@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD
select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64
+ select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
#include <xen/xen-ops.h>
@@ -240,6 +241,13 @@ static void __prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
lockdep_sys_exit();
+ /*
+ * x86_64 stack alignment means 3 bits are ignored, so keep
+ * the top 5 bits. x86_32 needs only 2 bits of alignment, so
+ * the top 6 bits will be used.
+ */
+ choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
+
cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
if (unlikely(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS))
@@ -346,6 +354,7 @@ __visible noinstr void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct thread_info *ti;
+ add_random_kstack_offset();
enter_from_user_mode();
instrumentation_begin();
@@ -409,6 +418,7 @@ static void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
/* Handles int $0x80 */
__visible noinstr void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
+ add_random_kstack_offset();
enter_from_user_mode();
instrumentation_begin();
@@ -467,6 +477,7 @@ __visible noinstr long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
regs->ip = landing_pad;
+ add_random_kstack_offset();
enter_from_user_mode();
instrumentation_begin();
Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly 5 bits of entropy. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)