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[76.182.20.124]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id u5-20020a25f805000000b00db4d3bf8df5sm633614ybd.27.2023.12.01.14.12.00 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 01 Dec 2023 14:12:00 -0800 (PST) From: Josef Bacik To: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@fb.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 03/46] fscrypt: add a fscrypt_inode_open helper Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 17:11:00 -0500 Message-ID: <32beea11211858a998ba2de88d01471c31004f2d.1701468306.git.josef@toxicpanda.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 We have fscrypt_file_open() which is meant to be called on files being opened so that their key is loaded when we start reading data from them. However for btrfs send we are opening the inode directly without a filp, so we need a different helper to make sure we can load the fscrypt context for the inode before reading its contents. We need a different helper as opposed to simply using fscrypt_has_permitted_context() directly because of '-o test_dummy_encryption', which allows for encrypted files to be created with !IS_ENCRYPTED set on the directory (the root directory in this case). fscrypt_file_open() already does the appropriate check where it simply doesn't call fscrypt_has_permitted_context() if the parent directory isn't marked with IS_ENCRYPTED in order to facilitate this invariant when using '-o test_dummy_encryption'. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik --- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fscrypt.h | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index 52504dd478d3..a391a987c58f 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -49,6 +49,48 @@ int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open); +/** + * fscrypt_inode_open() - prepare to open a possibly-encrypted regular file + * @dir: the directory that contains this inode + * @inode: the inode being opened + * + * Currently, an encrypted regular file can only be opened if its encryption key + * is available; access to the raw encrypted contents is not supported. + * Therefore, we first set up the inode's encryption key (if not already done) + * and return an error if it's unavailable. + * + * We also verify that if the parent directory is encrypted, then the inode + * being opened uses the same encryption policy. This is needed as part of the + * enforcement that all files in an encrypted directory tree use the same + * encryption policy, as a protection against certain types of offline attacks. + * Note that this check is needed even when opening an *unencrypted* file, since + * it's forbidden to have an unencrypted file in an encrypted directory. + * + * File systems should be using fscrypt_file_open in their open callback. This + * is for file systems that may need to open inodes outside of the normal file + * open path, btrfs send for example. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code + */ +int fscrypt_inode_open(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) +{ + int err; + + err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); + if (err) + return err; + + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && + !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode)) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)", + dir->i_ino); + err = -EPERM; + } + return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_inode_open); + int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h index ea8fdc6f3b83..756f23fc3e83 100644 --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ int fscrypt_zeroout_range(const struct inode *inode, pgoff_t lblk, /* hooks.c */ int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp); +int fscrypt_inode_open(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode); int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, @@ -738,6 +739,13 @@ static inline int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) return 0; } +static inline int fscrypt_inode_open(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) +{ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; +} + static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) {