From patchwork Wed Nov 13 18:46:55 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian X-Patchwork-Id: 11242655 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06211138C for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 18:47:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB847206F3 for ; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 18:47:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="Puq1wUqR" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727556AbfKMSrE (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Nov 2019 13:47:04 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:43324 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726300AbfKMSrD (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Nov 2019 13:47:03 -0500 Received: from nramas-ThinkStation-P520.corp.microsoft.com (unknown [131.107.174.108]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9FF6020B4901; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 10:47:02 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 9FF6020B4901 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1573670822; bh=VpCKoF921kDCvJLHf7GSVgqIIG8sIgGF5r2hC+zcLSU=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:From; b=Puq1wUqRgpA4PzgWPN65axKtm/Ikho0pn3rVfP6IOqBGoLmdtK0Ypq4hZhvz1k/Vq pZnexm5Sh7zlAKnK2B+uFd/x3OnpGI5YivFCR2hx+onD0xrITMEue1/1jJlMHUCpjH OUfwZZhcN5U9F/4O7RZZp6zD8c68dlb/Tzs6MIk8= From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 0/3] KEYS: Measure keys when they are created or updated Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 10:46:55 -0800 Message-Id: <20191113184658.2862-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Keys created or updated in the system are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether or not the trusted keys keyring(s), for instance, contain only known good (trusted) keys. IMA measures system files, command line arguments passed to kexec, boot aggregate, etc. It can be used to measure keys as well. But there is no mechanism available in the kernel for IMA to know when a key is created or updated. This change aims to address measuring keys created or updated in the system: To achieve the above the following changes have been made: - Added a new IMA hook namely, ima_post_key_create_or_update, which measures the key. This IMA hook is called from key_create_or_update function. The key measurement can be controlled through IMA policy. A new IMA policy function KEY_CHECK has been added to measure keys. # measure keys loaded onto any keyring measure func=KEY_CHECK Testing performed: * Booted the kernel with this change. * When KEY_CHECK policy is set IMA measures keys loaded onto any keyring. * Keys are not measured when KEY_CHECK is not set. * Added a new key to a keyring. => Added keys to .ima and .evm keyrings. * Added the same key again. => Add the same key to .ima and .evm keyrings. Change Log: v6: => Rebased the changes to v5.4-rc7 => Renamed KEYRING_CHECK to KEY_CHECK per Mimi's suggestion. => Excluded the patches that add support for limiting key measurement to specific keyrings ("keyrings=" option for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" in the IMA policy). Also, excluded the patches that add support for deferred processing of keys (queue support). These patches will be added in separate patch sets later. v5: => Reorganized the patches to add measurement of keys through the IMA hook without any queuing and then added queuing support. => Updated the queuing functions to minimize code executed inside mutex. => Process queued keys after custom IMA policies have been applied. v4: => Rebased the changes to v5.4-rc3 => Applied the following dependent patch set first and then added new changes. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/1572492694-6520-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com => Refactored the patch set to separate out changes related to func KEYRING_CHECK and options keyrings into different patches. => Moved the functions to queue and dequeue keys for measurement from ima_queue.c to a new file ima_asymmetric_keys.c. => Added a new config namely CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS to compile ima_asymmetric_keys.c v3: => Added KEYRING_CHECK for measuring keys. This can optionally specify keyrings to measure. => Updated ima_get_action() and related functions to return the keyrings if specified in the policy. => process_buffer_measurement() function is updated to take keyring as a parameter. The key will be measured if the policy includes the keyring in the list of measured keyrings. If the policy does not specify any keyrings then all keys are measured. v2: => Per suggestion from Mimi reordered the patch set to first enable measuring keys added or updated in the system. And, then scope the measurement to keys added to builtin_trusted_keys keyring through ima policy. => Removed security_key_create_or_update function and instead call ima hook, to measure the key, directly from key_create_or_update function. v1: => LSM function for key_create_or_update. It calls ima. => Added ima hook for measuring keys => ima measures keys based on ima policy. v0: => Added LSM hook for key_create_or_update. => Measure keys added to builtin or secondary trusted keys keyring. Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (3): IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 ++- include/linux/ima.h | 13 +++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 14 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +- security/keys/key.c | 9 ++++ 9 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c