From patchwork Tue Jul 14 13:29:36 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11662867 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B481D1392 for ; Tue, 14 Jul 2020 13:32:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A11F2224B1 for ; Tue, 14 Jul 2020 13:32:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727863AbgGNNcu (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jul 2020 09:32:50 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:48882 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725997AbgGNNct (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jul 2020 09:32:49 -0400 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jvL2q-0007X5-Qj; Tue, 14 Jul 2020 07:32:28 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jvL2n-0005PK-GW; Tue, 14 Jul 2020 07:32:26 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Kees Cook , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Al Viro , Luis Chamberlain , , Tetsuo Handa , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Morris , Kentaro Takeda , Casey Schaufler , John Johansen , Christoph Hellwig References: <871rle8bw2.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 08:29:36 -0500 In-Reply-To: <871rle8bw2.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Tue, 14 Jul 2020 08:27:41 -0500") Message-ID: <87k0z66x8f.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1jvL2n-0005PK-GW;;;mid=<87k0z66x8f.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/bTuLU7Jd4S+t/5VVrYMEsOQfOiE6Q7Uk= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa05.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.0 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TooManySym_01,T_TooManySym_02,T_TooManySym_03, XMNoVowels,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4799] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa05 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_03 6+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: ; sa05 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 592 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.08 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 11 (1.9%), b_tie_ro: 10 (1.7%), parse: 1.18 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 11 (1.9%), get_uri_detail_list: 2.5 (0.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 13 (2.2%), tests_pri_-950: 1.10 (0.2%), tests_pri_-900: 0.86 (0.1%), tests_pri_-90: 174 (29.3%), check_bayes: 172 (29.1%), b_tokenize: 11 (1.9%), b_tok_get_all: 8 (1.4%), b_comp_prob: 2.6 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 146 (24.7%), b_finish: 0.99 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 364 (61.5%), check_dkim_signature: 0.95 (0.2%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.7 (0.5%), poll_dns_idle: 0.63 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 1.89 (0.3%), tests_pri_500: 10 (1.7%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 3/7] exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Currently it is necessary for the usermode helper code and the code that launches init to use set_fs so that pages coming from the kernel look like they are coming from userspace. To allow that usage of set_fs to be removed cleanly the argument copying from userspace needs to happen earlier. Move the computation of bprm->filename and possible allocation of a name in the case of execveat into alloc_bprm to make that possible. The exectuable name, the arguments, and the environment are copied into the new usermode stack which is stored in bprm until exec passes the point of no return. As the executable name is copied first onto the usermode stack it needs to be known. As there are no dependencies to computing the executable name, compute it early in alloc_bprm. As an implementation detail if the filename needs to be generated because it embeds a file descriptor store that filename in a new field bprm->fdpath, and free it in free_bprm. Previously this was done in an independent variable pathbuf. I have renamed pathbuf fdpath because fdpath is more suggestive of what kind of path is in the variable. I moved fdpath into struct linux_binprm because it is tightly tied to the other variables in struct linux_binprm, and as such is needed to allow the call alloc_binprm to move. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig --- fs/exec.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- include/linux/binfmts.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 526156d6461d..7e8af27dd199 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1557,15 +1557,37 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) kfree(bprm->interp); + kfree(bprm->fdpath); kfree(bprm); } -static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(void) +static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename) { struct linux_binprm *bprm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL); + int retval = -ENOMEM; if (!bprm) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + goto out; + + if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') { + bprm->filename = filename->name; + } else { + if (filename->name[0] == '\0') + bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d", fd); + else + bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d/%s", + fd, filename->name); + if (!bprm->fdpath) + goto out_free; + + bprm->filename = bprm->fdpath; + } + bprm->interp = bprm->filename; return bprm; + +out_free: + free_bprm(bprm); +out: + return ERR_PTR(retval); } int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -1831,7 +1853,6 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, struct user_arg_ptr envp, int flags) { - char *pathbuf = NULL; struct linux_binprm *bprm; struct file *file; struct files_struct *displaced; @@ -1856,7 +1877,7 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, * further execve() calls fail. */ current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; - bprm = alloc_bprm(); + bprm = alloc_bprm(fd, filename); if (IS_ERR(bprm)) { retval = PTR_ERR(bprm); goto out_ret; @@ -1881,28 +1902,14 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, sched_exec(); bprm->file = file; - if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') { - bprm->filename = filename->name; - } else { - if (filename->name[0] == '\0') - pathbuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d", fd); - else - pathbuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d/%s", - fd, filename->name); - if (!pathbuf) { - retval = -ENOMEM; - goto out_unmark; - } - /* - * Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be - * inaccessible after exec. Relies on having exclusive access to - * current->files (due to unshare_files above). - */ - if (close_on_exec(fd, rcu_dereference_raw(current->files->fdt))) - bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE; - bprm->filename = pathbuf; - } - bprm->interp = bprm->filename; + /* + * Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be + * inaccessible after exec. Relies on having exclusive access to + * current->files (due to unshare_files above). + */ + if (bprm->fdpath && + close_on_exec(fd, rcu_dereference_raw(current->files->fdt))) + bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE; retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm); if (retval) @@ -1941,7 +1948,6 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, acct_update_integrals(current); task_numa_free(current, false); free_bprm(bprm); - kfree(pathbuf); putname(filename); if (displaced) put_files_struct(displaced); @@ -1970,7 +1976,6 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, reset_files_struct(displaced); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); - kfree(pathbuf); out_ret: putname(filename); diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index eb5cb8df5485..8e9e1b0c8eb8 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct linux_binprm { const char *interp; /* Name of the binary really executed. Most of the time same as filename, but could be different for binfmt_{misc,script} */ + const char *fdpath; /* generated filename for execveat */ unsigned interp_flags; int execfd; /* File descriptor of the executable */ unsigned long loader, exec;