From patchwork Fri May 11 01:36:47 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mimi Zohar X-Patchwork-Id: 10392863 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DEA1A60153 for ; Fri, 11 May 2018 01:37:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C552E28D52 for ; Fri, 11 May 2018 01:37:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B9D4B28DCA; Fri, 11 May 2018 01:37:36 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E35228D52 for ; Fri, 11 May 2018 01:37:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750805AbeEKBhI (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 May 2018 21:37:08 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:54756 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752111AbeEKBhG (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 May 2018 21:37:06 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w4B1Yne4124539 for ; Thu, 10 May 2018 21:37:05 -0400 Received: from e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.111]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2hw036b1wa-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 10 May 2018 21:37:05 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp15.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 11 May 2018 02:37:00 +0100 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w4B1axal8388994; Fri, 11 May 2018 01:36:59 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ECF211C04A; Fri, 11 May 2018 02:28:23 +0100 (BST) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E98F811C04C; Fri, 11 May 2018 02:28:21 +0100 (BST) Received: from localhost.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.104.201]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 11 May 2018 02:28:21 +0100 (BST) From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Eric Biederman , David Howells , Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , Matthew Garrett , Casey Schaufler Subject: [PATCH 2/3] kexec: call LSM hook for kexec_load syscall Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 21:36:47 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1526002608-27474-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1526002608-27474-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18051101-0020-0000-0000-0000041C145B X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18051101-0021-0000-0000-000042B114E8 Message-Id: <1526002608-27474-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2018-05-11_01:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1805110009 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between the kexec_load and kexec_file_load_syscalls, an LSM call needs to be added to the original kexec_load syscall. From a technical perspective there is no need for defining a new LSM hook, as the existing security_kernel_kexec_load() works just fine. However, the name is confusing. For this reason, instead of defining a new LSM hook, this patch defines security_kexec_load() as a wrapper for the existing LSM security_kernel_file_read() hook. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Kees Cook Cc: David Howells Cc: Matthew Garrett Cc: Casey Schaufler Changelog v1: - Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for security_kernel_read_file(). --- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/kexec.c | 11 +++++++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 63030c85ee19..26f6d85903ed 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); +int security_kexec_load(void); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags); int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); @@ -922,6 +923,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, return 0; } +static inline int security_kexec_load(void) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index aed8fb2564b3..6b44b0e9a60b 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -195,11 +196,21 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, unsigned long flags) { + int result; + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; /* + * Allow LSMs and IMA to differentiate between kexec_load and + * kexec_file_load syscalls. + */ + result = security_kexec_load(); + if (result < 0) + return result; + + /* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions. */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..0f3390000156 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1044,6 +1044,12 @@ int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); +int security_kexec_load() +{ + return security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kexec_load); + int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) {