| Message ID | 20181116200712.14154-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal | expand |
On Fri, 2018-11-16 at 18:07 -0200, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: > Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a > SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean > "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real > size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. > > The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the > definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. > > So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from > the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the > element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a > digest. > > A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of > evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that > definition. , specifically the EVM HMAC code. > > Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Other than commenting the evm_xattr usage is limited to HMAC before the structure definition, this looks good. Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > index 7f3f54d89a6e..a1b42d10efc7 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c > @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, > /* check value type */ > switch (xattr_data->type) { > case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: > - if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { > + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { > evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; > goto out; > } > @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, > xattr_value_len, &digest); > if (rc) > break; > - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, > + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (rc) > rc = -EINVAL; > @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, > const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, > struct xattr *evm_xattr) > { > - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; > + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; > int rc; > > if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) > @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, > if (!xattr_data) > return -ENOMEM; > > - xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; > + xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; > rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); > if (rc < 0) > goto out; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index deec1804a00a..8bcef90939f8 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > return sig->hash_algo; > break; > case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: > - ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; > + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ > + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; > if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) > return ret; > break; > @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > /* this is for backward compatibility */ > if (xattr_len == 21) { > unsigned int zero = 0; > - if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) > + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) > return HASH_ALGO_MD5; > else > return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > @@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous > version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 > */ > - rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], > + rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], > iint->ima_hash->digest, > iint->ima_hash->length); > else > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > index e60473b13a8d..20ac02bf1b84 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { > > struct evm_ima_xattr_data { > u8 type; > + u8 data[]; > +} __packed; > + Please add a comment here saying that evm_xattr is limited to HMAC. > +struct evm_xattr { > + struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; > u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; > } __packed; >
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 7f3f54d89a6e..a1b42d10efc7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: - if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, &digest); if (rc) break; - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; - xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index deec1804a00a..8bcef90939f8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return sig->hash_algo; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: - ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ret; break; @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, /* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len == 21) { unsigned int zero = 0; - if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) return HASH_ALGO_MD5; else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; @@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index e60473b13a8d..20ac02bf1b84 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { struct evm_ima_xattr_data { u8 type; + u8 data[]; +} __packed; + +struct evm_xattr { + struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed;
Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest. A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)