diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e7bfe1bde49e..469a65b3cf50 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1538,6 +1538,16 @@
 			Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of
 			current integrity status.
 
+	exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL]
+			Format: { no | yes }
+			Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall,
+			uprobe.
+			This overwrites KCONFIG CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
+			- 'no':  do not seal system mappings.
+			- 'yes': seal system mappings.
+			If not specified or invalid, default is the KCONFIG value.
+			This option has no effect if CONFIG_64BIT=n
+
 	early_page_ext [KNL,EARLY] Enforces page_ext initialization to earlier
 			stages so cover more early boot allocations.
 			Please note that as side effect some optimizations
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index 2fb7d53cf333..185553376f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -366,8 +366,13 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
 		set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
 	}
 
-	if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY)
-		vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, VM_EXEC);
+	if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) {
+		unsigned long vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
+
+		vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
+
+		vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, vm_flags);
+	}
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
 		     (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index df0a5eac66b7..f787d6c85cbb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -4238,4 +4238,16 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
 int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
 int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+/*
+ * return VM_SEALED if seal system mapping is enabled.
+ */
+unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void);
+#else
+static inline unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 57fd5ab2abe7..bc694c555805 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2133,6 +2133,16 @@ struct vm_area_struct *_install_special_mapping(
 	unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
 	unsigned long vm_flags, const struct vm_special_mapping *spec)
 {
+	/*
+	 * At present, all mappings (vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe) that
+	 * invoke the _install_special_mapping function can be sealed.
+	 * Therefore, it is logical to call the seal_system_mappings_enabled()
+	 * function here. In the future, if this is not the case, i.e. if certain
+	 * mappings cannot be sealed, then it would be necessary to move this
+	 * check to the calling function.
+	 */
+	vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
+
 	return __install_special_mapping(mm, addr, len, vm_flags, (void *)spec,
 					&special_mapping_vmops);
 }
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index ece977bd21e1..0a9d1e9faa28 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  *  Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
  */
 
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -266,3 +267,41 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
 {
 	return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Kernel cmdline overwrite for CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
+ */
+enum seal_system_mappings_type {
+	SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED,
+	SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED
+};
+
+static enum seal_system_mappings_type seal_system_mappings_v __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) ? SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED :
+	SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED;
+
+static const struct constant_table value_table_sys_mapping[] __initconst = {
+	{ "no", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED},
+	{ "yes", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static int __init early_seal_system_mappings_override(char *buf)
+{
+	if (!buf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	seal_system_mappings_v = lookup_constant(value_table_sys_mapping,
+			buf, seal_system_mappings_v);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("exec.seal_system_mappings", early_seal_system_mappings_override);
+
+unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
+{
+	if (seal_system_mappings_v == SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED)
+		return VM_SEALED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 28e685f53bd1..63b87a218943 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,17 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
 
 endchoice
 
+config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
+	bool "seal system mappings"
+	default n
+	depends on 64BIT
+	depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+	help
+	  Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall, uprobes.
+	  Note: CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore,
+	  and remap will fail if the mapping is sealed, therefore
+	  !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency.
+
 config SECURITY
 	bool "Enable different security models"
 	depends on SYSFS
