| Message ID | 20230626031835.2279738-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v4] Randomized slab caches for kmalloc() | expand |
On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 11:18:35AM +0800, GONG, Ruiqi wrote: > When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common > technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the > "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation. > Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by > triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore > getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on > various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out- > of-bound write and etc. > > There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic > slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and > 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones. > Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first > one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab > merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill. > > To efficiently prevent heap spraying, we propose the following approach: > to create multiple copies of generic slab caches that will never be > merged, and random one of them will be used at allocation. The random > selection is based on the address of code that calls `kmalloc()`, which > means it is static at runtime (rather than dynamically determined at > each time of allocation, which could be bypassed by repeatedly spraying > in brute force). In other words, the randomness of cache selection will > be with respect to the code address rather than time, i.e. allocations > in different code paths would most likely pick different caches, > although kmalloc() at each place would use the same cache copy whenever > it is executed. In this way, the vulnerable object and memory allocated > in other subsystems and modules will (most probably) be on different > slab caches, which prevents the object from being sprayed. > > Meanwhile, the static random selection is further enhanced with a > per-boot random seed, which prevents the attacker from finding a usable > kmalloc that happens to pick the same cache with the vulnerable > subsystem/module by analyzing the open source code. In other words, with > the per-boot seed, the random selection is static during each time the > system starts and runs, but not across different system startups. > > The overhead of performance has been tested on a 40-core x86 server by > comparing the results of `perf bench all` between the kernels with and > without this patch based on the latest linux-next kernel, which shows > minor difference. A subset of benchmarks are listed below: > > sched/ sched/ syscall/ mem/ mem/ > messaging pipe basic memcpy memset > (sec) (sec) (sec) (GB/sec) (GB/sec) > > control1 0.019 5.459 0.733 15.258789 51.398026 > control2 0.019 5.439 0.730 16.009221 48.828125 > control3 0.019 5.282 0.735 16.009221 48.828125 > control_avg 0.019 5.393 0.733 15.759077 49.684759 > > experiment1 0.019 5.374 0.741 15.500992 46.502976 > experiment2 0.019 5.440 0.746 16.276042 51.398026 > experiment3 0.019 5.242 0.752 15.258789 51.398026 > experiment_avg 0.019 5.352 0.746 15.678608 49.766343 > > The overhead of memory usage was measured by executing `free` after boot > on a QEMU VM with 1GB total memory, and as expected, it's positively > correlated with # of cache copies: > > control 4 copies 8 copies 16 copies > > total 969.8M 968.2M 968.2M 968.2M > used 20.0M 21.9M 24.1M 26.7M > free 936.9M 933.6M 931.4M 928.6M > available 932.2M 928.8M 926.6M 923.9M > > Co-developed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Thanks for the v4; this looks good. :)
On 6/26/23 05:18, GONG, Ruiqi wrote: > When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common > technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the > "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation. > Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by > triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore > getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on > various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out- > of-bound write and etc. > > There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic > slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and > 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones. > Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first > one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab > merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill. Interesting :) Here's a recent patch to make slub_nomerge a default: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230629221910.359711-1-julian.pidancet@oracle.com/ In v1, Kees said he's been running with that for ages: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202306281358.E6E6C2759@keescook/ So it's not universally accepted in the kernel hardening community? > To efficiently prevent heap spraying, we propose the following approach: > to create multiple copies of generic slab caches that will never be > merged, and random one of them will be used at allocation. The random > selection is based on the address of code that calls `kmalloc()`, which > means it is static at runtime (rather than dynamically determined at > each time of allocation, which could be bypassed by repeatedly spraying > in brute force). In other words, the randomness of cache selection will > be with respect to the code address rather than time, i.e. allocations > in different code paths would most likely pick different caches, > although kmalloc() at each place would use the same cache copy whenever > it is executed. In this way, the vulnerable object and memory allocated > in other subsystems and modules will (most probably) be on different > slab caches, which prevents the object from being sprayed. > > Meanwhile, the static random selection is further enhanced with a > per-boot random seed, which prevents the attacker from finding a usable > kmalloc that happens to pick the same cache with the vulnerable > subsystem/module by analyzing the open source code. In other words, with > the per-boot seed, the random selection is static during each time the > system starts and runs, but not across different system startups. > > The overhead of performance has been tested on a 40-core x86 server by > comparing the results of `perf bench all` between the kernels with and > without this patch based on the latest linux-next kernel, which shows > minor difference. A subset of benchmarks are listed below: > > sched/ sched/ syscall/ mem/ mem/ > messaging pipe basic memcpy memset > (sec) (sec) (sec) (GB/sec) (GB/sec) > > control1 0.019 5.459 0.733 15.258789 51.398026 > control2 0.019 5.439 0.730 16.009221 48.828125 > control3 0.019 5.282 0.735 16.009221 48.828125 > control_avg 0.019 5.393 0.733 15.759077 49.684759 > > experiment1 0.019 5.374 0.741 15.500992 46.502976 > experiment2 0.019 5.440 0.746 16.276042 51.398026 > experiment3 0.019 5.242 0.752 15.258789 51.398026 > experiment_avg 0.019 5.352 0.746 15.678608 49.766343 > > The overhead of memory usage was measured by executing `free` after boot > on a QEMU VM with 1GB total memory, and as expected, it's positively > correlated with # of cache copies: > > control 4 copies 8 copies 16 copies > > total 969.8M 968.2M 968.2M 968.2M > used 20.0M 21.9M 24.1M 26.7M > free 936.9M 933.6M 931.4M 928.6M > available 932.2M 928.8M 926.6M 923.9M > > Co-developed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > > v4: > - Set # of cache copies to 16 and remove config selection. > - Shorten "kmalloc-random-" to "kmalloc-rnd-". > - Update commit log and config's help paragraph. > - Fine-tune PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT to 12 instead of 13 (enough to > pass compilation with allmodconfig and CONFIG_SLUB_TINY=n). > - Some cleanup and typo fixing. > > v3: > - Replace SLAB_RANDOMSLAB with the new existing SLAB_NO_MERGE flag. > - Shorten long code lines by wrapping and renaming. > - Update commit message with latest perf benchmark and additional > theorectical explanation. > - Remove "RFC" from patch title and make it a formal patch > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230616111843.3677378-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com/ > > v2: > - Use hash_64() and a per-boot random seed to select kmalloc() caches. > - Change acceptable # of caches from [4,16] to {2,4,8,16}, which is > more compatible with hashing. > - Supplement results of performance and memory overhead tests. > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508075507.1720950-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ > > v1: > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230315095459.186113-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ > > include/linux/percpu.h | 12 ++++++++--- > include/linux/slab.