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Hallyn" , Kentaro Takeda , Tetsuo Handa , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , Eric Biederman , Andrew Morton , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:22:32 -0800 Message-Id: <20240124192228.work.788-kees@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=2841; i=keescook@chromium.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=1gaILVY/H6stGS/EvSXd6ZL/n9yg9wEbY6RbWPaWb/g=; b=owEBbQKS/ZANAwAKAYly9N/cbcAmAcsmYgBlsWN4cgMm3ifa4AxYv0rR1P9nb2T7XG8BeE5dh dQdKGdd8U+JAjMEAAEKAB0WIQSlw/aPIp3WD3I+bhOJcvTf3G3AJgUCZbFjeAAKCRCJcvTf3G3A Jj8eEACdqWJsXSjCuU2ZGkwBhmHssL73vpbJm9vow7VcgTvUcgVoF7WjPAqU3SkkUee2vuDuEEC uG3G42UgwdGwzUcascCCo7wkaex/Ac7gDV7BRBywIyjF/vLDCeQ5HhIqatIu/mH44Ebni5aTAQU hUYp/I3213FNl/oN3a+PJoqHHB5ORr/0z+NOMW3XT/pJ5DU0fMqAxTHtrF2s/IE9WWreJ4PP9dD X5FSgLuUtR0LuJ8/8gRd5EFCycwwUXuvOBcR9Nt4fBBQcU02uF3kcXzm4eF9JJyib+jYDu2tNP3 eouwdnVwePLu9Xbr2l2lFju9lrgM9QjR7aLXB4J6Bw1nlyZHuj6Hjrc+EYzI1fpVDfrBSTQtFfj Skv/zZriwMgLINYrOds5qiWwNPLT7pTEychRittwryFFuoqSyJwLS/5PkycmxUNlwqaQl4NU5S5 aP++f2Hfr2S7lrzFV1waa0HOn4J2drH3GfOqw+oPKvq/DxMlScVwY76Uvpncoov/alR5EnKKzn4 Pr66BX8S4pcrokYTbSm4BLat0ulOpUJgRCL1ixDnhwT4ftGIkEFBz8KiIYbfwT/bZCe9VHxD8/s bpXJ4Z6N1DuM1EnVnoMQy4GyH63CVXzi2u+ZM1eMNszMiKfYeeWkpZ+ljiyoNyt9iy/mx7u3pPW 6+jc5CV pbke/Mtw== X-Developer-Key: i=keescook@chromium.org; a=openpgp; fpr=A5C3F68F229DD60F723E6E138972F4DFDC6DC026 After commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else"), current->in_execve was no longer in sync with the open(). This broke AppArmor and TOMOYO which depend on this flag to distinguish "open" operations from being "exec" operations. Instead of moving around in_execve, switch to using __FMODE_EXEC, which is where the "is this an exec?" intent is stored. Note that TOMOYO still uses in_execve around cred handling. Reported-by: Kevin Locke Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZbE4qn9_h14OqADK@kevinlocke.name Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Fixes: 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else") Cc: Josh Triplett Cc: John Johansen Cc: Paul Moore Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Kentaro Takeda Cc: Tetsuo Handa Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Kevin Locke --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 7717354ce095..98e1150bee9d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -469,8 +469,10 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to * actually execute the image. + * + * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. */ - if (current->in_execve) { + if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) { fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; return 0; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 3c3af149bf1c..04a92c3d65d4 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -328,7 +328,8 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { /* Don't check read permission here if called from execve(). */ - if (current->in_execve) + /* Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. */ + if (f->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) return 0; return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, f->f_flags);