diff mbox

[09/11] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant

Message ID d055925e5d5c0099e9e9c871004fb45fab67e4bc.1512041070.git.dongsu@kinvolk.io (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Dongsu Park Dec. 22, 2017, 2:32 p.m. UTC
From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also
export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a
module.

Patch v4 is available: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8944671/

Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
---
 fs/fuse/dir.c           | 2 +-
 kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Serge E. Hallyn Dec. 23, 2017, 3:50 a.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, Dec 22, 2017 at 03:32:33PM +0100, Dongsu Park wrote:
> From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> 
> Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
> to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
> the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
> to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
> userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also
> export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a
> module.
> 
> Patch v4 is available: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8944671/
> 
> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> ---
>  fs/fuse/dir.c           | 2 +-
>  kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 +
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> index ad1cfac1..d41559a0 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  
>  	if (fc->allow_other)
> -		return 1;
> +		return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
>  
>  	cred = current_cred();
>  	if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 246d4d4c..492c255e 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
>  {
>  	return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns());
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns);

I have to say I'm not happy with this name.  I wish it had been
called current_under_userns or something to indicate it may also
be in a child.

>  
>  static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
>  {
> -- 
> 2.13.6
Eric W. Biederman Feb. 19, 2018, 11:16 p.m. UTC | #2
Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> writes:

> From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
>
> Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
> to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
> the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
> to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
> userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also
> export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a
> module.
>
> Patch v4 is available: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8944671/
>
> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>

Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

> ---
>  fs/fuse/dir.c           | 2 +-
>  kernel/user_namespace.c | 1 +
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> index ad1cfac1..d41559a0 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
>  	const struct cred *cred;
>  
>  	if (fc->allow_other)
> -		return 1;
> +		return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
>  
>  	cred = current_cred();
>  	if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 246d4d4c..492c255e 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
>  {
>  	return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns());
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns);
>  
>  static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
>  {
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index ad1cfac1..d41559a0 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@  int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 	const struct cred *cred;
 
 	if (fc->allow_other)
-		return 1;
+		return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
 
 	cred = current_cred();
 	if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 246d4d4c..492c255e 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -1235,6 +1235,7 @@  bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
 {
 	return in_userns(target_ns, current_user_ns());
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns);
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
 {