| Message ID | 3f0299bde58d0161c1dad75e0b7f93f074a6cd12.1466036668.git.luto@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
Hi, On 06/16/2016 03:28 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks. There are a > couple of interesting bits. > > First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc > area. This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access > the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die. > To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and > forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms. > > Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to > detect and handle stack overflow. > > I didn't enable it on x86_32. We'd need to rework the double-fault > code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual > addresses under some workloads. > > This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the > stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes > above the bottom of the stack. Specifically, we'll get #PF and make > it to no_context and an oops without triggering a double-fault, and > no_context doesn't know about stack overflows. The next patch will > improve that case. > > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index 0a7b885964ba..b624b24d1dc1 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config X86 > select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK > select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE > select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if X86_64 > + select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 > select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR > select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE > select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h > index 8f321a1b03a1..14e4b20f0aaf 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h > @@ -8,6 +8,28 @@ struct tss_struct; > void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, > struct tss_struct *tss); > > +/* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */ > +static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, > + struct task_struct *next) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > + /* > + * If we switch to a stack that has a top-level paging entry > + * that is not present in the current mm, the resulting #PF will > + * will be promoted to a double-fault and we'll panic. Probe > + * the new stack now so that vmalloc_fault can fix up the page > + * tables if needed. This can only happen if we use a stack > + * in vmap space. > + * > + * We assume that the stack is aligned so that it never spans > + * more than one top-level paging entry. > + * > + * To minimize cache pollution, just follow the stack pointer. > + */ > + READ_ONCE(*(unsigned char *)next->thread.sp); > +#endif > +} > + > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 > > #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR > @@ -39,6 +61,8 @@ do { \ > */ \ > unsigned long ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi; \ > \ > + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ > + \ > asm volatile("pushl %%ebp\n\t" /* save EBP */ \ > "movl %%esp,%[prev_sp]\n\t" /* save ESP */ \ > "movl %[next_sp],%%esp\n\t" /* restore ESP */ \ > @@ -103,7 +127,9 @@ do { \ > * clean in kernel mode, with the possible exception of IOPL. Kernel IOPL > * has no effect. > */ > -#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ > +#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ > + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ > + \ > asm volatile(SAVE_CONTEXT \ > "movq %%rsp,%P[threadrsp](%[prev])\n\t" /* save RSP */ \ > "movq %P[threadrsp](%[next]),%%rsp\n\t" /* restore RSP */ \ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c > index 00f03d82e69a..9cb7ea781176 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c > @@ -292,12 +292,30 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present) > DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment) > DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > +static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, > + struct pt_regs *regs, > + unsigned long fault_address) > +{ > + printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n", > + (void *)fault_address, current->stack, > + (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1); > + die(message, regs, 0); > + > + /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */ > + panic(message); > +} > +#endif > + > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 > /* Runs on IST stack */ > dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) > { > static const char str[] = "double fault"; > struct task_struct *tsk = current; > +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > + unsigned long cr2; > +#endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 > extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[]; > @@ -332,6 +350,20 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) > tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; > tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK > + /* > + * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail > + * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. CR2 will contain > + * the linear address of the second fault, which will be in the > + * guard page below the bottom of the stack. > + */ > + cr2 = read_cr2(); > + if ((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) > + handle_stack_overflow( > + "kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", > + regs, cr2); > +#endif > + > #ifdef CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT > df_debug(regs, error_code); > #endif > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c > index 5643fd0b1a7d..fbf036ae72ac 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c > @@ -77,10 +77,25 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, > unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id(); > > if (likely(prev != next)) { > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { > + /* > + * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't > + * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly > + * map it. > + */ > + unsigned int stack_pgd_index = > + pgd_index(current_stack_pointer()); stack pointer is still the previous task's, current_stack_pointer() returns that, not next task's which was intention I guess. Things may happen to work if on same pgd, but at least the boot cpu init_task_struct is special. > + pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index; > + > + if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd))) > + set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[stack_pgd_index]); > + } > + > #ifdef CONFIG_SMP > this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK); > this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.active_mm, next); > #endif > + > cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)); > > /* > --Mika
