From patchwork Fri Feb 23 18:26:51 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg KH X-Patchwork-Id: 10238759 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6D0E60225 for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 18:42:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6504297AC for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 18:42:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id AA20B29818; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 18:42:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 9B5D6297AC for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 18:42:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 12221 invoked by uid 550); 23 Feb 2018 18:41:19 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 12104 invoked from network); 23 Feb 2018 18:41:18 -0000 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Dan Williams , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Andy Lutomirski , alan@linux.intel.com, David Woodhouse , Jack Wang Subject: [PATCH 4.4 178/193] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:26:51 +0100 Message-Id: <20180223170354.028619665@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams (cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681) The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse [jwang: port to 4.4, no syscall_64] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -381,6 +382,7 @@ __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_ } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that