From patchwork Mon Mar 15 18:02:27 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 12140323 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-19.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7063FC433DB for ; Mon, 15 Mar 2021 18:03:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 8C2CE64F26 for ; Mon, 15 Mar 2021 18:03:25 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8C2CE64F26 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-20938-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 11496 invoked by uid 550); 15 Mar 2021 18:02:51 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 11296 invoked from network); 15 Mar 2021 18:02:50 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=DcTnVacz4A0tmKEIIvO2n/EpgXlfdRl1ckINTgAR5oI=; b=PQ3XGnvMsKcXU4s5p+F5dfZF6FA/iSbcSn0nswwcqPExK09KIRLEltkz0Bh8wiwE7N 1XkNp1GfB55SBD6zDGJQRjdRpTR4DYjid5msGEofOSSYqbipdCIbWhBqrPM9AWy1UM52 l+EaNe1XtG5skHL76gK0sXV38Rb8Lgh4egJtA= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=DcTnVacz4A0tmKEIIvO2n/EpgXlfdRl1ckINTgAR5oI=; b=M6k33OHSUk9V7sdOjYt4SY6rMoXUo9JZUGoMVpV1RbI7ir4pjP/D4r27YUx1Kl4y1m aVfTvWSDJ/5sNnTio168x17Vnmdjf6lfNXaYnMBy18E0GtWaGV/Ox2loEjLfgZ8qydJE Njbx4uqQy2KDcxhTwjJbKh18B6i7/FGFNYAQUGwJDgC4jeC12DrYRB1UdmVYWu8hhOMm dY5bo5KBUv3u/0Jpyf4WTYHSojlQNUIpySXUonHp0Qw2OUlxXxBlHc4ZByCUEG3EvzFY BUUPH8/6FHIR9mJra7UyupK7Vrl3GYgkU8xqU0UQ7GXFzGs+lFriCTumHiIQ8h8kIjQI cAjw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533sBhdvMePZ+MjOUOhyANzcckiBxJUabr1ZOHsjXNFJ1GOnAOb1 hXm+sYaQniFCGqu5S09Jso0b/g== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxy/jBx4lbYUG9dTL/BSOwG++1sLNIRxLhlf/Aak5xk+P2rM72P6uwME362sOaUIYrG0OIg4w== X-Received: by 2002:a65:4c86:: with SMTP id m6mr314819pgt.174.1615831358475; Mon, 15 Mar 2021 11:02:38 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Alexander Potapenko , Alexander Popov , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , Vlastimil Babka , David Hildenbrand , Mike Rapoport , Andrew Morton , Jonathan Corbet , Randy Dunlap , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 11:02:27 -0700 Message-Id: <20210315180229.1224655-5-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210315180229.1224655-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20210315180229.1224655-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Patch-Hashes: v=1; h=sha256; g=1a3993b6371bcc7c9fa1576e563a724a70c25875; i=np7yed3mY+gWIWkexmB7CyDLgwsIh0xV2RGaksJc7tI=; m=cc9SLz8pm+mdXOKZLHtRjH7FITDzwHCOKmwFrX1p7io=; p=UyRR1nzRrbUXeUU5ICay1xt2wYZVgu7b/Eh0FjkN2Hc= X-Patch-Sig: m=pgp; i=keescook@chromium.org; s=0x0x8972F4DFDC6DC026; b=iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEpcP2jyKd1g9yPm4TiXL039xtwCYFAmBPoTQACgkQiXL039xtwCb9dw/8CDN Ir13NcCLMJOuRm2LpzDYbdgOc9JQ2QokpXPH/jLGBVXWXwV2g8Nk5TYJJcm7X/yj75HbSyNJLBUVU c8QbEGqzcBxjyIZUTKBDrYfApusLejywRj5YCmq1CONO5XBcJTMPuNAo1ZlzyQ0fI+754FraF3eU/ O8qcOD18DBVIsRP7e9ASpSyjqINb46mpEDrlvXa+uJyzGfAGLz+B0NLm6WPK0eaKzRmPC3mUs5gXU 9pL8/JlmcsD3Ne3kzSexmn7+uvYXEcwRagE8A76gkzE69JK3Lq8uIAyFARV2VO8mXZcUD/loxowRK vpn44j3EK04VB/Nf0IEDP6SNkNmSFvdqOSbp8gXcBI+rAJgA91SXLBf+ld9pIsIkGf6+uvY+rKqb7 XT7pyiu/3f7C3m64R7FFFUsWH6waSp2VR4ccIbNM97N6o5FY5keipPsjJNinKedZwOGjmY2O+FMkE nxUr2FjxcwFOBCbAkwJL+rgVv9UPOprPnq+Gxi6axTrDjRe3JoWtapLhbdDjHYLos7Gh5+UhghIj/ vYKfMHbHOOlKyhcrufiMXbcy0dkK6EK9ES3KNDmWu0cpxS2QAPrJvyrC6eCIxT9T0fko/eWgdUhWi ZNc8RzQeH2jVopqqCkmd8L74weZxz2gnh8S5w2OW3/yb5VWZ8VjJWDr3879m6aVE= Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly 5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall, which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2792879d398e..4b4ad8ec10d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index a2433ae8a65e..810983d7c26f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 __visible noinstr void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs) { + add_random_kstack_offset(); nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr); instrumentation_begin(); @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ __visible noinstr void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs); + add_random_kstack_offset(); /* * Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than 2^32-1 into * orig_ax, the unsigned int return value truncates it. This may @@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ static noinstr bool __do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs); int res; + add_random_kstack_offset(); /* * This cannot use syscall_enter_from_user_mode() as it has to * fetch EBP before invoking any of the syscall entry work diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h index 2b87b191b3b8..8e41566e154a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H #define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H +#include #include #include @@ -70,6 +71,13 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, */ current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif + + /* + * x86_64 stack alignment means 3 bits are ignored, so keep + * the top 5 bits. x86_32 needs only 2 bits of alignment, so + * the top 6 bits will be used. + */ + choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF); } #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare