diff mbox series

[v1,1/2] audit: record fanotify event regardless of presence of rules

Message ID 3c2679cb9df8a110e1e21b7f387b77ddfaacc289.1741210251.git.rgb@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series override audit silence norule for fs cases | expand

Commit Message

Richard Guy Briggs March 5, 2025, 9:33 p.m. UTC
When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
audit rules.

To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
be denied.  Then check for an event with
	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent

Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/audit.h | 8 +-------
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Comments

Jan Kara March 6, 2025, 3:06 p.m. UTC | #1
On Wed 05-03-25 16:33:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
> sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> audit rules.
> 
> To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
> as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> be denied.  Then check for an event with
> 	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
> 
> Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>

I don't know enough about security modules to tell whether this is what
admins want or not so that's up to you but:

> -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> -{
> -	if (!audit_dummy_context())
> -		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> -}
> -

I think this is going to break compilation with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL &&
CONFIG_FANOTIFY?

								Honza
Richard Guy Briggs March 7, 2025, 1:12 a.m. UTC | #2
On 2025-03-06 16:06, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Wed 05-03-25 16:33:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> > unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> > any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
> > sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> > audit rules.
> > 
> > To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
> > as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> > be denied.  Then check for an event with
> > 	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
> > 
> > Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> 
> I don't know enough about security modules to tell whether this is what
> admins want or not so that's up to you but:
> 
> > -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> > -{
> > -	if (!audit_dummy_context())
> > -		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> > -}
> > -
> 
> I think this is going to break compilation with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL &&
> CONFIG_FANOTIFY?

Why would that break it?  The part of the patch you (prematurely)
deleted takes care of that.

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
 extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how);
 extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
-extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
+extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
 extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset);
 extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad);
 extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,

> 								Honza
> -- 
> Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
> SUSE Labs, CR

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
Upstream IRC: SunRaycer
Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570
Jan Kara March 7, 2025, 2:52 p.m. UTC | #3
On Thu 06-03-25 20:12:23, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2025-03-06 16:06, Jan Kara wrote:
> > On Wed 05-03-25 16:33:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> > > unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> > > any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
> > > sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> > > audit rules.
> > > 
> > > To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
> > > as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> > > be denied.  Then check for an event with
> > > 	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
> > > 
> > > Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> > 
> > I don't know enough about security modules to tell whether this is what
> > admins want or not so that's up to you but:
> > 
> > > -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> > > -{
> > > -	if (!audit_dummy_context())
> > > -		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> > > -}
> > > -
> > 
> > I think this is going to break compilation with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL &&
> > CONFIG_FANOTIFY?
> 
> Why would that break it?  The part of the patch you (prematurely)
> deleted takes care of that.

So I'm failing to see how it takes care of that when with
!CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL kernel/auditsc.c does not get compiled into the kernel.
So what does provide the implementation of audit_fanotify() in that case?
I think you need to provide empty audit_fanotify() inline wrapper for that
case...

								Honza

> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
>  extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
>  extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how);
>  extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
> -extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
> +extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
>  extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset);
>  extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad);
>  extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
> 
> > 								Honza
> > -- 
> > Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
> > SUSE Labs, CR
> 
> - RGB
> 
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
> Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
> Upstream IRC: SunRaycer
> Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570
>
Richard Guy Briggs March 7, 2025, 7:19 p.m. UTC | #4
On 2025-03-07 15:52, Jan Kara wrote:
> On Thu 06-03-25 20:12:23, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > On 2025-03-06 16:06, Jan Kara wrote:
> > > On Wed 05-03-25 16:33:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> > > > unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> > > > any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
> > > > sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> > > > audit rules.
> > > > 
> > > > To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
> > > > as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> > > > be denied.  Then check for an event with
> > > > 	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
> > > > 
> > > > Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> > > 
> > > I don't know enough about security modules to tell whether this is what
> > > admins want or not so that's up to you but:
> > > 
> > > > -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> > > > -{
> > > > -	if (!audit_dummy_context())
> > > > -		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> > > > -}
> > > > -
> > > 
> > > I think this is going to break compilation with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL &&
> > > CONFIG_FANOTIFY?
> > 
> > Why would that break it?  The part of the patch you (prematurely)
> > deleted takes care of that.
> 
> So I'm failing to see how it takes care of that when with
> !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL kernel/auditsc.c does not get compiled into the kernel.
> So what does provide the implementation of audit_fanotify() in that case?
> I think you need to provide empty audit_fanotify() inline wrapper for that
> case...

I'm sorry, I responded too quickly without thinking about your question,
my mistake.  It isn't the prototype that was changed in the
CONFIG_SYSCALL case that is relevant in that case.

There was already in existance in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case the
inline wrapper to do that job:

	static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
	{ }

Did I understand correctly this time and does this answer your question?

But you do cause me to notice the case that these notifications will be
dropped when CONFIG_AUDIT && !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.

Thanks for persisting.

> 								Honza
> 
> > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
> >  extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
> >  extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how);
> >  extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
> > -extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
> > +extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
> >  extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset);
> >  extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad);
> >  extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
> > 
> > > -- 
> > > Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
> > > SUSE Labs, CR
> > 
> > - RGB
> > 
> -- 
> Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
> SUSE Labs, CR

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
Upstream IRC: SunRaycer
Voice: +1.613.860 2354 SMS: +1.613.518.6570
Jan Kara March 10, 2025, 12:50 p.m. UTC | #5
On Fri 07-03-25 14:19:38, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2025-03-07 15:52, Jan Kara wrote:
> > On Thu 06-03-25 20:12:23, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > On 2025-03-06 16:06, Jan Kara wrote:
> > > > On Wed 05-03-25 16:33:19, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > When no audit rules are in place, fanotify event results are
> > > > > unconditionally dropped due to an explicit check for the existence of
> > > > > any audit rules.  Given this is a report from another security
> > > > > sub-system, allow it to be recorded regardless of the existence of any
> > > > > audit rules.
> > > > > 
> > > > > To test, install and run the fapolicyd daemon with default config.  Then
> > > > > as an unprivileged user, create and run a very simple binary that should
> > > > > be denied.  Then check for an event with
> > > > > 	ausearch -m FANOTIFY -ts recent
> > > > > 
> > > > > Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-1367
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> > > > 
> > > > I don't know enough about security modules to tell whether this is what
> > > > admins want or not so that's up to you but:
> > > > 
> > > > > -static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> > > > > -{
> > > > > -	if (!audit_dummy_context())
> > > > > -		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
> > > > > -}
> > > > > -
> > > > 
> > > > I think this is going to break compilation with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL &&
> > > > CONFIG_FANOTIFY?
> > > 
> > > Why would that break it?  The part of the patch you (prematurely)
> > > deleted takes care of that.
> > 
> > So I'm failing to see how it takes care of that when with
> > !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL kernel/auditsc.c does not get compiled into the kernel.
> > So what does provide the implementation of audit_fanotify() in that case?
> > I think you need to provide empty audit_fanotify() inline wrapper for that
> > case...
> 
> I'm sorry, I responded too quickly without thinking about your question,
> my mistake.  It isn't the prototype that was changed in the
> CONFIG_SYSCALL case that is relevant in that case.
> 
> There was already in existance in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case the
> inline wrapper to do that job:
> 
> 	static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
> 	{ }
> 
> Did I understand correctly this time and does this answer your question?

Yes, thanks for explanation and sorry for not noticing the second
audit_fanotify() implementation. Somehow I've hasted to a conclusion (based
on customs of parts of kernel I maintain ;)) that you rely on
audit_dummy_context() being constant 0 for !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL and thus
__audit_fanotify() call getting compiled out (which would not be the case
after your changes).

Anyway, for the patch feel free to add:

Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

> But you do cause me to notice the case that these notifications will be
> dropped when CONFIG_AUDIT && !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.

Glad my blindness helped something ;)

								Honza
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 0050ef288ab3..d0c6f23503a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@  extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
 extern void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how);
 extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
-extern void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
+extern void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar);
 extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset);
 extern void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad);
 extern void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
@@ -525,12 +525,6 @@  static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
 		__audit_log_kern_module(name);
 }
 
-static inline void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
-{
-	if (!audit_dummy_context())
-		__audit_fanotify(response, friar);
-}
-
 static inline void audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
 {
 	/* ignore no-op events */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0627e74585ce..936825114bae 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2880,7 +2880,7 @@  void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
 	context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
 }
 
-void __audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
+void audit_fanotify(u32 response, struct fanotify_response_info_audit_rule *friar)
 {
 	/* {subj,obj}_trust values are {0,1,2}: no,yes,unknown */
 	switch (friar->hdr.type) {