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++---- > mm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++ > mm/kfence/kfence_test.c | 6 ++++-- > mm/slab.c | 2 +- > mm/slab.h | 2 +- > mm/slab_common.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h > index 42125cf9c506..7692b5559098 100644 > --- a/include/linux/percpu.h > +++ b/include/linux/percpu.h > @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ > #define PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_BITS (PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_SIZE >> \ > PCPU_MIN_ALLOC_SHIFT) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 12 > +#else > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 10 > +#endif > + > /* > * Percpu allocator can serve percpu allocations before slab is > * initialized which allows slab to depend on the percpu allocator. > @@ -41,7 +47,7 @@ > * for this. Keep PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE equal to or larger than > * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE. > */ > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > > /* > * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE indicates the amount of free area to piggy > @@ -55,9 +61,9 @@ > * intelligent way to determine this would be nice. > */ > #if BITS_PER_LONG > 32 > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > #else > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > #endif > > extern void *pcpu_base_addr; > diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h > index 791f7453a04f..747fc2587b56 100644 > --- a/include/linux/slab.h > +++ b/include/linux/slab.h > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include <linux/types.h> > #include <linux/workqueue.h> > #include <linux/percpu-refcount.h> > +#include <linux/hash.h> > > > /* > @@ -342,6 +343,13 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > #define SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE < 16 ? \ > (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 16 // # of cache copies > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS 4 // =log2(_NR), for hashing > +#else > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 1 > +#endif > + > /* > * Whenever changing this, take care of that kmalloc_type() and > * create_kmalloc_caches() still work as intended. > @@ -351,7 +359,9 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > * kmem caches can have both accounted and unaccounted objects. > */ > enum kmalloc_cache_type { > - KMALLOC_NORMAL = 0, > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = 0, > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR - 1, > + KMALLOC_NORMAL = KMALLOC_RANDOM_END, > #ifndef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA > KMALLOC_DMA = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > #endif > @@ -383,14 +393,21 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1]; > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) ? __GFP_DMA : 0) | \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM) ? __GFP_ACCOUNT : 0)) I'd rather keep KMALLOC_NORMAL as 0, including the usual name, and then create 15 extra caches (see the diff later). > > -static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags) > +extern unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed; > + > +static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > { > /* > * The most common case is KMALLOC_NORMAL, so test for it > * with a single branch for all the relevant flags. > */ > if (likely((flags & KMALLOC_NOT_NORMAL_BITS) == 0)) > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + return KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + hash_64(caller ^ random_kmalloc_seed, > + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS); > +#else > return KMALLOC_NORMAL; > +#endif > > /* > * At least one of the flags has to be set. Their priorities in > @@ -577,7 +594,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > > index = kmalloc_index(size); > return kmalloc_trace( > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], > + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], > flags, size); > } > return __kmalloc(size, flags); > @@ -593,7 +610,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t fla > > index = kmalloc_index(size); > return kmalloc_node_trace( > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], > + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], > flags, node, size); > } > return __kmalloc_node(size, flags, node); > diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig > index a3c95338cd3a..e9dc606c9317 100644 > --- a/mm/Kconfig > +++ b/mm/Kconfig > @@ -337,6 +337,22 @@ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL > which requires the taking of locks that may cause latency spikes. > Typically one would choose no for a realtime system. > > +config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + default n > + depends on SLUB I'd make it depend also on !SLUB_TINY to limit configs to sane combinations. > + bool "Random slab caches for normal kmalloc" s/Random/Randomize/ ? > + help > + A hardening feature that creates multiple copies of slab caches for > + normal kmalloc allocation and makes kmalloc randomly pick one based > + on code address, which makes the attackers unable to spray vulnerable "unable" may be too strong word. more difficult? > + memory objects on the heap for the purpose of exploiting memory > + vulnerabilities. > + > + Currently the number of copies is set to 16, a reasonably large value > + that effectively diverges the memory objects allocated for different > + subsystems or modules into different caches, at the expense of about > + 7 MB of memory overhead. Ok you measured 7MB, but in a specific situation. Could be more than that depending on number of CPUs, and the workload. Hm I guess all we could honestly say is there will be some system and workload-specific memory and cpu overhead. > endmenu # SLAB allocator options > > config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR > diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > index 9e008a336d9f..7f5ffb490328 100644 > --- a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > @@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ static void test_cache_destroy(void) > > static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size) > { > - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; > + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); We're just getting an ->align there so it's not useful to pass an actual _RET_IP_, we could just pass 0 there. If it was performance critical, have another kmalloc_type_norandom() variant, but it's not. > + return kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; > } > > /* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */ > @@ -282,8 +283,9 @@ static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocat > > if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) { > struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(alloc); > + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); > struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?: > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; > + kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; > > /* > * Verify that various helpers return the right values > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > index 88194391d553..9ad3d0f2d1a5 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.c > +++ b/mm/slab.c > @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static size_t calculate_slab_order(struct kmem_cache *cachep, > if (freelist_size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) { > freelist_cache_size = PAGE_SIZE << get_order(freelist_size); > } else { > - freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u); > + freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u, _RET_IP_); > if (!freelist_cache) > continue; > freelist_cache_size = freelist_cache->size; > diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h > index 6a5633b25eb5..4ebe3bdfc17c 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.h > +++ b/mm/slab.h > @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void); > void create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t); > > /* Find the kmalloc slab corresponding for a certain size */ > -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t, gfp_t); > +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller); > > void *__kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, > int node, size_t orig_size, > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index fe436d35f333..6f385956ef07 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -678,6 +678,11 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1] __ro_after_init = > { /* initialization for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42570 */ }; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed __ro_after_init; > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_kmalloc_seed); > +#endif > + > /* > * Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the > * kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power > @@ -720,7 +725,7 @@ static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes) > * Find the kmem_cache structure that serves a given size of > * allocation > */ > -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned int index; > > @@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > index = fls(size - 1); > } > > - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index]; > + return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, caller)][index]; > } > > size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) > @@ -753,7 +758,7 @@ size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) > return PAGE_SIZE << get_order(size); > > /* The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all. */ > - c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL); > + c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); Also would pass 0 instead of _RET_IP_, the object_size doesn't depend on it. > return c ? c->object_size : 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); > @@ -776,12 +781,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); > #define KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(sz) > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b > +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz) > +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 0] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_16(sz) KMA_RAND_15(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-16-" #sz, > +#else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) > +#endif > + > #define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \ > { \ > .name[KMALLOC_NORMAL] = "kmalloc-" #__short_size, \ > KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(__short_size) \ > KMALLOC_CGROUP_NAME(__short_size) \ > KMALLOC_DMA_NAME(__short_size) \ > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, __short_size) \ > .size = __size, \ > } With W=1 I've got warnings here as it tried to init 16th cache with both random and non-random name. This lead me to the renumbering of the enum and the diff below. > > @@ -890,6 +919,11 @@ new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type, slab_flags_t flags) > flags |= SLAB_CACHE_DMA; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + if (type >= KMALLOC_RANDOM_START && type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END) > + flags |= SLAB_NO_MERGE; > +#endif > + > if (minalign > ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN) { > aligned_size = ALIGN(aligned_size, minalign); > aligned_idx = __kmalloc_index(aligned_size, false); > @@ -923,7 +957,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > /* > * Including KMALLOC_CGROUP if CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM defined > */ > - for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > + for (type = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) { > if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i]) > new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags); > @@ -941,6 +975,9 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > new_kmalloc_cache(2, type, flags); > } > } > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + random_kmalloc_seed = get_random_u64(); > +#endif > > /* Kmalloc array is now usable */ > slab_state = UP; > @@ -976,7 +1013,7 @@ void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node, unsigned long caller > return ret; > } > > - s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags); > + s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags, caller); > > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s))) > return s; Here's the renumbering diff. It assumes SLUB_TINY would be excluded as suggested, otherwise more adjustment would be needed for KMALLOC_RECLAIM. ----8<---- diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index 96fdfd96b708..2f6337361515 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -347,10 +347,10 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16) #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES -#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 16 // # of cache copies +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 15 // # of extra cache copies #define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS 4 // =log2(_NR), for hashing #else -#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 1 +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 0 #endif /* @@ -362,15 +362,15 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) * kmem caches can have both accounted and unaccounted objects. */ enum kmalloc_cache_type { - KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = 0, - KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR - 1, - KMALLOC_NORMAL = KMALLOC_RANDOM_END, + KMALLOC_NORMAL = 0, #ifndef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA KMALLOC_DMA = KMALLOC_NORMAL, #endif #ifndef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM KMALLOC_CGROUP = KMALLOC_NORMAL, #endif + KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = KMALLOC_NORMAL, + KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_TINY KMALLOC_RECLAIM = KMALLOC_NORMAL, #else diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index a1a111ca229c..0479037b2959 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -784,22 +784,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES #define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b #define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz) -#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 0] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, -#define KMA_RAND_16(sz) KMA_RAND_15(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-16-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, #else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES #define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) #endif @@ -957,7 +956,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) /* * Including KMALLOC_CGROUP if CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM defined */ - for (type = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { + for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) { if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i]) new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags);
