diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 12e9ec6847b5..3539a159a7ac 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -240,8 +240,10 @@ void ima_measure_queued_keys(void);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
-		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
-		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags, int *pcr,
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		     char **keyrings);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index f614e22bf39f..f488d1cead79 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
  *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
  *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE
+ *      | KEYRING_CHECK
  *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
@@ -190,7 +191,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
-				template_desc);
+				template_desc, NULL);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 89b83194d1dc..5bed19be0f6a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 
 	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
-				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
+				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0cc49f2d5233..b972a32ccb1b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 #define IMA_PCR		0x0100
 #define IMA_FSNAME	0x0200
+#define IMA_KEYRINGS	0x0400
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
+	char *keyrings; /* Keyrings to measure */
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };
 
@@ -476,6 +478,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
  * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
+ * @keyrings: keyrings for this rule, if specified
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -486,7 +489,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
-		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc)
+		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
+		     char **keyrings)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -518,6 +522,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
 			*pcr = entry->pcr;
 
+		if ((keyrings) && (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS))
+			*keyrings = entry->keyrings;
+
 		if (template_desc && entry->template)
 			*template_desc = entry->template;
 		else if (template_desc)
@@ -761,7 +768,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, Opt_err
 };
 
 static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -796,6 +803,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
 	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
+	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -959,6 +967,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
 				entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEYRING_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = KEYRING_CHECK;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
@@ -1011,6 +1021,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			result = 0;
 			entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
 			break;
+		case Opt_keyrings:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "keyrings", args[0].from);
+
+			if ((entry->keyrings) ||
+			    (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
+			    (entry->func != KEYRING_CHECK)) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			entry->keyrings = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!entry->keyrings) {
+				result = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			result = 0;
+			entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS;
+			break;
 		case Opt_fsuuid:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
 
@@ -1371,6 +1398,15 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, " ");
 	}
 
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_KEYRINGS) {
+		if (entry->keyrings != NULL)
+			snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->keyrings);
+		else
+			snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", "All keyrings");
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_keyrings), tbuf);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
 		snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
