| Message ID | 1523633272.3272.30.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, Apr 13, 2018 at 11:27:52AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > If both IMA-appraisal and sig_enforce are enabled, then both signatures > are currently required. If the IMA-appraisal signature verification > fails, it could rely on the appended signature verification; but with the > lockdown patch set, the appended signature verification assumes that if > IMA-appraisal is enabled, it has verified the signature. Basically each > signature verification method would be relying on the other to verify the > kernel module signature. > > This patch addresses the problem of requiring both kernel module signature > verification methods, when both are enabled, by verifying just the > appended signature. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > kernel/module.c | 4 +--- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++++- > 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > index 9c1709a05037..60861eb7bc4d 100644 > --- a/kernel/module.c > +++ b/kernel/module.c > @@ -2803,9 +2803,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, > if (sig_enforce) { > pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason); > return -EKEYREJECTED; > - } > - > - if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) > + } else if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) > return 0; > if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) > return -EPERM; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 754ece08e1c6..2155b1f316a4 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > { > + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); > enum ima_hooks func; > u32 secid; > > @@ -490,7 +491,11 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > return 0; > } > > - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ > + /* > + * If both IMA-appraisal and appended signature verification are > + * enabled, rely on the appended signature verification. > + */ > + if (sig_enforce && read_id == READING_MODULE) > return 0; > > /* permit signed certs */ > -- > 2.7.5 > I agree with the solution. Acked-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 9c1709a05037..60861eb7bc4d 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2803,9 +2803,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags, if (sig_enforce) { pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason); return -EKEYREJECTED; - } - - if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) + } else if (can_do_ima_check && is_ima_appraise_enabled()) return 0; if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) return -EPERM; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 754ece08e1c6..2155b1f316a4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -490,7 +491,11 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ + /* + * If both IMA-appraisal and appended signature verification are + * enabled, rely on the appended signature verification. + */ + if (sig_enforce && read_id == READING_MODULE) return 0; /* permit signed certs */
If both IMA-appraisal and sig_enforce are enabled, then both signatures are currently required. If the IMA-appraisal signature verification fails, it could rely on the appended signature verification; but with the lockdown patch set, the appended signature verification assumes that if IMA-appraisal is enabled, it has verified the signature. Basically each signature verification method would be relying on the other to verify the kernel module signature. This patch addresses the problem of requiring both kernel module signature verification methods, when both are enabled, by verifying just the appended signature. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- kernel/module.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)