On Wed, 2016-06-15 at 22:33 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c > > > @@ -77,10 +77,25 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct > > > *prev, struct mm_struct *next, > > > unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id(); > > > > > > if (likely(prev != next)) { > > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { > > > + /* > > > + * If our current stack is in vmalloc space > > > and isn't > > > + * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double- > > > fault. Forcibly > > > + * map it. > > > + */ > > > + unsigned int stack_pgd_index = > > > + pgd_index(current_stack_pointer()); > > > > stack pointer is still the previous task's, current_stack_pointer() > > returns that, not > > next task's which was intention I guess. Things may happen to work > > if on same pgd, but at least the > > boot cpu init_task_struct is special. > This is intentional. When switching processes, we first switch the > mm > and then switch the task. We need to make sure that the prev stack > is > mapped in the new mm or we'll double-fault and die after switching > the > mm which still trying to execute on the old stack. > > The change to switch_to makes sure that the new stack is mapped. > On a HARDENED_USERCOPY tangential note: by not allowing copy_to/from_user access to vmalloc memory by default, with exception of the stack, a task will only be able to copy_to/from_user from its own stack, not another task's stack, at least using the kernel virtual address the kernel uses to access that stack. This can be accomplished by simply not adding any vmalloc checking code to the current HARDENED_USERCOPY patch set :)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 0a7b885964ba..b624b24d1dc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if X86_64 + select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h index 8f321a1b03a1..14e4b20f0aaf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h @@ -8,6 +8,28 @@ struct tss_struct; void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, struct tss_struct *tss); +/* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */ +static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, + struct task_struct *next) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + /* + * If we switch to a stack that has a top-level paging entry + * that is not present in the current mm, the resulting #PF will + * will be promoted to a double-fault and we'll panic. Probe + * the new stack now so that vmalloc_fault can fix up the page + * tables if needed. This can only happen if we use a stack + * in vmap space. + * + * We assume that the stack is aligned so that it never spans + * more than one top-level paging entry. + * + * To minimize cache pollution, just follow the stack pointer. + */ + READ_ONCE(*(unsigned char *)next->thread.sp); +#endif +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR @@ -39,6 +61,8 @@ do { \ */ \ unsigned long ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi; \ \ + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ + \ asm volatile("pushl %%ebp\n\t" /* save EBP */ \ "movl %%esp,%[prev_sp]\n\t" /* save ESP */ \ "movl %[next_sp],%%esp\n\t" /* restore ESP */ \ @@ -103,7 +127,9 @@ do { \ * clean in kernel mode, with the possible exception of IOPL. Kernel IOPL * has no effect. */ -#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ +#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \ + prepare_switch_to(prev, next); \ + \ asm volatile(SAVE_CONTEXT \ "movq %%rsp,%P[threadrsp](%[prev])\n\t" /* save RSP */ \ "movq %P[threadrsp](%[next]),%%rsp\n\t" /* restore RSP */ \ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 00f03d82e69a..9cb7ea781176 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -292,12 +292,30 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP, SIGBUS, "segment not present", segment_not_present) DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS, SIGBUS, "stack segment", stack_segment) DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check) +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK +static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, + struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long fault_address) +{ + printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n", + (void *)fault_address, current->stack, + (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1); + die(message, regs, 0); + + /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */ + panic(message); +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* Runs on IST stack */ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { static const char str[] = "double fault"; struct task_struct *tsk = current; +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + unsigned long cr2; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[]; @@ -332,6 +350,20 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF; +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + /* + * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail + * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead. CR2 will contain + * the linear address of the second fault, which will be in the + * guard page below the bottom of the stack. + */ + cr2 = read_cr2(); + if ((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE) + handle_stack_overflow( + "kernel stack overflow (double-fault)", + regs, cr2); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT df_debug(regs, error_code); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 5643fd0b1a7d..fbf036ae72ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -77,10 +77,25 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id(); if (likely(prev != next)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { + /* + * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't + * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly + * map it. + */ + unsigned int stack_pgd_index = + pgd_index(current_stack_pointer()); + pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index; + + if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd))) + set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[stack_pgd_index]); + } + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.active_mm, next); #endif + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)); /*
This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks. There are a couple of interesting bits. First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc area. This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die. To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms. Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to detect and handle stack overflow. I didn't enable it on x86_32. We'd need to rework the double-fault code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual addresses under some workloads. This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes above the bottom of the stack. Specifically, we'll get #PF and make it to no_context and an oops without triggering a double-fault, and no_context doesn't know about stack overflows. The next patch will improve that case. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)