@@ -128,9 +128,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
struct evm_hmac_ng_data *hmac_ng_data;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_ng_data *digsig_ng_data;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
int rc, xattr_len;
+ u64 flags;
if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
return iint->evm_status;
@@ -209,6 +211,30 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
+ case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG_NG:
+ digsig_ng_data = (struct evm_ima_xattr_ng_data *)xattr_data;
+ flags = be64_to_cpu(digsig_ng_data->hdr.flags);
+
+ rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len, flags, calc.digest);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
+ (const char *)&digsig_ng_data->sig,
+ xattr_len-sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_ng_hdr),
+ calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
+ if (!rc) {
+ /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
+ * not immutable
+ */
+ if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
+ !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
+ evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
+ xattr_value,
+ xattr_value_len,
+ evm_default_flags);
+ }
+ break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
EVM_XATTR_HMAC_NG,
+ EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG_NG,
IMA_XATTR_LAST
};
@@ -113,6 +114,11 @@ struct evm_hmac_ng_data {
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
+struct evm_ima_xattr_ng_data {
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_ng_hdr hdr;
+ struct signature_v2_hdr sig;
+} __packed;
+
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
As a companion to EVM: Add an hmac_ng xattr format add an equivalent format for digital signatures, identical to the previous format but with an additional 64 bits of information about which metadata was used to generate the signature. This allows for distributing digital signatures that protect the metadata without having to include the inode number (something that's not known in advance) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)