From patchwork Sat Nov 9 19:00:32 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11236101 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A74CF14E5 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8816521924 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726681AbfKITBE (ORCPT ); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:01:04 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:27208 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726730AbfKITBD (ORCPT ); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:01:03 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098409.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id xA9Iv03Q050484 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:01:02 -0500 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2w5smwetub-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Sat, 09 Nov 2019 14:01:02 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:00 -0000 Received: from b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.26.192) by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.134) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:56 -0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xA9J0JwL38207828 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:19 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98FC552050; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:54 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20AA85204E; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:52 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v8 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:00:32 -0600 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19110919-0016-0000-0000-000002C23D10 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19110919-0017-0000-0000-00003323C7BD Message-Id: <20191109190032.96259-5-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911090193 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Eric Richter --- security/integrity/Kconfig | 9 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 4 +- .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 0bae6adb63a9..71f0177e8716 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS depends on S390 def_bool y +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + default y + help + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 351c9662994b..7ee39d66cf16 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o - +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..99ddc2ed59e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "keyring_handler.h" + +/* + * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable. + */ +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, uint64_t *size) +{ + int rc; + void *db; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!db) + return NULL; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size); + if (rc) { + kfree(db); + pr_err("Error reading %s var: %d\n", key, rc); + return NULL; + } + + return db; +} + +/* + * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted + * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist + * keyring. + */ +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) +{ + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; + uint64_t dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + int rc = 0; + struct device_node *node; + + if (!secvar_ops) + return -ENODEV; + + /* The following only applies for the edk2-compat backend. + * Return early if it is not set. + */ + + node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,edk2-compat-v1"); + if (!node) + return -ENODEV; + + /* Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't + * an error if we can't get them. + */ + db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize); + if (!db) { + pr_err("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db", db, dbsize, + get_handler_for_db); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(db); + } + + dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 4, &dbxsize); + if (!dbx) { + pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx", dbx, dbxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(dbx); + } + + of_node_put(node); + + return rc; +} +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);