From patchwork Sat Nov 10 01:38:05 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Edgecombe, Rick P" X-Patchwork-Id: 10676811 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 12C0C14DB for ; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 01:37:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3D882E2AF for ; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 01:36:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id E728F2F050; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 01:36:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id A7E3B2E2AF for ; Sat, 10 Nov 2018 01:36:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 10018 invoked by uid 550); 10 Nov 2018 01:36:44 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 9894 invoked from network); 10 Nov 2018 01:36:43 -0000 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,485,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="105025663" From: Rick Edgecombe To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, willy@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org Cc: kristen@linux.intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com, Rick Edgecombe Subject: [PATCH v9 2/4] x86/modules: Increase randomization for modules Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 17:38:05 -0800 Message-Id: <20181110013807.24903-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20181110013807.24903-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20181110013807.24903-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This changes the behavior of the KASLR logic for allocating memory for the text sections of loadable modules. It randomizes the location of each module text section with about 17 bits of entropy in typical use. This is enabled on X86_64 only. For 32 bit, the behavior is unchanged. It refactors existing code around module randomization somewhat. There are now three different behaviors for x86 module_alloc depending on config. RANDOMIZE_BASE=n, and RANDOMIZE_BASE=y ARCH=x86_64, and RANDOMIZE_BASE=y ARCH=i386. The refactor of the existing code is to try to clearly show what those behaviors are without having three separate versions or threading the behaviors in a bunch of little spots. The reason it is not enabled on 32 bit yet is because the module space is much smaller and simulations haven't been run to see how it performs. The new algorithm breaks the module space in two, a random area and a backup area. It first tries to allocate at a number of randomly located starting pages inside the random section. If this fails, then it will allocate in the backup area. The backup area base will be offset in the same way as the current algorithm does for the base area, 1024 possible locations. Due to boot_params being defined with different types in different places, placing the config helpers modules.h or kaslr.h caused conflicts elsewhere, and so they are placed in a new file, kaslr_modules.h, instead. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr_modules.h | 38 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr_modules.h diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index ba7e3464ee92..db93cde0528a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2144,6 +2144,9 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE If unsure, say Y. +config RANDOMIZE_FINE_MODULE + def_bool y if RANDOMIZE_BASE && X86_64 && !CONFIG_UML + # Relocation on x86 needs some additional build support config X86_NEED_RELOCS def_bool y diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr_modules.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr_modules.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1da6eced4b47 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr_modules.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_KASLR_MODULES_H_ +#define _ASM_KASLR_MODULES_H_ + +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE +/* kaslr_enabled is not always defined */ +static inline int kaslr_mod_randomize_base(void) +{ + return kaslr_enabled(); +} +#else +static inline int kaslr_mod_randomize_base(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_FINE_MODULE +/* kaslr_enabled is not always defined */ +static inline int kaslr_mod_randomize_each_module(void) +{ + return kaslr_enabled(); +} + +static inline unsigned long get_modules_rand_len(void) +{ + return MODULES_RAND_LEN; +} +#else +static inline int kaslr_mod_randomize_each_module(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +unsigned long get_modules_rand_len(void); +#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_FINE_MODULE */ + +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h index 04edd2d58211..5e26369ab86c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h @@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d; #define MODULES_END _AC(0xffffffffff000000, UL) #define MODULES_LEN (MODULES_END - MODULES_VADDR) +/* + * Dedicate the first part of the module space to a randomized area when KASLR + * is in use. Leave the remaining part for a fallback if we are unable to + * allocate in the random area. + */ +#define MODULES_RAND_LEN PAGE_ALIGN((MODULES_LEN/3)*2) + #define ESPFIX_PGD_ENTRY _AC(-2, UL) #define ESPFIX_BASE_ADDR (ESPFIX_PGD_ENTRY << P4D_SHIFT) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c index b052e883dd8c..35cb912ed1f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #if 0 #define DEBUGP(fmt, ...) \ @@ -48,34 +49,96 @@ do { \ } while (0) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE static unsigned long module_load_offset; +static const unsigned long NO_TRY_RAND = 10000; /* Mutex protects the module_load_offset. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(module_kaslr_mutex); static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void) { - if (kaslr_enabled()) { - mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex); - /* - * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this - * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until - * reboot. - */ - if (module_load_offset == 0) - module_load_offset = - (get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE; - mutex_unlock(&module_kaslr_mutex); - } + mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex); + /* + * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this + * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until + * reboot. + */ + if (module_load_offset == 0) + module_load_offset = (get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE; + mutex_unlock(&module_kaslr_mutex); + return module_load_offset; } -#else -static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void) + +static unsigned long get_module_vmalloc_start(void) { - return 0; + unsigned long addr = MODULES_VADDR; + + if (kaslr_mod_randomize_base()) + addr += get_module_load_offset(); + + if (kaslr_mod_randomize_each_module()) + addr += get_modules_rand_len(); + + return addr; +} + +static void *try_module_alloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +{ + const unsigned long vm_flags = 0; + + return __vmalloc_node_try_addr(addr, size, GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, + vm_flags, NUMA_NO_NODE, + __builtin_return_address(0)); +} + +/* + * Find a random address to try that won't obviously not fit. Random areas are + * allowed to overflow into the backup area + */ +static unsigned long get_rand_module_addr(unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long nr_max_pos = (MODULES_LEN - size) / MODULE_ALIGN + 1; + unsigned long nr_rnd_pos = get_modules_rand_len() / MODULE_ALIGN; + unsigned long nr_pos = min(nr_max_pos, nr_rnd_pos); + + unsigned long module_position_nr = get_random_long() % nr_pos; + unsigned long offset = module_position_nr * MODULE_ALIGN; + + return MODULES_VADDR + offset; +} + +/* + * Try to allocate in the random area at 10000 random addresses. If these + * fail, return NULL. + */ +static void *try_module_randomize_each(unsigned long size) +{ + void *p = NULL; + unsigned int i; + + /* This will have a guard page */ + unsigned long va_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size) + PAGE_SIZE; + + if (!kaslr_mod_randomize_each_module()) + return NULL; + + /* Make sure there is at least one address that might fit. */ + if (va_size < PAGE_ALIGN(size) || va_size > MODULES_LEN) + return NULL; + + /* Try to find a spot that doesn't need a lazy purge */ + for (i = 0; i < NO_TRY_RAND; i++) { + unsigned long addr = get_rand_module_addr(va_size); + + p = try_module_alloc(addr, size); + + if (p) + return p; + } + + return NULL; } -#endif void *module_alloc(unsigned long size) { @@ -84,16 +147,18 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size) if (PAGE_ALIGN(size) > MODULES_LEN) return NULL; - p = __vmalloc_node_range(size, MODULE_ALIGN, - MODULES_VADDR + get_module_load_offset(), - MODULES_END, GFP_KERNEL, - PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0, NUMA_NO_NODE, - __builtin_return_address(0)); + p = try_module_randomize_each(size); + + if (!p) + p = __vmalloc_node_range(size, MODULE_ALIGN, + get_module_vmalloc_start(), MODULES_END, + GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0, + NUMA_NO_NODE, __builtin_return_address(0)); + if (p && (kasan_module_alloc(p, size) < 0)) { vfree(p); return NULL; } - return p; }