Message ID | 20171204195456.17193-1-bmeneguele@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On 04-12, Bruno E. O. Meneguele wrote: > Simple but useful message log to the user in case of module appraise is > forced and fails due to the lack of file descriptor, that might be > caused by kmod calls to compressed modules. > > Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <bmeneguele@gmail.com> > --- Oh sorry, I sent through my personal email configuration! Sorry for that. Self NACK here, I'll repost a v2 with the correct signed-off and From fields. Thanks! > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++++- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 770654694efc..95ec39910058 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -366,8 +366,12 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > > if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { > if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && > - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) > + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file \ > + descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might \ > + help\n"); > return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > + } > return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ > } > return 0; > -- > 2.14.3 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 770654694efc..95ec39910058 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -366,8 +366,12 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file \ + descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might \ + help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0;
Simple but useful message log to the user in case of module appraise is forced and fails due to the lack of file descriptor, that might be caused by kmod calls to compressed modules. Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <bmeneguele@gmail.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)