Kernel space pointer or NULL.
+ * @ksize: Actual size of the data pointed to by @dst.
+ * @ksize_min: Minimal required size to be copied.
+ * @src: User space pointer or NULL.
+ * @usize: (Alleged) size of the data pointed to by @src.
+ */
+static __always_inline int copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst,
+ const size_t ksize, const size_t ksize_min,
+ const void __user *const src, const size_t usize)
+{
+ /* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst);
+ if (!src)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Checks size ranges. */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min);
+ if (usize < ksize_min)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ /* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */
+ return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function only contains arithmetic operations with constants, leading to
+ * BUILD_BUG_ON(). The related code is evaluated and checked at build time,
+ * but it is then ignored thanks to compiler optimizations.
+ */
+static void build_check_abi(void)
+{
+ size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
+
+ /*
+ * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
+ * hole in them, then checks that all architectures have the same
+ * struct size.
+ */
+ ruleset_size = sizeof_field(struct landlock_ruleset_attr, handled_access_fs);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr) != 8);
+
+ path_beneath_size = sizeof_field(struct landlock_path_beneath_attr, allowed_access);
+ path_beneath_size += sizeof_field(struct landlock_path_beneath_attr, parent_fd);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) != 12);
+}
+
+/* Ruleset handling */
+
+static int fop_ruleset_release(struct inode *const inode,
+ struct file *const filp)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset = filp->private_data;
+
+ landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t fop_dummy_read(struct file *const filp, char __user *const buf,
+ const size_t size, loff_t *const ppos)
+{
+ /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_READ. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t fop_dummy_write(struct file *const filp,
+ const char __user *const buf, const size_t size,
+ loff_t *const ppos)
+{
+ /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_WRITE. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A ruleset file descriptor enables to build a ruleset by adding (i.e.
+ * writing) rule after rule, without relying on the task's context. This
+ * reentrant design is also used in a read way to enforce the ruleset on the
+ * current task.
+ */
+static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
+ .release = fop_ruleset_release,
+ .read = fop_dummy_read,
+ .write = fop_dummy_write,
+};
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
+ *
+ * @attr: Pointer to a &struct landlock_ruleset_attr identifying the scope of
+ * the new ruleset.
+ * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for
+ * backward and forward compatibility).
+ * @flags: Must be 0.
+ *
+ * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the
+ * related file descriptor on success.
+ *
+ * Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or unknown access, or too small @size;
+ * - E2BIG or EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
+ * - ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr,
+ const size_t, size, const __u32, flags)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
+ struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+ int err, ruleset_fd;
+
+ /* Build-time checks. */
+ build_check_abi();
+
+ if (!landlock_initialized)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* No flag for now. */
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Copies raw user space buffer. */
+ err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
+ offsetofend(typeof(ruleset_attr), handled_access_fs),
+ attr, size);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* Checks content (and 32-bits cast). */
+ if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs | _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MASK) !=
+ _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
+ ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
+ if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+ return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+
+ /* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */
+ ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("landlock-ruleset", &ruleset_fops,
+ ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (ruleset_fd < 0)
+ landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+ return ruleset_fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns an owned ruleset from a FD. It is thus needed to call
+ * landlock_put_ruleset() on the return value.
+ */
+static struct landlock_ruleset *get_ruleset_from_fd(const int fd,
+ const fmode_t mode)
+{
+ struct fd ruleset_f;
+ struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+
+ ruleset_f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!ruleset_f.file)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
+
+ /* Checks FD type and access right. */
+ if (ruleset_f.file->f_op != &ruleset_fops) {
+ ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EBADFD);
+ goto out_fdput;
+ }
+ if (!(ruleset_f.file->f_mode & mode)) {
+ ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ goto out_fdput;
+ }
+ ruleset = ruleset_f.file->private_data;
+ landlock_get_ruleset(ruleset);
+
+out_fdput:
+ fdput(ruleset_f);
+ return ruleset;
+}
+
+/* Path handling */
+
+/*
+ * @path: Must call put_path(@path) after the call if it succeeded.
+ */
+static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path)
+{
+ struct fd f;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(fd,
+ ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd));
+
+ /* Handles O_PATH. */
+ f = fdget_raw(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ /*
+ * Only allows O_PATH file descriptor: enables to restrict ambient
+ * filesystem access without requiring to open and risk leaking or
+ * misusing a file descriptor. Forbid internal filesystems (e.g.
+ * nsfs), including pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
+ * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs).
+ */
+ if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH) ||
+ (f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) ||
+ (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
+ d_is_negative(f.file->f_path.dentry) ||
+ IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry))) {
+ err = -EBADFD;
+ goto out_fdput;
+ }
+ *path = f.file->f_path;
+ path_get(path);
+
+out_fdput:
+ fdput(f);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
+ *
+ * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset which should be extended
+ * with the new rule.
+ * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
+ * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
+ * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
+ * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
+ * @flags: Must be 0.
+ *
+ * This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing
+ * ruleset.
+ *
+ * Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
+ * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's
+ * accesses);
+ * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread;
+ * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor;
+ * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no write access to the underlying ruleset;
+ * - EFAULT: @rule_attr inconsistency.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule,
+ const int, ruleset_fd, const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type,
+ const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags)
+{
+ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
+ struct path path;
+ struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
+ int res, err;
+
+ if (!landlock_initialized)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* No flag for now. */
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
+ res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr,
+ sizeof(path_beneath_attr));
+ if (res)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
+ ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_WRITE);
+ if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+ return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+
+ /*
+ * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
+ * (ruleset->fs_access_mask is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
+ * Allows empty allowed_access i.e., deny @ruleset->fs_access_mask .
+ */
+ if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | ruleset->fs_access_mask) !=
+ ruleset->fs_access_mask) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_put_ruleset;
+ }
+
+ /* Gets and checks the new rule. */
+ err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_put_ruleset;
+
+ /* Imports the new rule. */
+ err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path,
+ path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
+ path_put(&path);
+
+out_put_ruleset:
+ landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Enforcement */
+
+/**
+ * sys_landlock_enforce_ruleset_current - Enforce a ruleset on the current task
+ *
+ * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target.
+ * @flags: Must be 0.
+ *
+ * This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current
+ * thread. Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its
+ * namespace or is running with no_new_privs. This avoids scenarios where
+ * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
+ *
+ * Possible returned errors are:
+ *
+ * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0.
+ * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread;
+ * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor;
+ * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the
+ * current thread is not running with no_new_privs, or it doesn't have
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace.
+ * - E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current
+ * task.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_enforce_ruleset_current,
+ const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32, flags)
+{
+ struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *ruleset;
+ struct cred *new_cred;
+ struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!landlock_initialized)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* No flag for now. */
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be
+ * returned.
+ */
+ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
+ !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
+ ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
+ if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
+ return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
+
+ /* Prepares new credentials. */
+ new_cred = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new_cred) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_put_ruleset;
+ }
+ new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no possible race condition while copying and manipulating
+ * the current credentials because they are dedicated per thread.
+ */
+ new_dom = landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset);
+ if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(new_dom);
+ goto out_put_creds;
+ }
+
+ /* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */
+ landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain);
+ new_llcred->domain = new_dom;
+
+ landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+ return commit_creds(new_cred);
+
+out_put_creds:
+ abort_creds(new_cred);
+
+out_put_ruleset:
+ landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
+ return err;
+}