From patchwork Fri Jan 15 14:57:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Gladkov X-Patchwork-Id: 12023067 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACEA3C433E0 for ; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 15:01:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 6A7E023403 for ; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 15:01:30 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 6A7E023403 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-20658-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 19576 invoked by uid 550); 15 Jan 2021 14:59:36 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 18250 invoked from network); 15 Jan 2021 14:59:33 -0000 From: Alexey Gladkov To: LKML , io-uring@vger.kernel.org, Kernel Hardening , Linux Containers , linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Alexey Gladkov , Andrew Morton , Christian Brauner , "Eric W . Biederman" , Jann Horn , Jens Axboe , Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 7/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 15:57:28 +0100 Message-Id: <0829877fe0381f10d927bb94548021224e72f3c9.1610722474.git.gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.1 (raptor.unsafe.ru [5.9.43.93]); Fri, 15 Jan 2021 14:59:14 +0000 (UTC) After calling set_user(), we always have to call commit_creds() to apply new credentials upon the current task. There is no need to separate limit check and counter incrementing. Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov --- kernel/cred.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- kernel/sys.c | 13 ------------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index c43e30407d22..991c43559ee8 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -487,14 +487,26 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) key_fsgid_changed(new); - /* do it - * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked - * in set_user(). - */ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns) { + bool overlimit; + set_cred_ucounts(new, new->user_ns, new->euid); - inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); + + overlimit = inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, + 1, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)); + + /* + * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many + * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming + * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit + * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the + * failure to the execve() stage. + */ + if (overlimit && new->user != INIT_USER) + current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; + else + current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; } rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index c2734ab9474e..180c4e06064f 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -467,19 +467,6 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new) if (!new_user) return -EAGAIN; - /* - * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many - * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming - * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit - * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the - * failure to the execve() stage. - */ - if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && - new_user != INIT_USER) - current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; - else - current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; - free_uid(new->user); new->user = new_user; return 0;