@@ -2,6 +2,21 @@
Executability check
===================
+The ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` :manpage:`execveat(2)` flag, and the
+``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` securebits
+are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a
+consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel. See the
+`samples/check-exec/inc.c`_ example.
+
+Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the
+security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution
+environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or
+not. For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary
+syscalls and access arbitrary files. Such interpreters should then be
+enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security policy.
+However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should already be
+sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's environment.
+
AT_EXECVE_CHECK
===============
@@ -32,3 +47,85 @@ be executable, which also requires integrity guarantees.
To avoid race conditions leading to time-of-check to time-of-use issues,
``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` should be used with ``AT_EMPTY_PATH`` to check against a
file descriptor instead of a path.
+
+SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE
+==========================================================
+
+When ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE`` is set, a process should only interpret or
+execute a file if a call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file
+descriptor and the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
+
+This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
+container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the
+related ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
+
+Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the
+securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration.
+Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code
+vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be
+careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration.
+
+However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as
+environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits
+checks. For instance, the ``PATH`` and ``LD_PRELOAD`` variables can be set by
+a script's caller. Changing these variables may lead to unintended code
+executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK. For this to
+make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to avoid
+arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute policy.
+
+When ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set, a process should never interpret
+interactive user commands (e.g. scripts). However, if such commands are passed
+through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be interpreted if a
+call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with the related file descriptor and the
+``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag succeed.
+
+For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument
+should always deny such execution if ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE`` is set.
+
+This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
+container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the
+related ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED`` bit should also be set.
+
+Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to combination
+of any exec securebits:
+
+1. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
+
+ Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands (default).
+
+ No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of
+ potential issues thanks to the call to :manpage:`execveat(2)` with
+ ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` which should always be performed but ignored by the
+ script interpreter. Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems
+ administrators to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for
+ migration to a secure mode.
+
+2. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0``
+
+ Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow
+ arbitrary user commands.
+
+ The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not fooled)
+ users. That can protect against unintended script executions (e.g. ``sh
+ /tmp/*.sh``). This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user sessions.
+
+3. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
+
+ Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
+
+ This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without interactive
+ user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g. with IMA/EVM or
+ dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be ready yet. Indeed,
+ arbitrary interactive commands would be much more difficult to check.
+
+4. ``SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1`` and ``SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1``
+
+ Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
+ any arbitrary user commands.
+
+ The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted code).
+ This makes sense for system services that may only execute trusted scripts.
+
+.. Links
+.. _samples/check-exec/inc.c:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/samples/check-exec/inc.c
@@ -52,10 +52,32 @@
#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
+/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
+#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE 8
+#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED 9 /* make bit-8 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \
+ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
+
+/* See Documentation/userspace-api/check_exec.rst */
+#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE 10
+#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED 11 /* make bit-10 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \
+ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
+#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \
+ (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
+
#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
- issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
@@ -1302,21 +1302,38 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user_ns,
- CAP_SETPCAP,
- CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
* [3] no setting of unsupported bits
- * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
- * the "sendmail capabilities bug")
*/
)
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
+ * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
+ * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
+ * itself.
+ */
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
+ const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+ const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
+
+ /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
+ if (!changed)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* Denies privileged changes. */
+ if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;