From patchwork Wed Apr 7 10:52:45 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12187855 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FBB9C43461 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 10:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64151611EE for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 10:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S244920AbhDGKyc (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 06:54:32 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2789 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S233117AbhDGKyb (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 06:54:31 -0400 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.226]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4FFh3G0X36z686yJ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 18:49:14 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 12:54:19 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v5 05/12] evm: Introduce evm_status_revalidate() Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2021 12:52:45 +0200 Message-ID: <20210407105252.30721-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210407105252.30721-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210407105252.30721-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml753-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.203) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded. However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function. For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the portable signature invalid. This patch introduces evm_status_revalidate(), which callers of evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr post hooks to determine whether re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in its xattr post hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is re-evaluated after a metadata operation. Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a setattr operation. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- include/linux/evm.h | 6 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++++--- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 8302bc29bb35..e5b7bcb152b9 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); +extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -104,5 +105,10 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } +static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_EVM */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 7ac5204c8d1f..998818283fda 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -425,6 +425,30 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +/** + * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * + * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the + * EVM status. + * + * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. + */ +bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +{ + if (!evm_key_loaded()) + return false; + + /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */ + if (!xattr_name) + return true; + + if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -441,8 +465,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -462,7 +485,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -513,9 +536,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_key_loaded()) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) return; + evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 1f029e4c8d7f..d4b8db1acadd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -586,13 +586,15 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -611,6 +613,6 @@ void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1) + if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); }