On 2023/6/26 11:18, GONG, Ruiqi wrote: > When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common > technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the > "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation. > Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by > triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore > getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on > various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out- > of-bound write and etc. > > There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic > slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and > 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones. > Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first > one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab > merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill. > > To efficiently prevent heap spraying, we propose the following approach: > to create multiple copies of generic slab caches that will never be > merged, and random one of them will be used at allocation. The random > selection is based on the address of code that calls `kmalloc()`, which > means it is static at runtime (rather than dynamically determined at > each time of allocation, which could be bypassed by repeatedly spraying > in brute force). In other words, the randomness of cache selection will > be with respect to the code address rather than time, i.e. allocations > in different code paths would most likely pick different caches, > although kmalloc() at each place would use the same cache copy whenever > it is executed. In this way, the vulnerable object and memory allocated > in other subsystems and modules will (most probably) be on different > slab caches, which prevents the object from being sprayed. > > Meanwhile, the static random selection is further enhanced with a > per-boot random seed, which prevents the attacker from finding a usable > kmalloc that happens to pick the same cache with the vulnerable > subsystem/module by analyzing the open source code. In other words, with > the per-boot seed, the random selection is static during each time the > system starts and runs, but not across different system startups. > > The overhead of performance has been tested on a 40-core x86 server by > comparing the results of `perf bench all` between the kernels with and > without this patch based on the latest linux-next kernel, which shows > minor difference. A subset of benchmarks are listed below: > > sched/ sched/ syscall/ mem/ mem/ > messaging pipe basic memcpy memset > (sec) (sec) (sec) (GB/sec) (GB/sec) > > control1 0.019 5.459 0.733 15.258789 51.398026 > control2 0.019 5.439 0.730 16.009221 48.828125 > control3 0.019 5.282 0.735 16.009221 48.828125 > control_avg 0.019 5.393 0.733 15.759077 49.684759 > > experiment1 0.019 5.374 0.741 15.500992 46.502976 > experiment2 0.019 5.440 0.746 16.276042 51.398026 > experiment3 0.019 5.242 0.752 15.258789 51.398026 > experiment_avg 0.019 5.352 0.746 15.678608 49.766343 > > The overhead of memory usage was measured by executing `free` after boot > on a QEMU VM with 1GB total memory, and as expected, it's positively > correlated with # of cache copies: > > control 4 copies 8 copies 16 copies > > total 969.8M 968.2M 968.2M 968.2M > used 20.0M 21.9M 24.1M 26.7M > free 936.9M 933.6M 931.4M 928.6M > available 932.2M 928.8M 926.6M 923.9M > > Co-developed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > > v4: > - Set # of cache copies to 16 and remove config selection. > - Shorten "kmalloc-random-" to "kmalloc-rnd-". > - Update commit log and config's help paragraph. > - Fine-tune PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT to 12 instead of 13 (enough to > pass compilation with allmodconfig and CONFIG_SLUB_TINY=n). > - Some cleanup and typo fixing. > > v3: > - Replace SLAB_RANDOMSLAB with the new existing SLAB_NO_MERGE flag. > - Shorten long code lines by wrapping and renaming. > - Update commit message with latest perf benchmark and additional > theorectical explanation. > - Remove "RFC" from patch title and make it a formal patch > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230616111843.3677378-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com/ > > v2: > - Use hash_64() and a per-boot random seed to select kmalloc() caches. > - Change acceptable # of caches from [4,16] to {2,4,8,16}, which is > more compatible with hashing. > - Supplement results of performance and memory overhead tests. > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508075507.1720950-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ > > v1: > - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230315095459.186113-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ > > include/linux/percpu.h | 12 ++++++++--- > include/linux/slab.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++---- > mm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++ > mm/kfence/kfence_test.c | 6 ++++-- > mm/slab.c | 2 +- > mm/slab.h | 2 +- > mm/slab_common.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h > index 42125cf9c506..7692b5559098 100644 > --- a/include/linux/percpu.h > +++ b/include/linux/percpu.h > @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ > #define PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_BITS (PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_SIZE >> \ > PCPU_MIN_ALLOC_SHIFT) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 12 > +#else > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 10 > +#endif > + > /* > * Percpu allocator can serve percpu allocations before slab is > * initialized which allows slab to depend on the percpu allocator. > @@ -41,7 +47,7 @@ > * for this. Keep PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE equal to or larger than > * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE. > */ > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > > /* > * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE indicates the amount of free area to piggy > @@ -55,9 +61,9 @@ > * intelligent way to determine this would be nice. > */ > #if BITS_PER_LONG > 32 > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > #else > -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << 10) > +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) > #endif > > extern void *pcpu_base_addr; > diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h > index 791f7453a04f..747fc2587b56 100644 > --- a/include/linux/slab.h > +++ b/include/linux/slab.h > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > #include <linux/types.h> > #include <linux/workqueue.h> > #include <linux/percpu-refcount.h> > +#include <linux/hash.h> > > > /* > @@ -342,6 +343,13 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > #define SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE < 16 ? \ > (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 16 // # of cache copies > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS 4 // =log2(_NR), for hashing