@@ -140,16 +140,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
- /*
- * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
- * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
- * and check again at the very end too.
- */
- error = -EACCES;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
- path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
- goto exit;
-
fsnotify_open(file);
error = -ENOEXEC;
@@ -168,7 +158,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
break;
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
-exit:
fput(file);
out:
return error;
@@ -925,16 +914,6 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
- /*
- * may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
- * impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
- * and check again at the very end too.
- */
- err = -EACCES;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
- path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
- goto exit;
-
err = deny_write_access(file);
if (err)
goto exit;
We got issue as follows: may_open [pid=1900]: path=file0 mode=1 exec=0 path_mount [pid = 1901]: mnt_flags=0x64 sb_flags=0x1 flags=0x4029 name=/ do_open_execat [pid=1900]: file=./file0 mode = 8828 exec=1 mnt_flags=1064 s_iflags=0, path=file0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1900 at fs/exec.c:943 do_open_execat+0x24a/0x570 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 1900 Comm: rep Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-next-20220615+ #240 RIP: 0010:do_open_execat+0x24a/0x570 RSP: 0018:ffff88810243fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff11020487fa4 RCX: ffff888126db6900 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888126db6900 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: ffff88810c022200 R08: ffffffff86a52a3a R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: ffffed1075e5e4e2 R12: ffff8881098c23c0 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8881098c23e0 R15: ffff8881098c23d0 FS: 00007fd72a66c700(0000) GS:ffff8883af2c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200013c0 CR3: 0000000123548000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bprm_execve+0x2c7/0xd70 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x338/0x420 __x64_sys_execveat+0x71/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 The above issue is caused by remount the file system as noexec concurrently. As commit 0fd338b2d2cd move path_noexec to may_open, and add recheck at end. This kind of repeated check is unnecessary, because it also occurs in some scenarios. Even if we guarantee the order of the file opening and remounting process, there will still be binaries executing under the noexec file system. The current process can at least ensure that binary files cannot be executed after the file system is remounted into noexec. So it is safe to delete this check Fixes:0fd338b2d2cd("exec: move path_noexec() check earlier") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com> --- fs/exec.c | 21 --------------------- 1 file changed, 21 deletions(-)