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+============
+Digest Lists
+============
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+============
+
+IMA is a security module with the objective of reporting or enforcing the
+integrity of a system, by measuring files accessed with the execve(),
+mmap() and open() system calls. For reporting, it takes advantage of the
+TPM and extends a PCR with the digest of an evaluated event. For enforcing,
+it returns a value which is zero if the operation should be allowed,
+negative if it should be denied.
+
+Measuring files of an operating system introduces three main issues. First,
+since the overhead introduced by the TPM is noticeable, the performance of
+the system decreases linearly with the number of measurements taken. This
+can be seen especially at boot time. Second, managing large measurement
+lists requires computation power and network bandwidth. Third, it is
+necessary to obtain reference measurements (i.e. digests of software known
+to be good) to evaluate/enforce the integrity of the system. If file
+signatures are used to enforce access, Linux distribution vendors have to
+modify their building systems in order to include signatures in their
+packages.
+
+Digest lists aim at mitigating these issues. A digest list is a list of
+digests that are taken by IMA as reference measurements and loaded before
+files are accessed. Then, IMA compares calculated digests of accessed files
+with digests from loaded digest lists. If the digest is found, measurement,
+appraisal and audit are not performed.
+
+Multiple digest lists can be loaded at the same time, by providing to IMA
+metadata for each list: digest, signature and path. The digest is specified
+so that loaded digest lists can be identified only with the measurement of
+metadata. The signature is used for appraisal. If the verification
+succeeds, IMA loads the digest list even if security.ima is missing.
+
+Digest lists address the first issue because the TPM is used only if the
+digest of a measured file is unknown. On a minimal system, 10 of 1400
+measurements are unknown because of mutable files (e.g. log files).
+
+Digest lists mitigate the second issue because, since digest lists do not
+change, they don't have to be sent at every remote attestation. Sending
+unknown measurements and a reference to digest lists would be sufficient.
+
+Finally, digest lists address also the third issue because Linux
+distribution vendors already provide the digests of files included in each
+RPM package. The digest list is stored in the RPM header, signed by the
+vendor.
+
+When using digest lists, a limitation must be considered. Since a
+measurement is not reported if the digest of an accessed file is found in a
+digest list, the measurement list does not show which files have been
+actually accessed, and in which sequence.
+
+A possible solution would be to load a list with digest of files which are
+usually accessed. Also, it is possible to selectively enable digest list
+lookup only for a subset of IMA policy rules. For example, a policy could
+enable digest lookup only for file accesses from the TCB and disable it
+for execve() and mmap() from regular users.
+
+
+
+SETUP
+=====
+
+Digest lists should be placed in the /etc/ima/digest_lists directory and
+metadata should be written to /etc/ima/digest_lists/metadata.
+
+If digest lists are included in the initial ram disk, IMA will load them
+early in the boot process. Otherwise, a patched systemd can check if the
+file with digest list metadata exists in the filesystem and, if yes, send
+the path to IMA through the 'digest_lists' securityfs interface. The main
+use case for the patched systemd is to load digest lists of newly installed
+packages, which are not included in the initial ram disk.
+
+
+
+FORMATS
+=======
+
+The format of digest list metadata is:
+
+algo[2]
+digest_len[4] digest[digest_len]
+signature_len[4] signature[signature_len]
+path_len[4] path[path_len]
+ref_id_len[4] ref_id[ref_id_len]
+list_type[2]
+
+algo and list_type are in little endian.
+
+algo values are defined in include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h. The algorithms
+in the list metadata must be the same of ima_hash_algo (algorithm used by
+IMA to calculate the file digest).
+
+list type values:
+
+0: compact digest list
+1: RPM package header
+
+
+The format of the compact digest list is:
+
+entry_id[2] count[4] data_len[4]
+data[data_len]
+[...]
+entry_id[2] count[4] data_len[4]
+data[data_len]
+
+entry_id, count and data_len are in little endian.
+
+entry_id can have values 0 or 1. If entry_id is 0, files with provided
+digests are immutable. If entry_id is 1, files are mutable. 'data' contains
+'count' digests concatenated together.
+
+For example, a compact digest list with 10 SHA256 digests will look like:
+
+0 10 320
+digest1..digest10
+
+
+
+MEASUREMENT LIST
+================
+
+If IMA loads the digest lists from the initial ram disk, the measurement
+list should look like:
+
+10 <template digest> ima-ng sha1:<digest> boot_aggregate
+10 <template digest> ima-ng sha1:<digest> /etc/ima/digest_lists/metadata
+
+For the integrity evaluation, metadata and digest lists must be provided to
+verifiers. The digest of digest lists must be compared with the digest
+included in the metadata, and the digest of metadata with the digest in the
+measurement list.
+
+
+
+APPRAISAL
+=========
+
+Appraisal verification consists on comparing the calculated digest of an
+accessed file with the value of the security.ima extended attribute. With
+digest lists, appraisal verification succeeds if the calculated digest is
+included in a list. Since the digital signature of each digest list is
+verified, it is not possible to allow access of unauthorized files.
+
+For mutable files, IMA writes the current digest to security.ima so that
+next file accesses are allowed even if the files have been modified. For
+immutable files, IMA writes security.ima only if also additional extended
+attributes should be protected by EVM. Otherwise, security.ima would be
+redundant, as digest lists provide reference values.
+
+When IMA writes security.ima, EVM calculates the HMAC based on the current
+value of protected extended attributes. Without file signatures, initial
+extended attribute values will not checked until digest lists include them.
+When extended attribute values are available, IMA will check them as the
+same as the digest, and will not write security.ima for immutable files if
+values are provided for all extended attributes protected by EVM.
This patch adds the documentation of digest lists. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 161 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt