From patchwork Fri Jun 17 20:00:44 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Andy Lutomirski X-Patchwork-Id: 9184847 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D079D6075D for ; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 20:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A81A227DCE for ; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 20:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9CC7527EED; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 20:02:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id CA86427DCE for ; Fri, 17 Jun 2016 20:02:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 28390 invoked by uid 550); 17 Jun 2016 20:01:21 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 28202 invoked from network); 17 Jun 2016 20:01:19 -0000 From: Andy Lutomirski To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Nadav Amit , Kees Cook , Brian Gerst , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , Linus Torvalds , Josh Poimboeuf , Jann Horn , Heiko Carstens , Andy Lutomirski Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2016 13:00:44 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.5.5 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack. The latter gives us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a stack overflow to write out our logs. I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks. This way, if we need to revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack overflow handling. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++---- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index 983e5d3a0d27..0b56666e6039 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault) jmp error_code END(async_page_fault) #endif + +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit) + /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp + + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi + leal -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp + + call do_exit +1: jmp 1b +END(rewind_stack_do_exit) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 9ee0da1807ed..b846875aeea6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret) mov $-ENOSYS, %eax sysret END(ignore_sysret) + +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit) + /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp + + movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rax + leaq -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp + + call do_exit +1: jmp 1b +END(rewind_stack_do_exit) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index 36effb39c9c9..d4d085e27d04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -228,6 +228,8 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oops_begin); NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin); +extern void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr); + void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) { if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current)) @@ -247,12 +249,15 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) return; if (in_interrupt()) panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); - if (((current_stack_pointer() ^ (current_top_of_stack() - 1)) - & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) != 0) - panic("Fatal exception on special stack"); if (panic_on_oops) panic("Fatal exception"); - do_exit(signr); + + /* + * We're not going to return, but we might be on an IST stack or + * have very little stack space left. Rewind the stack and kill + * the task. + */ + rewind_stack_do_exit(signr); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);