From patchwork Sat Aug 3 06:08:15 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13752289 Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5D1E38DD9; Sat, 3 Aug 2024 06:17:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1722665874; cv=none; b=G+ty1xV4Po7vyxYH/KzHsyF4X4m3zvq3TrBtkwQN8H7qG940Rg0L2gA4WITf23nzgJhGXFwxONknQSohJJ8Fwj0M4IOxWq6PU9zelFISj723HAj6e5+C5eA2jAF4Gmtyq+uzbjK7Ka0NDSl9C5PK38GRRAVkjauPcG7/na+HnF4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1722665874; c=relaxed/simple; bh=u6HgDRZ6v5f5+Yu/8SEw3UBBfrUKtxd5Oi+ez/79q2c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=nSjOaM0z+8ZpkGByCiXFrEv2/eCNwqoRHwwkyATmiVMVxATAStCMqHFdTH6+zemkt/NBkS9r04WxsYA2c/UOJnHcjcmu+szBnqYVEueQRyExq2xeYF0yuHcxAiv+/LuI9GxoNnNK5KALlqjaXU/Au3sLIIpVxL/eXQxjwBBB/PU= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=r0mpTIIq; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="r0mpTIIq" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 1BD4720B7127; Fri, 2 Aug 2024 23:08:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 1BD4720B7127 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1722665320; bh=bG5XZZCTKgsgqwjeOuaQEgdamtNgwLgy8mjap89B3lg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=r0mpTIIqIr0H4nf4vyI/hmRBjdNcD8l+YiH38db8bwHAOVO5nVRa10SuPluPiiv1b g8A7TRhlRNEvLYV4DyCXU4ve+kpvLcxNjudlUh+bHFjshmNV57hSdrn7fn+SKYJ+aC +3Iadp4rEzOFAaOv5NUIScOFnuBgGKVZWnS7kWwI= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, mpatocka@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 23:08:15 -0700 Message-Id: <1722665314-21156-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1722665314-21156-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1722665314-21156-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which resource can be trusted. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for kunit tests in isolation. v8: + Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks. + Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static. v9: + Remove ipe_context for simplification v10: + Add github url v11: + Correct github url + Move ipe before bpf v12: + Switch to use lsm_id instead of string for lsm name v13: + No changes v14: + No changes v15: + Add missing code in tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c v16: + No changes v17: + Add years to license header + Fix code and documentation style issues v18: + No changes v19: + No changes v20: + No changes --- include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + security/Kconfig | 11 ++--- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 ++++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 9 ++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 16 +++++++ security/security.c | 3 +- .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 ++ 9 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index 33d8c9f4aa6b..938593dfd5da 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 #define LSM_ID_IMA 111 #define LSM_ID_EVM 112 +#define LSM_ID_IPE 113 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 412e76f1575d..9fb8f9b14972 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -231,11 +232,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 59f238490665..cc0982214b84 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4875fb04883 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5486398a69e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8d4ea372873e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include + +#include "ipe.h" + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { +}; + +static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { + .name = "ipe", + .id = LSM_ID_IPE, +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { +}; + +/** + * ipe_init() - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the + * builtin boot policy. + * + * Return: + * * %0 - OK + * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory (OOM) + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid); + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..adc3c45e9f53 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_H +#define _IPE_H + +#ifdef pr_fmt +#undef pr_fmt +#endif +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ipe: " fmt + +#include + +#endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8cee5b6c6e6d..8218c745d5e2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c index 06d24d4679a6..1cc8a977c711 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c @@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules) case LSM_ID_EVM: name = "evm"; break; + case LSM_ID_IPE: + name = "ipe"; + break; default: name = "INVALID"; break;