It's unnecessary to define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS, use ilog2(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR) directly in kmalloc_type(). > +#else > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 1 > +#endif > + > /* > * Whenever changing this, take care of that kmalloc_type() and > * create_kmalloc_caches() still work as intended. > @@ -351,7 +359,9 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > * kmem caches can have both accounted and unaccounted objects. > */ > enum kmalloc_cache_type { > - KMALLOC_NORMAL = 0, > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = 0, > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR - 1, > + KMALLOC_NORMAL = KMALLOC_RANDOM_END, > #ifndef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA > KMALLOC_DMA = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > #endif > @@ -383,14 +393,21 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1]; > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) ? __GFP_DMA : 0) | \ > (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM) ? __GFP_ACCOUNT : 0)) > > -static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags) > +extern unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed; > + > +static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > { > /* > * The most common case is KMALLOC_NORMAL, so test for it > * with a single branch for all the relevant flags. > */ > if (likely((flags & KMALLOC_NOT_NORMAL_BITS) == 0)) > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + return KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + hash_64(caller ^ random_kmalloc_seed, > + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS); > +#else > return KMALLOC_NORMAL; > +#endif > > /* > * At least one of the flags has to be set. Their priorities in > @@ -577,7 +594,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > > index = kmalloc_index(size); > return kmalloc_trace( > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], > + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], > flags, size); > } > return __kmalloc(size, flags); > @@ -593,7 +610,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t fla > > index = kmalloc_index(size); > return kmalloc_node_trace( > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], > + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], > flags, node, size); > } > return __kmalloc_node(size, flags, node); > diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig > index a3c95338cd3a..e9dc606c9317 100644 > --- a/mm/Kconfig > +++ b/mm/Kconfig > @@ -337,6 +337,22 @@ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL > which requires the taking of locks that may cause latency spikes. > Typically one would choose no for a realtime system. > > +config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + default n > + depends on SLUB > + bool "Random slab caches for normal kmalloc" > + help > + A hardening feature that creates multiple copies of slab caches for > + normal kmalloc allocation and makes kmalloc randomly pick one based > + on code address, which makes the attackers unable to spray vulnerable > + memory objects on the heap for the purpose of exploiting memory > + vulnerabilities. > + > + Currently the number of copies is set to 16, a reasonably large value > + that effectively diverges the memory objects allocated for different > + subsystems or modules into different caches, at the expense of about > + 7 MB of memory overhead. > + > endmenu # SLAB allocator options > > config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR > diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > index 9e008a336d9f..7f5ffb490328 100644 > --- a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c > @@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ static void test_cache_destroy(void) > > static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size) > { > - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; > + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); > + return kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; > } > > /* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */ > @@ -282,8 +283,9 @@ static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocat > > if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) { > struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(alloc); > + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); > struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?: > - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; > + kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; > > /* > * Verify that various helpers return the right values > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > index 88194391d553..9ad3d0f2d1a5 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.c > +++ b/mm/slab.c > @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static size_t calculate_slab_order(struct kmem_cache *cachep, > if (freelist_size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) { > freelist_cache_size = PAGE_SIZE << get_order(freelist_size); > } else { > - freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u); > + freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u, _RET_IP_); > if (!freelist_cache) > continue; > freelist_cache_size = freelist_cache->size; > diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h > index 6a5633b25eb5..4ebe3bdfc17c 100644 > --- a/mm/slab.h > +++ b/mm/slab.h > @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void); > void create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t); > > /* Find the kmalloc slab corresponding for a certain size */ > -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t, gfp_t); > +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller); > > void *__kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, > int node, size_t orig_size, > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index fe436d35f333..6f385956ef07 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -678,6 +678,11 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1] __ro_after_init = > { /* initialization for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42570 */ }; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed __ro_after_init; > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_kmalloc_seed); > +#endif > + > /* > * Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the > * kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power > @@ -720,7 +725,7 @@ static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes) > * Find the kmem_cache structure that serves a given size of > * allocation > */ > -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) > { > unsigned int index; > > @@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) > index = fls(size - 1); > } > > - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index]; > + return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, caller)][index]; > } > > size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) > @@ -753,7 +758,7 @@ size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) > return PAGE_SIZE << get_order(size); > > /* The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all. */ > - c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL); > + c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); > return c ? c->object_size : 0; > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); > @@ -776,12 +781,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); > #define KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(sz) > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b > +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz) > +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 0] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_16(sz) KMA_RAND_15(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-16-" #sz, > +#else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) > +#endif > + > #define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \ > { \ > .name[KMALLOC_NORMAL] = "kmalloc-" #__short_size, \ > KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(__short_size) \ > KMALLOC_CGROUP_NAME(__short_size) \ > KMALLOC_DMA_NAME(__short_size) \ > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, __short_size) \ > .size = __size, \ > } > > @@ -890,6 +919,11 @@ new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type, slab_flags_t flags) > flags |= SLAB_CACHE_DMA; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + if (type >= KMALLOC_RANDOM_START && type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END) > + flags |= SLAB_NO_MERGE; > +#endif > + > if (minalign > ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN) { > aligned_size = ALIGN(aligned_size, minalign); > aligned_idx = __kmalloc_index(aligned_size, false); > @@ -923,7 +957,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > /* > * Including KMALLOC_CGROUP if CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM defined > */ > - for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > + for (type = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) { > if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i]) > new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags); > @@ -941,6 +975,9 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > new_kmalloc_cache(2, type, flags); > } > } > +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > + random_kmalloc_seed = get_random_u64(); > +#endif > > /* Kmalloc array is now usable */ > slab_state = UP; > @@ -976,7 +1013,7 @@ void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node, unsigned long caller > return ret; > } > > - s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags); > + s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags, caller); > > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s))) > return s;
On 2023/07/13 20:46, Vlastimil Babka wrote: > > On 6/26/23 05:18, GONG, Ruiqi wrote: >> When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common >> technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the >> "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation. >> Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by >> triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore >> getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on >> various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out- >> of-bound write and etc. >> >> There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic >> slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and >> 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones. >> Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first >> one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab >> merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill. > > Interesting :) Here's a recent patch to make slub_nomerge a default: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230629221910.359711-1-julian.pidancet@oracle.com/ > > In v1, Kees said he's been running with that for ages: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/202306281358.E6E6C2759@keescook/ > > So it's not universally accepted in the kernel hardening community? > Thanks for the information! I'm not sure if the slub merging is that much unwelcomed in the hardening community, since I don't see hardening folks complaining a lot about it. I personally don't hate it as it does bring benefits for the performance, at least theoretically (e.g. keeping cache hot, reducing internal fragments etc.). > [...] > > Here's the renumbering diff. It assumes SLUB_TINY would be excluded as > suggested, otherwise more adjustment would be needed for KMALLOC_RECLAIM. > > ----8<---- > diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h > index 96fdfd96b708..2f6337361515 100644 > --- a/include/linux/slab.h > +++ b/include/linux/slab.h > @@ -347,10 +347,10 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16) > > #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > -#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 16 // # of cache copies > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 15 // # of extra cache copies > #define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS 4 // =log2(_NR), for hashing > #else > -#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 1 > +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 0 > #endif > > /* > @@ -362,15 +362,15 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) > * kmem caches can have both accounted and unaccounted objects. > */ > enum kmalloc_cache_type { > - KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = 0, > - KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR - 1, > - KMALLOC_NORMAL = KMALLOC_RANDOM_END, > + KMALLOC_NORMAL = 0, > #ifndef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA > KMALLOC_DMA = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > #endif > #ifndef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM > KMALLOC_CGROUP = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > #endif > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > + KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, > #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_TINY > KMALLOC_RECLAIM = KMALLOC_NORMAL, > #else > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index a1a111ca229c..0479037b2959 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -784,22 +784,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); > #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > #define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b > #define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz) > -#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 0] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, > -#define KMA_RAND_16(sz) KMA_RAND_15(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-16-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, > +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, > #else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES > #define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) > #endif > @@ -957,7 +956,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > /* > * Including KMALLOC_CGROUP if CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM defined > */ > - for (type = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > + for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { > for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) { > if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i]) > new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags); > > I've adjusted the code according to all suggestions I received and sent out the v5 patch. Thanks for the comments!
diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h index 42125cf9c506..7692b5559098 100644 --- a/include/linux/percpu.h +++ b/include/linux/percpu.h @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ #define PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_BITS (PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_SIZE >> \ PCPU_MIN_ALLOC_SHIFT) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 12 +#else +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT 10 +#endif + /* * Percpu allocator can serve percpu allocations before slab is * initialized which allows slab to depend on the percpu allocator. @@ -41,7 +47,7 @@ * for this. Keep PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE equal to or larger than * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE. */ -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << 10) +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_EARLY_SIZE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) /* * PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE indicates the amount of free area to piggy @@ -55,9 +61,9 @@ * intelligent way to determine this would be nice. */ #if BITS_PER_LONG > 32 -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << 10) +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (28 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) #else -#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << 10) +#define PERCPU_DYNAMIC_RESERVE (20 << PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT) #endif extern void *pcpu_base_addr; diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index 791f7453a04f..747fc2587b56 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/percpu-refcount.h> +#include <linux/hash.h> /* @@ -342,6 +343,13 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) #define SLAB_OBJ_MIN_SIZE (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE < 16 ? \ (KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE) : 16) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 16 // # of cache copies +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS 4 // =log2(_NR), for hashing +#else +#define RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR 1 +#endif + /* * Whenever changing this, take care of that kmalloc_type() and * create_kmalloc_caches() still work as intended. @@ -351,7 +359,9 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_slab_minalign(void) * kmem caches can have both accounted and unaccounted objects. */ enum kmalloc_cache_type { - KMALLOC_NORMAL = 0, + KMALLOC_RANDOM_START = 0, + KMALLOC_RANDOM_END = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR - 1, + KMALLOC_NORMAL = KMALLOC_RANDOM_END, #ifndef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA KMALLOC_DMA = KMALLOC_NORMAL, #endif @@ -383,14 +393,21 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1]; (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZONE_DMA) ? __GFP_DMA : 0) | \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM) ? __GFP_ACCOUNT : 0)) -static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags) +extern unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed; + +static __always_inline enum kmalloc_cache_type kmalloc_type(gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) { /* * The most common case is KMALLOC_NORMAL, so test for it * with a single branch for all the relevant flags. */ if (likely((flags & KMALLOC_NOT_NORMAL_BITS) == 0)) +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES + return KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + hash_64(caller ^ random_kmalloc_seed, + RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_BITS); +#else return KMALLOC_NORMAL; +#endif /* * At least one of the flags has to be set. Their priorities in @@ -577,7 +594,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) index = kmalloc_index(size); return kmalloc_trace( - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], flags, size); } return __kmalloc(size, flags); @@ -593,7 +610,7 @@ static __always_inline __alloc_size(1) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t fla index = kmalloc_index(size); return kmalloc_node_trace( - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], + kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, _RET_IP_)][index], flags, node, size); } return __kmalloc_node(size, flags, node); diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index a3c95338cd3a..e9dc606c9317 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -337,6 +337,22 @@ config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL which requires the taking of locks that may cause latency spikes. Typically one would choose no for a realtime system. +config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES + default n + depends on SLUB + bool "Random slab caches for normal kmalloc" + help + A hardening feature that creates multiple copies of slab caches for + normal kmalloc allocation and makes kmalloc randomly pick one based + on code address, which makes the attackers unable to spray vulnerable + memory objects on the heap for the purpose of exploiting memory + vulnerabilities. + + Currently the number of copies is set to 16, a reasonably large value + that effectively diverges the memory objects allocated for different + subsystems or modules into different caches, at the expense of about + 7 MB of memory overhead. + endmenu # SLAB allocator options config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c index 9e008a336d9f..7f5ffb490328 100644 --- a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c @@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ static void test_cache_destroy(void) static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size) { - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); + return kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align; } /* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */ @@ -282,8 +283,9 @@ static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocat if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) { struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(alloc); + enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?: - kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; + kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]; /* * Verify that various helpers return the right values diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index 88194391d553..9ad3d0f2d1a5 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static size_t calculate_slab_order(struct kmem_cache *cachep, if (freelist_size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE) { freelist_cache_size = PAGE_SIZE << get_order(freelist_size); } else { - freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u); + freelist_cache = kmalloc_slab(freelist_size, 0u, _RET_IP_); if (!freelist_cache) continue; freelist_cache_size = freelist_cache->size; diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h index 6a5633b25eb5..4ebe3bdfc17c 100644 --- a/mm/slab.h +++ b/mm/slab.h @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void); void create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t); /* Find the kmalloc slab corresponding for a certain size */ -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t, gfp_t); +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller); void *__kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, int node, size_t orig_size, diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index fe436d35f333..6f385956ef07 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -678,6 +678,11 @@ kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES][KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1] __ro_after_init = { /* initialization for https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42570 */ }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches); +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES +unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed __ro_after_init; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_kmalloc_seed); +#endif + /* * Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the * kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power @@ -720,7 +725,7 @@ static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes) * Find the kmem_cache structure that serves a given size of * allocation */ -struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) +struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) { unsigned int index; @@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) index = fls(size - 1); } - return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index]; + return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, caller)][index]; } size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) @@ -753,7 +758,7 @@ size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size) return PAGE_SIZE << get_order(size); /* The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all. */ - c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL); + c = kmalloc_slab(size, GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_); return c ? c->object_size : 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); @@ -776,12 +781,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup); #define KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(sz) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES +#define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz) +#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 0] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz, +#define KMA_RAND_16(sz) KMA_RAND_15(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-16-" #sz, +#else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES +#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) +#endif + #define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \ { \ .name[KMALLOC_NORMAL] = "kmalloc-" #__short_size, \ KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(__short_size) \ KMALLOC_CGROUP_NAME(__short_size) \ KMALLOC_DMA_NAME(__short_size) \ + KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, __short_size) \ .size = __size, \ } @@ -890,6 +919,11 @@ new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type, slab_flags_t flags) flags |= SLAB_CACHE_DMA; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES + if (type >= KMALLOC_RANDOM_START && type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END) + flags |= SLAB_NO_MERGE; +#endif + if (minalign > ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN) { aligned_size = ALIGN(aligned_size, minalign); aligned_idx = __kmalloc_index(aligned_size, false); @@ -923,7 +957,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) /* * Including KMALLOC_CGROUP if CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM defined */ - for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { + for (type = KMALLOC_RANDOM_START; type < NR_KMALLOC_TYPES; type++) { for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) { if (!kmalloc_caches[type][i]) new_kmalloc_cache(i, type, flags); @@ -941,6 +975,9 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) new_kmalloc_cache(2, type, flags); } } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES + random_kmalloc_seed = get_random_u64(); +#endif /* Kmalloc array is now usable */ slab_state = UP; @@ -976,7 +1013,7 @@ void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node, unsigned long caller return ret; } - s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags); + s = kmalloc_slab(size, flags, caller); if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s))) return s;
When exploiting memory vulnerabilities, "heap spraying" is a common technique targeting those related to dynamic memory allocation (i.e. the "heap"), and it plays an important role in a successful exploitation. Basically, it is to overwrite the memory area of vulnerable object by triggering allocation in other subsystems or modules and therefore getting a reference to the targeted memory location. It's usable on various types of vulnerablity including use after free (UAF), heap out- of-bound write and etc. There are (at least) two reasons why the heap can be sprayed: 1) generic slab caches are shared among different subsystems and modules, and 2) dedicated slab caches could be merged with the generic ones. Currently these two factors cannot be prevented at a low cost: the first one is a widely used memory allocation mechanism, and shutting down slab merging completely via `slub_nomerge` would be overkill. To efficiently prevent heap spraying, we propose the following approach: to create multiple copies of generic slab caches that will never be merged, and random one of them will be used at allocation. The random selection is based on the address of code that calls `kmalloc()`, which means it is static at runtime (rather than dynamically determined at each time of allocation, which could be bypassed by repeatedly spraying in brute force). In other words, the randomness of cache selection will be with respect to the code address rather than time, i.e. allocations in different code paths would most likely pick different caches, although kmalloc() at each place would use the same cache copy whenever it is executed. In this way, the vulnerable object and memory allocated in other subsystems and modules will (most probably) be on different slab caches, which prevents the object from being sprayed. Meanwhile, the static random selection is further enhanced with a per-boot random seed, which prevents the attacker from finding a usable kmalloc that happens to pick the same cache with the vulnerable subsystem/module by analyzing the open source code. In other words, with the per-boot seed, the random selection is static during each time the system starts and runs, but not across different system startups. The overhead of performance has been tested on a 40-core x86 server by comparing the results of `perf bench all` between the kernels with and without this patch based on the latest linux-next kernel, which shows minor difference. A subset of benchmarks are listed below: sched/ sched/ syscall/ mem/ mem/ messaging pipe basic memcpy memset (sec) (sec) (sec) (GB/sec) (GB/sec) control1 0.019 5.459 0.733 15.258789 51.398026 control2 0.019 5.439 0.730 16.009221 48.828125 control3 0.019 5.282 0.735 16.009221 48.828125 control_avg 0.019 5.393 0.733 15.759077 49.684759 experiment1 0.019 5.374 0.741 15.500992 46.502976 experiment2 0.019 5.440 0.746 16.276042 51.398026 experiment3 0.019 5.242 0.752 15.258789 51.398026 experiment_avg 0.019 5.352 0.746 15.678608 49.766343 The overhead of memory usage was measured by executing `free` after boot on a QEMU VM with 1GB total memory, and as expected, it's positively correlated with # of cache copies: control 4 copies 8 copies 16 copies total 969.8M 968.2M 968.2M 968.2M used 20.0M 21.9M 24.1M 26.7M free 936.9M 933.6M 931.4M 928.6M available 932.2M 928.8M 926.6M 923.9M Co-developed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- v4: - Set # of cache copies to 16 and remove config selection. - Shorten "kmalloc-random-" to "kmalloc-rnd-". - Update commit log and config's help paragraph. - Fine-tune PERCPU_DYNAMIC_SIZE_SHIFT to 12 instead of 13 (enough to pass compilation with allmodconfig and CONFIG_SLUB_TINY=n). - Some cleanup and typo fixing. v3: - Replace SLAB_RANDOMSLAB with the new existing SLAB_NO_MERGE flag. - Shorten long code lines by wrapping and renaming. - Update commit message with latest perf benchmark and additional theorectical explanation. - Remove "RFC" from patch title and make it a formal patch - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230616111843.3677378-1-gongruiqi@huaweicloud.com/ v2: - Use hash_64() and a per-boot random seed to select kmalloc() caches. - Change acceptable # of caches from [4,16] to {2,4,8,16}, which is more compatible with hashing. - Supplement results of performance and memory overhead tests. - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230508075507.1720950-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ v1: - Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230315095459.186113-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ include/linux/percpu.h | 12 ++++++++--- include/linux/slab.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++---- mm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++ mm/kfence/kfence_test.c | 6 ++++-- mm/slab.c | 2 +- mm/slab.h | 2 +- mm/slab_common.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 7 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)